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ART. I. — *A Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion.*
By THEODORE PARKER. Boston: Little & Brown.
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IN our last Review, we established the fact, that the Transcendentalists assume, as their rule of faith or method of philosophizing, the truth and rectitude of human nature; that man in his spontaneous or instinctive nature, which we identified with the inferior or sensitive soul, is the measure or criterion of truth and goodness; and therefore, that, in order to ascertain what is proper for us to believe or to do, we have only to ascertain what our nature spontaneously or instinctively approves. We now proceed to consider the second fundamental principle we have charged them with maintaining, namely, —

RELIGION IS A FACT OR PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN NATURE.

IN strictness, perhaps, the Transcendentalists do not mean to assert that religion itself is a fact or principle of human nature, but simply, that it has its principle and cause in human nature; and, consequently, this second principle might be resolved into the third principle we enumerated, namely, All the religions which have been or are have their principle and cause in human nature. It is possible that we should have been more strictly scientific in our analysis, if we had omitted the second proposition altogether, and embraced the whole teachings of the school within the first and third. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the second proposition is true, and includes a portion of the teachings of the school, which we could not, without some inconvenience, discuss otherwise than under a separate head.

The word *religion* may be taken, and is taken by the Transcendentalists in several senses. They use the word, — 1. To embrace religious institutions ; that is, dogmas, morals, and worship. In this sense, they do not hold it to be a fact or principle of human nature ; but they hold that it grows out of such fact or principle. But, 2. These religious institutions do not constitute what, in their view, is essential in religion. They are not its substance, but its forms and accidents, and we may have all that is essential to it without them, and even in opposition to them. What is essential in religion, if we understand them, is what is invariable and permanent, the same in all ages and nations, and in all individuals, — which is the religious *sentiment* and *idea* ; and both of these they make facts or principles of human nature. Yet the teachings of the school are so vague and contradictory on this head, that it is not possible to reduce them to a common principle. It does not appear to have ever distinguished clearly, in its own mind, between the creator and creation, between the active or passive subject and action or passion ; nor, again, between intuitive reason and discursive reason. It frequently puts causes for effects, and effects for causes ; and just as frequently runs the one into the other, and concludes indifferently from one or the other, without noting any distinction between them. It affirms a proposition to be intuitive, when it is evidently inductive ; and tells us that it is given us immediately, when according to its own showing it is obtained only by reasoning. If any one doubts our assertion, we refer him to the first and second chapters of the *Discourse* before us.

In consequence of this contradiction and confusion, and in order to avoid even the appearance of injustice to the school, we shall, for the most part, in what we have to say, treat the proposition under consideration simply as if it stood, Religion originates spontaneously in, and depends upon, a fact or principle of human nature.

We must bear in mind that the Transcendental doctrine is not, that from the facts or principles of human nature we may rationally, scientifically, conclude to the objective truths of religion ; but that these truths *are given us immediately*, without any reasoning at all, by a special fact, principle, or element of our nature. Religion is natural to us ; we are religious by a law of our nature ; in like manner as it is by a law of our nature that we breathe, that the stomach secretes the gastric juice, or the liver, bile. In a word, religion is a natural secretion of the human soul. That the Transcendentalists adhere throughout

to this statement we are far from pretending ; for it is well known that they are not remarkable for self-consistency, and some of them consider it a mark of littleness for a man to aim at being consistent with himself. Their maxim is, Speak out from the great soul, or, rather, let the great soul speak out, and as it will. Nevertheless, this is their formal, official doctrine, to which we shall insist on our right to hold them.

The Transcendentalists begin by distinguishing between religion and religious institutions. Religious institutions are the forms with which man clothes his religious sentiment and idea. They vary according to time and space, and in passing from one individual to another. They are accidental and transitory. They may serve a useful purpose, or they may not ; but they are not of the essence or substance of religion. Religion, in its substance, lies back of these, and is their creator, and independent of them. In this sense, as abstracted from religious forms and institutions, religion is, as we have said, sentiment and idea. The sentiment is a special element of human nature, and is defined by Mr. Parker, after Schleiermacher, to be “the *sense of dependence*.” The idea is “an intuition of reason,” not obtained by reasoning, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, but “is a fact given by the nature of man.” — p. 21. Hence religion, in its absolute sense, or what Mr. Parker calls absolute religion, is said to be religion as it exists in the facts of human nature, or “in the facts of man’s soul.” — p. 243. According to this, we should be justified in insisting, to the very letter, on the proposition, that the Transcendentalists hold religion to be a fact or principle of human nature. But it is probable, after all, that they do not mean this, that they in this put the effect in the place of the cause, and really mean only that the origin and ground of religion is in a special element of human nature.

“We are driven to confess,” says Mr. Parker, “that there is in man a spiritual nature, which directly and legitimately leads to religion ; that, as man’s body is connected with the world of matter, rooted in it, has bodily wants, bodily senses to minister thereto, and a fund of external materials wherewith to gratify these senses and appease these wants, — so man’s soul is connected with the world of spirit, rooted in God, has spiritual wants and spiritual senses, and a fund of materials wherewith to gratify these spiritual senses, and to appease these spiritual wants. If this be so, then do not religious institutions come equally from man ? Now the existence of a religious element in us is not a matter of haz-

ardous or random conjecture, nor attested only by a superficial glance at the history of man, but this principle is found out, and its existence demonstrated, in several legitimate ways. Thus, then, it appears that induction from notorious facts, consciousness spontaneously active, and a philosophical analysis of man's nature, all lead equally to *some religious sentiment or principle as an essential part of man's constitution*. It is, indeed, abundantly established that there is a *religious element in man*." — *Discourse*, pp. 14 – 19.

The main point asserted in this loosely written passage is the fact, that religious institutions spring from a special religious sentiment, element, or principle of human nature, and "which is an *essential* part of man's constitution." This is the first point to be disposed of. What are the proofs of this? These proofs, so far as we can collect them from Mr. Parker and others, are, 1. The existence of religious phenomena in human history; 2. The universality and indestructibility of the religious phenomena; 3. The power of religion over our thoughts, passions, and interests; 4. Consciousness; 5. Philosophical analysis of man's nature.

1. The existence of religious phenomena in human history is unquestionable, and this existence proves that they have a principle and cause in man, or *out of him*; but to infer that this principle and cause are a special element of human nature is a plain begging of the question, — at least, cannot be justifiable, unless it be first established that there is and can be nothing in human history which has not its principle and cause in human nature, — a proposition which may, indeed, be asserted, but not maintained, as we shall show when we come to discuss the third fundamental proposition of the Transcendentalists. The history of the human race is inexplicable, save on the supposition of the supernatural intervention of Providence in human affairs.

2. The religious phenomena are universal and indestructible, we admit. Wherever you find man, you find the altar, the priest, and the victim, — at least some sort of religious worship. But this simply proves that religion does not spring from accidental and temporary causes, but from a universal and permanent principle. Yet that principle may be divine as well as human; for God, to say the least, is as universal and permanent a principle and cause as man.

3. The great power of religion in all ages is freely conceded. It is able to control man in his most intimate rela-

tions, — to control his thoughts and passions, — to make him forego his strongest desires, his dearest affections, and his most pressing interests, — to make him submit to what is most repugnant to his nature, to glory in being condemned, and to sacrifice himself with joy at its bidding. But this, though conclusive against those who contend that religion is the mere creature of human passion, caprice, fear, hope, ignorance, imagination, or interest, says nothing in favor of its origin and ground in a principle or element of human nature. Indeed, it is rather a presumption that it has its origin and ground in that which is superhuman and independent of man. For it is hard to conceive how that which originates in man, and depends wholly on man, should be able to control him, and make him voluntarily abnegate himself.

4. Mr. Parker alleges that we are conscious of our own insufficiency, and that this consciousness is the consciousness of a religious element in our nature. It is true, he does not say this formally, but this is what he is required to say by the line of argument he is pursuing.

“We feel conscious,” he says, “of this element within us. We are not sufficient for ourselves; not self-originated; not self-sustained. A few years ago and we were not; a few years hence and our bodies shall not be. A mystery is gathered about our little life. We have but small control over things around us; are limited and hemmed in on all sides. Our schemes fail. Our plans miscarry. One after another our lights go out. Our realities prove dreams. Our hopes waste away. We are not where we would be, nor what we would be. After much experience, men as powerful as Napoleon, victorious as Cæsar, confess, what simpler men knew by instinct long before, that it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps. We find our circumference very near the centre, everywhere. An exceedingly short radius measures all our strength. We can know little of material things; nothing but phenomena. As the circle of our knowledge widens its ring, we feel our ignorance on more numerous points, and the unknown seems greater than before. At the end of a toilsome life, we confess, with a great man of modern times, that we have wandered on the shore, and gathered here a bright pebble, and there a shining shell, — but the ocean of truth, shoreless and unfathomed, lies before us and *all unknown*. The wisest ancient knew only this, that he knew nothing. We feel an irresistible tendency to refer all outward things, and ourselves with them, to a power beyond us, sublime, mysterious, which we cannot measure, nor even comprehend. We are filled with reverence at the

thought of this power. Outward matters give us the occasion which awakens consciousness, and spontaneous nature leads us to something higher than ourselves and greater than all eyes behold. We are bowed down at the thought. Thus the sentiment of something superhuman comes naturally as breath. This primitive spiritual sensation comes over the soul, when a sudden calamity throws us from our habitual state; when joy fills our cup to its brim; at a wedding or a funeral, a mourning or a festival; when we stand beside a great work of nature, a mountain, a waterfall; when the twilight gloom of a primitive forest sends awe into the heart; when we sit alone with ourselves and turn in the eye, and ask, What am I? Whence come I? Whither shall I go? There is no man who has not felt this sensation, this mysterious sentiment of something unbounded." — *Discourse*, pp. 16, 17.

Ergo, we are conscious of a special religious element which is an essential part of man's constitution; *ergo*, again, the religious phenomena depend on a fact or principle of human nature!

We have inserted this passage because it is a favorable specimen of Mr. Parker's style and method of argumentation. In reading it, one is led to ask, Is the writer of this, who allows man the ability only to know that he knows nothing, the same man who sneers at the notion of supernatural revelation, — who assumes to sit in judgment on all ages and nations, on even our blessed Saviour himself, — who contends that man has an intuitive knowledge of God, and bears about with him absolute religion as the standard by which to try even the Christian religion itself, — and who tells us we may and ought "to approach the Infinite One face to face"? — p. 5. It is a great convenience to be freed from the necessity of maintaining consistency in one's own views.

But this is foreign to our present purpose. The point Mr. Parker was required to establish in this passage was, that we are conscious that the religious element, for which he contends, is an element or principle of our nature. "We feel this element within us." Does he prove this? Not at all. He simply proves that there are facts in all men's experience which prove that we are not sufficient for ourselves, and that, finding we are not sufficient for ourselves, we are very naturally led to ask if there is not a power above us. All this may be very true, but is nothing to his purpose. For, 1. He makes the fact of our own insufficiency a deduction from certain other facts which he enumerates and to which we

come by experience ; whereas, the fact of our insufficiency should, on his ground, be a fact of immediate consciousness, arrived at without any aid of discursive reason at all. 2. The consciousness of our own insufficiency, according to the paragraph quoted, does not of itself give us religion, or the objects of religion. It does not give us God immediately, but is simply a fact from which we are led to ask if there be not a God, or, at most, from which we *infer* there is and must be something above and beyond us. But his doctrine is not that we may rationally conclude from the facts of our nature to the existence of God and the necessity or propriety of religion, but that religion is given immediately, without any process of reasoning, by a special law, element, or principle of our nature, bearing the same or an analogous relation to spiritual objects that the bodily senses do to material objects. Admit, therefore, that we are conscious of our own insufficiency, and that we may rationally conclude from this insufficiency to the existence of a power that is all-sufficient, this does not prove that we have a special religious element,—far less, that we are conscious of the existence of such element. 3. Even assuming that we are conscious, immediately conscious, which is more than Mr. Parker proves, of our own insufficiency, it does not follow that we are conscious of the religious element ; for our insufficiency is not an element or principle of our nature. An element or principle of nature is something positive, constitutive of that nature ; but insufficiency is a mere negation, and is not included in what our nature is, but in what it is not. Consciousness of it, therefore, is not, and cannot be, consciousness of an element within us, or an element of our nature, “an essential part of our constitution.”

5. According to Mr. Parker, philosophical analysis of man's nature gives us the element in question. This analysis, in his hands, gives us the sense of dependence ; and the sense of dependence, in the last analysis, he tells us, is the religious element. But philosophical analysis cannot give us the *sense* of dependence as an element or principle of nature, for the best of all reasons,—because it is not and cannot be such element or principle. The *sense* of dependence is a fact of human life or experience,—not a fact, element, or principle of human nature. That our nature is dependent is a fact, but not an element or principle of that nature, for the same reason that insufficiency is not such element or principle. The word *sense* is, or may be, ambiguous. When we say *sense* of sight or

hearing, we mean a principle, or rather power or faculty, of human nature. But we cannot use the word in this sense, when we say *sense* of dependence, any more than when we say *sense* of danger. Sense in this case is not a power or faculty, is not an element or principle of nature, but a simple fact of experience. It means simply, that we mentally apprehend, perceive, or are conscious of the fact that we are dependent. It is an intellectual fact, a product of the activity of the intelligent subject, not an element of its nature. Consequently, it is idle to pretend, that, if the religious element be rightly defined the sense of dependence, it is an element or principle of our nature.

But Mr. Parker, though he officially defines the religious element to be the sense of dependence, tells us that he is not tenacious of that definition. "Others," he says, "may call it the *consciousness of the infinite* ; I contend less for the analysis than for the fact of a religious element in man." — p. 18, note. But, my dear Sir, how, unless you tell us what you mean by this religious element, are we to determine whether you have proved it to be an element of man's nature or not ? We cannot allow you to write thus loosely. You affirm that there is a religious element in man, and that philosophical analysis of man's nature can detect it. If you have not determined what this element is, if you know not its characteristic, how do you know philosophical analysis can detect it ? We hold you to your definition, or to the alternative you give us. According to you, it is the sense of dependence, or, at least, the consciousness of the infinite. The first it cannot be, and, if held to that, you are evidently wrong. We will give you the advantage of the second, but we will give you no other advantage. Say, then, the ultimate principle of religion is the "consciousness of the infinite." The infinite is not an element or principle of man's nature, for man's nature is finite. Consciousness is not a principle of nature at all, but simply the act or state of being conscious. It is a fact of life, not an element of nature. Consequently, the consciousness of the infinite, even admitting it to be a fact of our intellectual life, is no more, than the sense of dependence, an element or principle of human nature.

But perhaps we shall be told that it is not contended, strictly speaking, that the consciousness of the infinite is an element or principle of human nature, but that we are conscious of the infinite by virtue of a special principle or power

of our nature. This is, we suppose, the real doctrine of the Transcendentalists. Hence, Mr. Parker contends that we have spiritual senses, and that the idea of God is an intuition of reason. They question the unity of the intelligent principle in man, and seem to lay down the doctrine, that our knowledge does not differ objectively only, but subjectively also, — that we know one class of objects by virtue of one subjective intelligent power or principle, and another class by another. It is this doctrine which misleads them and involves them in the greater part of their errors and absurdities. But this doctrine we have refuted in our last Review, as well as on several previous occasions. The faculty of intelligence is not complex, but simple. It may have various degrees and conditions, but in itself is one and the same, whatever the degree or sphere of knowledge. The subjective power, by which I know an object to be a tree or a house, is one and the same with the power by which I know the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that I ought to love my neighbour as myself. Consciousness is nothing but a peculiar modification of knowing, and is the same subjectively considered, whatever the object of which I am conscious. If, then, I am conscious of the infinite, I am conscious of it by my general power of consciousness, and this consciousness differs from any other consciousness only in so far as its object is different.

Strictly speaking, however, to say I am conscious of the infinite is absurd ; for I can be conscious only of myself as the subject of my own phenomena, whether voluntary, sentient, or intellectual. The fact of consciousness is restricted by all accurate psychologists to the recognition of myself, as subject in the intellectual phenomenon to which Leibnitz gives the name of *apperception*. In every act I perform, that is, in every *actus humanus*, I always recognize myself as subject or actor, as distinguished both from the act and the object to which I act. This recognition is the fact of consciousness, and the only fact to which the term is ever rightly applied. Consequently, to say I am conscious of the infinite is to affirm my own infinity, which is false and absurd. Instead of saying we are conscious of the infinite, we should say we perceive, or mentally apprehend, the infinite, — that is, the infinite is an object of our knowledge, or, in other words, we know the infinite.

But waiving these remarks on consciousness, which are conclusive in themselves, we deny that the consciousness of the

infinite is an element or principle of our nature, for the simple reason, that we have no consciousness of the infinite. The infinite is conceived, but it is no object of knowledge. Knowledge of the infinite would be infinite knowledge, and infinite knowledge is possible only to an infinite subject, which man is not. Man is finite, and his knowledge is necessarily finite, and therefore limited to the finite.

This is a point we commend to the very serious attention of the Transcendentalists. They seem on many occasions, and when it suits their purpose, to be duly aware of the limited nature of our faculties, and the littleness and emptiness of our knowledge, as we see in the passage quoted from Mr. Parker, in which he is endeavouring to establish the fact of our own insufficiency for ourselves. Yet, with a consistency purely Transcendental, they contend that we may see God face to face, may have intuitive vision of the infinite !

The great endeavour of several of the later German metaphysicians, and of some of our own, as it was with the old Alexandrians, is to find in man's subjective power of cognition a faculty or principle by which he can cognize intrinsically the mysteries of faith. They find mankind believing in certain mysteries, which unquestionably transcend the reach of the ordinary understanding. These are believed, not by the few only, — the *élite* of the race, men of rare genius and cultivation, — but by the simple and uncultivated, — the shepherd watching his flocks, and the rustic following his plough ; and often by these more sincerely and more firmly than by the gifted and enlightened few. Whence is this ? Surely these simple, unlettered, and unreasoning masses have not demonstrated to their own minds the intrinsic truth of these mysteries, and reasoned themselves into the belief of them ; for few, if any, of them can assign even a tolerable reason for their belief, or render any satisfactory account of it. Is this belief a delusion, and is the human race wholly deceived in its faith ? We dare not say it. To say so would be to blaspheme humanity, and, in blaspheming humanity, to blaspheme humanity's Maker. To assume that it is a delusion would be to deny all criterion of truth and falsehood, and to plunge into the ocean of universal doubt. Moreover, it would be anti-philosophical to make such assumption, for it would be to assume the reality of an effect, and a most stupendous effect, without conceding it any actual or even possible cause.

This faith, then, must have a solid and imperishable ground

somewhere. It must be well founded. Hence, say they, there must be in man some principle or faculty, overlooked by philosophers generally, which takes immediate cognizance of the objects of this faith. These objects all are, or imply, the infinite; therefore man must have the subjective power of cognizing the infinite. Therefore the infinite is cognoscible. Therefore the human race believe in the mysteries, because able, by the inherent faculties of the soul, to apprehend intuitively their intrinsic truth.

But what is this power? It is not sense, it is not intellect, it is not reason in its ordinary acceptation, but a faculty *sui generis*, which may indeed be called reason, but which cannot better be defined than by calling it a spiritual sense, or power of apprehending the invisible, of approaching the inapproachable, of knowing the unknowable, of comprehending the incomprehensible, of measuring the immeasurable! It is a mysterious and incomprehensible faculty, like the matters with which it places us in relation. All very intelligible, no doubt, to those who call darkness light, and finite infinite. But what is the evidence of the reality of such faculty? The only ground, it will be seen from our statement, for asserting the reality of such faculty is the well known fact, that mankind do believe, and always have believed, and, in spite of all obstacles, persist in believing, in mysteries whose intrinsic truth transcends both the senses and the understanding. But how could they believe in such mysteries, if they had no power above that of the senses and the understanding, by which their intrinsic truth is apprehended?

In reply, we may simply ask how a man who has never been in China can believe there is such a city as Peking? Assuredly, he does not perceive the intrinsic truth of the proposition, There is a city in China called Peking. Yet he believes it, and *because he has, or believes he has, sufficient EXTERNAL evidence of the fact.* The philosophers in question assume, that, since mankind believe in the mysteries, the intrinsic truth of the mysteries must be apprehended by them, which could not be, unless we had the subjective power of knowing it. But this assumption is unwarrantable; for faith is to believe what is not intrinsically known. The facts adduced only prove the *faith* of mankind in mysteries; and if it be faith, it is not knowledge. Therefore, the fact, that mankind believe in the mysteries, is itself not proof that the intrinsic truth of the mysteries is cognoscible, but that it is not cognoscible; and

therefore the faith of mankind in mysteries which transcend sense and understanding, instead of proving the reality of a subjective power of knowing what transcends sense and understanding, proves, so far as it goes, the reverse ; for, if we had such power, our faith would not be faith, but knowledge.

The philosophers in question assume, as their point of departure, that what is believable is intrinsically cognoscible, and that what is believed is intrinsically known. — an evident falsehood ; for faith ends where knowledge begins, and what is an object of knowledge is not an object of faith, since faith is belief of what is not known. To establish, then, the fact they contend for, these philosophers must go a step further, and prove that mankind do not merely believe the mysteries, but actually know them. If they prove that the mysteries are intrinsically known by the race, then we will admit in the soul the subjective power to know them. But this the facts they adduce do not prove. These facts only prove that mankind believe them, from which we cannot conclude that they know them.

That this faith of the race has a solid and imperishable foundation we readily admit. But because it must have such foundation, it does not necessarily follow that the foundation is in a special faculty of the soul ; for we can conceive the possibility, to say the least, of its being in authority which propounds and evidences them *extrinsically* to the human mind, as religious people contend and always have contended. The philosophers, when they assume the foundation to be in this special subjective faculty, then, merely beg the question. They take for granted the very point the conditions of the argument require them to prove.

Moreover, they reject, in asserting the cognoscibility of the mysteries, the very authority on which their whole reasoning is founded. They infer the solidity of the faith of mankind in the mysteries from the fact, that the race has always believed, and persists in believing in them. But the race, while it has believed the mysteries, has also believed that it did not know their intrinsic truth, and has always confessed that its faith in them *was* faith, not knowledge. Now, if you take the faith of mankind as authority in the one instance, why not in the other ? Assuredly, it is worth as much in the latter case as in the former ; because no man can know without knowing that he knows, and whenever he really believes he does not know, it is certain that he does not. A man may fancy that he knows when he does not, but he cannot fancy that he does not know

when he does. These philosophers, no doubt, are governed by a commendable motive ; but they attempt what is not possible to effect. They would fain give a philosophical basis to the religious faith of mankind. They are far from wishing to overthrow or to weaken that faith ; their ambition is to legitimate it, — not to *prove* it, indeed, by evidence, but to *demonstrate* it, and to bring it within the province of science. But they should remember that what is of science is not of faith, that faith has its object always in a region into which science does not or cannot penetrate. It rests not on demonstration, but on authority, — and may be proved, but never demonstrated. They would fain find in man an element which bears the same relation to it that the sense of sight bears to colors, or the sense of hearing to sounds, and that we attain to its objects as naturally and as simply as we do by our senses to the objects of the material world. But this element they cannot detect ; they assert its reality, but do not and cannot establish it ; for, after all they may say, each man knows of himself that to him the objects of his religious faith, however certainly, infallibly, evidenced, are not known. He believes, without doubting, that they are, — but he does not know them.

This is evident from Mr. Parker himself. To know the mysteries is to know the infinite ; to know the infinite is to know God ; and God, according to Mr. Parker, “ is the substantiality of matter.” — p. 170. And yet he says, in the passage we have quoted, “ We can know little of material things ; nothing but their phenomena.” That is, the substance of things we cannot know. Yet, since God is this substance, “ substantiality,” we could know something more than their phenomena, we could know even their substance, if we could know God. Let it not be replied to us, that Mr. Parker has told us elsewhere, that we may know God, that we may approach the Infinite One face to face ; for, if he unhappily contradicts himself, that is not our fault. He says, formally, that we can know nothing of material things but their phenomena, — also that God is the substantiality of matter, and if of matter, of course of material things. To this we hold him. The truth here got the better of his theorizing, and the man had the courage to tell it. It is idle to talk of man’s power to cognize the infinite, to behold God intuitively, while you tell me that such is the limited nature of man’s faculties, that even in material things he takes notice only of phenomena. In this last, Mr. Parker is right. We know only phenomena ; and substances,

essences, only as we by reason infer them from the phenomena. Hence, in the Blessed Eucharist, though my senses, my own faculties, show me only the phenomena or the accidents of bread and wine, I am still able to believe, under those accidents, under those phenomena, there is no substance of bread, no substance of wine, but the substance of the body and blood, soul and divinity of my Lord and Saviour.

But, however this may be, it is evident, from what we have said, that, whether we define the ultimate fact in religion to be the sense of dependence, or a consciousness of the infinite, it is not, and cannot be, an element of nature. Neither notorious facts, nor consciousness, nor philosophical analysis of man's nature proves Mr. Parker's position, that religion has its principle and cause in an element of human nature.

But we go still further, and deny the existence of religious phenomena themselves, in the sense in which Mr. Parker and the Transcendentalists assert them. They contend that the so-called religious phenomena differ not merely as to their object from all other psychological phenomena, but also as to their subjective principle. This they must do, or else the existence of the phenomena would not warrant the induction of a special element of human nature as their subjective principle. If, for instance, the religious phenomena differ from the other phenomena only as to their object, then their existence would imply no special element in the soul in which they subjectively originate.

Now, we demand the proof of the existence of religious phenomena that are subjectively distinct from other phenomena not denominated religious. Mr. Parker defines the ultimate fact of religion to be a *sense* of dependence, that is, mental perception or apprehension of the fact that we are dependent. Is this sense or apprehension, *quoad* sense, essentially different from the sense or apprehension of other facts? Or take the other definition, consciousness of the infinite, — is this consciousness, as consciousness, regarded solely in relation to the conscient agent, different from consciousness in any other case? If not, how can Mr. Parker allege that we have in this sense religious phenomena specifically distinct, on the side of their subjective principle, from all other phenomena presented in human history?

In the passage quoted above from Mr. Parker, we find the religious sentiment identified with the sensation we experience “when a sudden calamity overtakes us,” “at a wedding or a

funeral," "by a mountain or a waterfall," "in the twilight gloom of the primitive forest," or in the solitude of our own self-communings. What is there, then, peculiar in the religious sentiment?

The religious phenomena, under the point of view we are now considering them, may, according to Mr. Parker, be classed under three heads; namely, love, reverence, obedience. But love, on its subjective side, is the same, whatever the object to which it is directed. Love to God, save as to its object, is not essentially different from love to our neighbour. Reverence, as simple reverence, is the same whether directed towards one object or another. Obedience to God, as obedience, differs not from obedience to the magistrate. Indeed, we are aware of no phenomena which are peculiarly religious, save in the intention with which we exhibit them, and the object for the sake of which we exhibit them. I pray to God; I pray also to man. Prayer is simply asking a favor; and I ask favors of man as well as of God. I sing praises to God, so also to the conquering hero, or to the father of my country; and who dare say that I may not with the same power sing the one praises and the other? I offer sacrifice to God, and ought to offer sacrifice to no other being, because sacrifice is the peculiar, the distinctive, act of divine worship; and yet I can offer sacrifice to an idol, if I choose, and the sacrifice in the one case will not differ *psychologically* from what it is in the other.

If this be so, all this talk about a special religious element of man's nature is — talk, and nothing else. By the faculty of loving wherewith I love man, can I love God; and by the same power by which I sacrifice to the Supreme God, may I, if I choose, sacrifice to idols of wood and stone. The religious phenomena are peculiar, distinct from all the other phenomena man exhibits, we admit, — not because they proceed from a peculiar, distinct, special element of human nature, but because they are exhibited for the sake of a peculiar, distinct, and special end, contemplated in the exhibition of no other class of phenomena. With the same tongue I bless God and curse man; with the same power of will I will good and will evil; with the same intellectual power recognize I a man, a horse, an ox, a tree, a mathematical theorem, a metaphysical principle, and a moral precept. There is, then, no need of assuming a special element of human nature to account for the religious phenomena.

So much for the religious sentiment as an element of human nature. We proceed now to the Idea of religion. The idea is the idea of God ; and this idea, according to Mr. Parker, is not obtained by reasoning *a priori*, or *a posteriori*, but is a primitive fact given us immediately in our nature. Here we let Mr. Parker speak for himself.

“ Now, the existence of this religious element, of this sense of dependence, this sentiment of something without bounds, is itself a proof by implication of the existence of its object, — something on which dependence rests. A belief in this relation between the feeling in us and its object independent of us comes unavoidably from the laws of man’s nature. There is nothing of which we can be more certain. A natural want in man’s constitution implies satisfaction in some quarter, just as the faculty of seeing implies something to correspond to this faculty ; namely, objects to be seen and a medium of light to see by. As the tendency to love implies something lovely for its object, so the religious sentiment implies its object ; if it is regarded as the sense of absolute dependence, it implies the absolute on which this dependence rests, independent of ourselves.

“ Now, spiritual, like bodily faculties, act jointly, and not one at a time ; and when the occasion is given us from without, reason, spontaneously, independent of our forethought and volition, acting by its own laws, gives us by intuition an idea of that on which we depend. To this idea we give the name God, or Gods, as it is represented by one or several separate conceptions. Thus the existence of God is implied by the natural sense of dependence in the religious sentiment itself ; it is expressed by the spontaneous intuition of reason itself.

“ Now, men come to this idea early. It is the logical condition of all other ideas ; without this as an element of our consciousness, or lying latent, as it were, and unrecognized in us, we could have no ideas at all. The senses reveal us something external to the body, and independent thereof, on which it depends ; they tell not what it is. Consciousness reveals something in like manner, — not the soul, but the absolute ground of the soul, on which the soul depends. Outward circumstances furnish the occasion by which we approach and discover the idea of God ; but they do not furnish the idea itself. That is a fact given by the nature of man. Hence, some philosophers have called it an innate idea ; others a reminiscence of what the soul knew in a higher state of life before it took the body. Both opinions may be regarded as rhetorical statements of the truth, that the idea of God is a fact given by man’s nature, and not an invention of ours. The belief, therefore, in God’s existence is natural, not against nature. It comes unavoidably from the legitimate action of reason and the

religious sentiment, just as the belief in light comes from using our eyes, and belief in our existence from mere existence. The knowledge of God's existence, therefore, may be called an intuition of reason, in the language of philosophy; or a revelation from God, in the language of the elder theology.

"If the above statement be correct, then our belief in God's existence does not depend on the *a posteriori* argument, on considerations drawn from the order, fitness, and beauty discovered by observations made in the material world; nor yet on the *a priori* argument, on considerations drawn from the eternal nature of things, and observations made in the spiritual world. It depends primarily on no argument, not on *reasoning*, but *reason*. The fact is given us outright, as it were, and comes to man as soon and as naturally as belief in his own existence, and is, indeed, logically inseparable from it, for we cannot be conscious of ourselves except as *dependent* beings." — *Discourse*, pp. 20 – 23.

This passage is designed expressly to answer the question, How does man come to the idea of God, or how is it that he is in possession of the idea of God, belief in the existence of God, or knowledge of the existence of God? To this question, notwithstanding the looseness of the passage, we may say, two answers are given. 1. The idea of God is a primitive *datum* of our nature, or fact given us in our nature itself. 2. It is an intuitive perception of God, — "given us," as he says in the following page, "by intuition." These two answers Mr. Parker evidently regards as one and the same, and with him a fact given us in our nature and a fact of intuition mean one and the same thing. This shows that he is not far advanced in his philosophy, and that he but imperfectly comprehends the meaning of the words he uses. A fact given us in our nature must, if it mean any thing, mean an essential element or principle of our nature as human nature, the absence of which cannot be conceived without implying the absence or essential change of our nature itself. An intuition is a fact of experience, a simple intellectual act, the immediate perception of an object; that is, perception of an idea or object, without another idea or object as the medium of its perception. And intuition of reason can only mean the immediate perception of an object of reason as distinguished from an object of external sense. Whether in this last sense there are any intuitions of reason, that is, whether we have immediate perception of any non-sensible objects, may be a question, or rather in our mind is no question; but it is certain, that,

if the idea of God be an intuition, it cannot be a fact given us in our nature ; for since it is an act, it must be subsequent to the nature that acts. The intuitive nature, the intuitive subject, must precede it, be independent of it, and complete without it. It requires very little philosophy to know this. Mr. Parker cannot, then, insist on its being both. Which he will decide in favor of we know not ; but we deny that it is either.

1. The idea of God is a fact given us in our nature. By this, we repeat, Mr. Parker does not mean that the idea of God may be merely inferred from a fact or facts of our nature, but that it is itself a fact of our nature ; for he tells us it depends on no argument, no reasoning, but is given us outright in our nature. Now, to this we object (*a.*), that no *idea* can properly, in the sense Mr. Parker uses the term, be considered a fact of nature. Idea must be taken either objectively or subjectively. Taken objectively, as it is by Plato, it means the form or essence of the thing in question, that which distinguishes it from all other things, determines it to be what it is, and is that which, in knowing it, must be the real object known. In this case, the idea is simply the object known, and the idea of God would not be a belief or knowledge of the existence of God, but would be the object of such belief or knowledge. But this is not the sense in which Mr. Parker uses the term ; for we may learn from the passage quoted, that, what in one place he calls the *idea* of God, he in another calls *belief* in the existence of God, and in still another, *knowledge* of the existence of God. He evidently understands the term in a subjective sense, and designates by it a fact in the mind, not the object of that fact. But, subjectively, idea is simply apprehension, notion, or conception of some object existing, or believed to exist, out of the mind. It is, then, a fact of experience, an act performed by the intelligent subject, and therefore cannot be a fact or principle of the intelligent nature itself. If Mr. Parker understands the word subjectively, then idea of God is not a fact given in our nature, any more than is the idea of a horse, a mountain, or a book. If he understands it objectively, then the idea of God is God himself, and cannot be a fact of our nature, unless God himself is a fact of our nature, which not even Mr. Parker will dare assert. So, take the word either objectively or subjectively, it cannot designate a fact given us in our nature itself.

(*b.*) According to Mr. Parker's own account of it, *idea* of

God cannot be a fact given us in our nature, for he makes it depend on the sense of dependence. His assertion is, that the sense of dependence implies it. He himself makes it a deduction from the sense of dependence. "The sense of dependence is a proof by implication," he says, "of something on which dependence rests. . . . A natural want in our constitution implies satisfaction in some quarter. . . . As the tendency to love implies something lovely for its object, so the religious sentiment implies its object." Now, admit, what is not true, that the sense of dependence is a fact, element, or principle of our nature, — the idea of God, which Mr. Parker defines to be "an idea of that on which we depend," is only a deduction, a logical inference, from a fact of our nature. It is obtained only by analyzing the idea of dependence, and drawing forth from it what it logically contains. Consequently, the idea of God cannot be said to be given us outright in our nature, prior to, or independent of, all reasoning.

(c.) But, even admitting that the idea of that on which we depend is given us in the sense of dependence, explicitly, not merely implicitly, — the idea of that, or of a somewhat, on which we depend is not equivalent to the idea of God. To the idea of this, Mr. Parker says, men give the name God. This is not true ; for the idea of God, as the race entertains, and always has entertained it, is the idea of a Supreme Power from which we spring, to which we are subject, and for which — *propter quem* — we are bound to live, which is more than the mere idea of a somewhat on which we depend, which is merely the complement of ourselves. (d.) And, even passing over this, admitting that the idea of a somewhat on which we depend is equivalent to the idea of God, and that it is given immediately in the sense of dependence, it is, nevertheless, not a fact given us immediately in our nature, — for the sense of dependence itself is not a fact of our nature, as we have already proved, but merely a deduction from certain facts of our experience. We find by experience that we are limited, that we cannot do what we will, that we are insufficient for ourselves, and *therefore* infer that we are not self-sustained, but are dependent beings, and therefore, again, that there must needs be something on which we depend, and which does not depend on us.

That this something on which we depend, and which does not depend on us, is God, we, of course, do not deny ; but the

idea of something not dependent on us, and on which we depend, is yet, considered *in se*, far below the idea of God, and can only by a long chain of induction, to which only a few gifted minds are equal, be shown to imply it. The idea of God is not, we say, therefore, a fact given us in our nature, a primitive *datum*.

2. The same arguments we have used to prove that the idea of God is not a fact given us in our nature, or, at least, all but one of them, prove equally that it is not an intuition. Mr. Parker offers no evidence of its being an intuition, but the fact that it is implied in the sense of dependence, and that men have entertained it before they could have demonstrated it, either by the argument *a priori* or the argument *a posteriori*. Admit the first, and it proves nothing to his purpose; for an idea which is given only as implied in another is not given by intuition, even though that other idea be itself intuitive. An intuitive idea is not an implicit, but an explicit, idea. An implicit idea is merely an idea involved or contained in another, and is obtained through that other as its medium; but intuitive ideas are not given through the medium of other ideas. They are given immediately, or else they are discursive, not intuitive. Moreover, the sense of dependence, assumed to give implicitly the idea of God, is not even itself intuitive, as we have just seen, but a logical deduction from facts of experience. Even admitting, then, that an idea implied in another may be an intuitive idea, the idea of God is not intuitive, since the idea which implies it is not intuitive.

The second proof alleged begs the question. The human race may have entertained, and no doubt have entertained, the idea of God prior to having demonstrated the existence of God; but this does not prove the intuitive origin of the idea of God; for the idea may have been communicated, in the first instance, supernaturally, by God himself, as is alleged by the universal traditions of the race. Mr. Parker must prove that the idea could not have been communicated in this or in any way other than the one he assumes, before, from the fact that the human race has entertained the idea prior to having demonstrated it, he can conclude to its intuitive origin.

But it is unnecessary to dwell longer on this point; for it is evident from what we have already said, that man has, and can have, no intuitive perception of God. Indeed, Mr. Parker concedes this; for he says in a note, p. 24, that the idea of God may be called a judgment *a priori*. Now, if it is a

judgment *a priori*, it is not an intuitive perception ; for the intuitive idea can never precede, either historically or logically, the actual perception of the object. Consequently, no intuitive idea is or can be a judgment *a priori*, that is, a judgment which logically precedes every real or possible fact of experience.

Nevertheless, we do not admit that the idea of God is a judgment *a priori* ; for we do not admit the reality of any judgments *a priori*. A judgment is an act, and always implies an act of discrimination, and therefore, from its very nature, cannot precede intuition of the matter or matters discriminated. The Kantian doctrine on this subject is more specious than solid, and involves us in a new difficulty greater than that from which it proposes to extricate us. What Kant calls judgments or cognitions *a priori* are nothing but the properties, the essential qualities, so to speak, of the subjective faculty of intelligence, — and therefore are not ideas, judgments, or cognitions, but, at best, the subjective ability to form ideas, judgments, or cognitions.

But all this reasoning is unnecessary, for Mr. Parker concedes the whole question in debate. “ We can know God only in part, — from the manifestations of his divinity, *seen* in nature, *felt* in man.” — p. 160. Even he will not, we think, after this, dare maintain that the idea of God is an intuitive perception ; for the existence of a being knowable only through the medium of his manifestations, that is, of his works, is not and cannot be an object of intuitive perception.

The idea of God, Mr. Parker tells us, “ is the logical condition of all our other ideas ; without this as an element of our consciousness, lying latent, as it were, unrecognized in us, we could have no *ideas* at all.” Consciousness is the state or condition of being conscious. An element of consciousness must be a fact of which we are always and invariably conscious, when we are conscious at all. To be conscious is to know, to recognize. If the idea of God be an element or fact of consciousness, it must be a fact of which we are always and invariably conscious when we are conscious at all, and, therefore, cannot lie latent or unrecognized in us.

The *idea* is either subjective or objective. It is not in this case objective, as before proved, and as is evident from the fact that Mr. Parker makes it synonymous with belief or knowledge. It is, then, subjective. Then it is the *notion* or *conception* of the existence of God. Then it is not latent or un-

recognized ; for no notion or conception exists when not recognized, since its very being is in its recognition. The power to form the notion, but not the notion itself, may lie latent, unrecognized in us ; and this is all that Descartes teaches, when he calls the idea of God innate, that is, that we have the innate power to rise to a conception of God's existence.

But we must tell Mr. Parker that he not only fails to prove that the idea of God is a fact given us in our nature, that it is a judgment *a priori*, that it is an intuitive perception, but he does not even show that the existence of God is demonstrable. On his principles of reasoning, from the facts he alleges, we cannot logically even conclude to the existence of God. "A natural want in our constitution," he says, "implies satisfaction in some quarter." If our constitution be assumed to be the work of an all-wise, powerful, and good creator, we grant the conclusion,—otherwise we deny it ; for, till it is known that the author of our nature would not or could not implant in us a want for which he makes no provision, the existence of the want is no evidence of satisfaction. It implies the *need* of satisfaction, but not that there is satisfaction. "The tendency to love implies something lovely as its object." *If it is to be satisfied*, — otherwise not. But how do you know that it is to be satisfied ? "So the religious sentiment implies its object." If it is to be satisfied,—not otherwise. In itself considered, taken independently of the assumption of a God who has implanted it, and who would not have implanted it without providing satisfaction for it, it merely proves the need of some object,—not that the object really exists. The argument, then, on which Mr. Parker relies is without validity, and is no demonstration of the existence of God.

But we do not stop here. Granting the religious sentiment and the idea of God, that is, the sense of dependence and idea of its object, are facts, elements, or principles of human nature, we deny that religion is a fact or principle of human nature, or that even then there is any thing in our nature in which religion can be assumed to originate.

Mr. Parker's thesis is not, that the principles of religion may be deduced, by reasoning, from the facts of human nature, but that religion originates spontaneously in those facts, independently of our will or foresight. It is, so to speak, a natural production of the essential facts or elements of human nature. This is his thesis, and to this we hold him.

Now, the two facts, sense of dependence and idea of its object, do not authorize, but impugn, Mr. Parker's own definition of religion. Absolute, that is, perfect religion, he tells us (p. 46), is "voluntary obedience to the law of God, inward and outward obedience to the law he has written on our nature." Here is an element very essential, namely, voluntary obedience, not included in the sense of dependence and idea of its object, and which they do not and cannot generate. Doubtless, a man, by reasoning upon all the facts of his nature, by ascertaining that he is a dependent being, and that that on which he depends is God, and that God is his rightful lawgiver, his sovereign, may come very legitimately to the conclusion that he ought to obey God ; but this is nothing to the purpose. There can be, according to Mr. Parker's thesis, nothing in religion not spontaneously generated by the two facts of human nature assumed. These operate naturally, independently of will and foresight, from their own inherent force. Voluntary obedience, if essential to religion, must be their spontaneous production, to which volition and reasoning are not necessary, nay, from which they are excluded. But this is impossible ; for there is and can be no voluntary obedience, where will and foresight are excluded.

If religion be voluntary obedience, it is not and cannot be a fact of human nature, nor the spontaneous product of a fact of human nature, for it must be a free creation of the human will. If not, the obedience would not be voluntary, but necessary. How, then, obtain the idea of religion as voluntary obedience from the two facts of human nature assumed ? But if it is to be regarded as the sense of dependence and idea of its object, or as growing spontaneously out of them, it cannot be voluntary, but must be necessary. By what right, then, does Mr. Parker define religion to be voluntary obedience ? And wherefore does he labor to prove that religion is all included in the sense of dependence and idea of its object, when he finds himself obliged to include in its definition an element not even implied by them, and repugnant to them as the essential elements of religion ?

But this definition, all too broad as it is for Mr. Parker's thesis, is altogether defective. It has the merit of recognizing the province of the will. In making religion *voluntary* obedience, Mr. Parker makes it a virtue, and therefore rejects the Transcendental theory, according to which religion is not a virtue, since it recognizes, as essential to it, no *actus*

humanus. This definition shows that he, after all, retains something better than Transcendentalism, and has not quite lost all sense of religion. Nevertheless, the definition is defective, and its rejection of Transcendentalism more in appearance than in reality. The serpent lies coiled at the bottom, ready, if you penetrate too far, to spring upon you. Religion is defined to be voluntary obedience ; but obedience to what ? Simply to our own nature. Mr. Parker says, obedience to the law of God ; but we must not suffer ourselves to be deceived by his rhetorical flourishes. The law of God is, he himself says, simply the law which Almighty God has written on our nature, which is merely the law of our nature, that is, our nature itself. Hence, religion is voluntary obedience to our nature,—which means, in the last analysis, that it is the surrender of ourselves up to our instinctive nature, to do simply what it moves or impels us to do. This is Transcendentalism in full bloom, whether Mr. Parker intended it or not.

Now, Mr. Parker, in using the term religion, is bound to use it in its received sense. Saving his responsibility, he is free to accept or reject that sense, but not free to reject it and still retain the term. If he does not retain, in his definition of religion, all that is essential to religion in its generally received sense, he does not retain religion ; if he rejects what is essential to religion, as the term is generally understood by mankind, he rejects religion. That which he retains may be true, may be all he ought to retain, or it may not be ; but it is not religion, and he has no right to call it religion. Now, religion, in its generally received sense, is the acknowledgment and worship of the Deity. It may mean more than this, but less it cannot. As Mr. Parker will not quarrel with us about the unity of God, we may say the acknowledgment of the Deity is the recognition of, and expression of our belief in, the existence and providence of God ; and the worship of God implies not only the acknowledgment of his being and providence, but the performing certain acts or services, external or internal, believed to be his due and *because* his due. Mr. Parker is familiar enough with the religious history of mankind to know that the race has always meant by religion at least all that is implied in this definition. Then, if what he calls religion does not amount to this, it is not religion. But what he calls religion does not amount to this, and cannot be obtained from the principles which he admits.

In Mr. Parker's definition of religion, not even the being

of God is necessarily implied, but simply the *idea* of God, which is alleged to be a fact of human nature. But, in this definition, not only the being of God, but his providence, is implied. Now, the idea of the providence of God, essential to religion, is not included in Mr. Parker's definition of religion; neither when he defines it to be the sense of dependence and idea of its object, nor when he defines it to be voluntary obedience to the law of our nature. Will he tell us how, from the two facts of our nature, or from voluntary obedience, he can then obtain it? The two facts, according to him, ought to generate it spontaneously; for nothing can be essential to religion but these and their spontaneous productions. But will he show us how, even by logic, we can obtain from these the idea of providence? If not, — and he cannot, — they are not themselves religion, nor able to give us religion; for there is no religion, where there is no belief in providence.

Moreover, Mr. Parker nowhere in his book recognizes God's providence. None but a personal being, acting voluntarily, and for the sake of an end, can exercise providence, — that is, care for, watch over, and provide for his creatures. But Mr. Parker expressly denies the personality of God, speaks of the Divinity as an abstraction, applies to him pronouns of the neuter gender, and even refuses to allow him consciousness, save potentially. "God, as absolute cause," he says, "contains in himself" — he should have said *itself*, to have preserved consistency — "potentially the ground of consciousness and personality, yes, and of unconsciousness and impersonality. But to apply these terms to him seems to me a vain attempt to sound the abyss of the Godhead." — p. 165. He denies, by implication, the propriety of prayer (p. 167), though we have heard that he himself goes, at times, through the form of prayer, whether with "his eyes fixed devoutly on himself" or not, our informants do not report. "God," he says (p. 170), "is the substantiality of matter"; p. 182, "as he is the materiality of matter, so is he the spirituality of spirit." We do not suppose he understands the full import of the words he uses; but it is evident, that, so far as he conceives of God at all, he conceives of him not as a free, voluntary being, acting with a purpose, and for the sake of an end, but as a mighty force or energy developing itself through all infinities *ad finem*, it may be, but simply according to its own inherent laws, from the necessity of its own nature, not from freedom of will. He calls him Being, Cause, Knowledge, Love, but never one who is,

causes, knows, loves ; consequently, never represents him as a being who is capable of exercising a providential care. We may say, then, that his notion of religion does not include the idea of providence, and therefore does not include all that is essential to religion.

Again, the definition of religion, as generally received, involves the idea of *obligation*. We worship God, because we *owe* him a service. In worshipping him, we are simply rendering him his *due*, and we worship him for the sake of paying what we owe. But is the conception of obligation, of a debt due and to be paid, contained in the sense of dependence and idea of its object, or even deducible from them ? Of course not. No alchemy can transmute either or both of them into the idea of obligation, nor can either or both of them generate it.

These two facts, if obeyed, cannot lead to the worship of God, because what we do in obedience to them we do *ex necessitate naturæ*, not from reason and will. The acts we should perform would not be acts of worship, because they would not be done for the sake of worshipping God, that is, of rendering him his due. Then, unless they can give us of themselves the idea of obligation, that we owe God a service, they cannot be the essential elements of religion, and we might have them and still have no religion, and nothing able to give us religion. But instinctive, involuntary, themselves, operating without will or foresight, it is evident they do not contain, and cannot give, the idea of obligation, and thus furnish the *motive*, without which no act is or can be religious.

Mr. Parker nowhere, so far as we have discovered, asserts the obligation to worship God. He does not seem to admit that man is *morally* bound at all to worship God. The only obligation he seems to recognize is the obligation of man to obey his own nature, — that is, to cease to be man as rapidly as possible, and descend from a person to a thing. God is nowhere represented as demanding any service of man ; man nowhere said to *owe* God any thing ; man is merely to study nature and himself, — ascertain and act out his own nature. The law in his nature is all the law there is for him, and religion is nothing but the harmonious action of all his faculties (p. 241). But the ground of *this* obligation is nowhere given, or, if given, is not represented to be the fact that God wills it, and that we are to obey ourselves for the sake of obeying him.

It is, then, false to assume, that the two facts, sense of dependence and idea of its object, include all that is essential to religion. They do not include, and cannot give us, the two essential elements of religion, namely, the idea of providence and that of obligation. They disclose no ground for worship in the providence of God ; they suggest no service to God, to be given *because* his due. They are not religion, then, and cannot, of themselves alone, give us religion.

But we are not yet done with Mr. Parker's theory. We have shown that it cannot give us religion ; we now assert that it is repugnant to religion, and, if admitted as true, would enable us to account for all religious phenomena without assuming even the existence of God. "Two things," says Mr. Parker, "are necessary to render religion possible ; a religious nature in man, and God out of man, as the object of that nature. These two facts admitted, religion follows necessarily, as vision from the existence of a seeing faculty in man, and that of light out of him. Now, the existence of the religious element implies its object. We have naturally a sentiment of God. Reason gives us an idea of him. These are founded in our nature, and are in themselves unchangeable, always the same." — p. 159. This sounds well ; but the sentiment of God, the religious sentiment, we must remember, is the sense of dependence, and the idea of God is merely the idea of something on which dependence rests. The sense and the idea are both facts of our nature, facts given us in our nature. Our nature being given, then, both these facts are given. Then man being given, all is given that is essential to religion. Then Mr. Parker is quite too liberal in allowing the existence of God out of man as necessary to religion. The existence of God is quite superfluous, and quite unphilosophically assumed ; for philosophy admits no more causes for a fact than are necessary. If religion, then, be the facts of our nature, or their spontaneous production, it requires the admission of no existence but man, and can dispense with God altogether.

But Mr. Parker replies, "The sentiment implies its object." Not if its existence can be accounted for without assuming its object ; and this can be done, if it be a fact of man's nature ; for, man's nature given, it is given. Moreover, as we have seen, the sentiment only implies the *necessity* of an object to satisfy it, not that the object exists. It implies the necessity of its object, not as the condition of its existence,

but simply as the condition of its satisfaction. Here is a point Mr. Parker probably overlooked.

But the sentiment is said to be the sentiment of God, and therefore necessarily implies that God is. The sentiment in question is defined, officially, to be the sense of dependence. Strictly speaking, the object of the *sense* is *dependence*, and therefore, even admitting the sense or sentiment implies its object, it does not necessarily imply God, unless God and dependence are one and the same.

“But reason gives us the idea of God.” This amounts to nothing ; because reason gives it, not because it sees the object of the idea, or demonstrates from certain *data* that God is. The idea is said to be a fact given in our nature, and therefore antecedently to all exercise of reason. It is simply a fact or property of the rational subject, and is given in the idea of the subject, — consequently, does not necessarily imply God out of the subject. Before you can conclude from the idea to a reality outside of man responding to it, you must establish the principle, that no idea is, or can be, given in human nature. But establish this, then the idea of God is not given as a fact of human nature. But this is to deny your own assertion. Therefore you have no right to conclude from the idea of God to the existence of God.

It is clear, therefore, that, if you reduce religion to the sense of dependence and idea of its object, and declare these to be facts, elements, or principles of human nature, you have no occasion to assume any existence, in order to account for religion, — to give you all of religion, — but that of man himself. But, if there be no God, all religion is a delusion. Consequently, the attempt to find in human nature a solid and imperishable foundation for religion ends in showing that it has no foundation at all. Alas ! man is a poor foundation to build any thing upon. The wise master-builder will seek some other foundation, — even the Rock of Ages.

Again, Mr. Parker has no occasion to assume the existence of God as an object of obedience. When he defines religion to be voluntary obedience, he defines it to be obedience to the law of our own nature. Our nature given, this law is given, and all is given, and contained in it. There is no need, then, of introducing the cumbrous machinery of a God. Man is what he is. He is all his nature is. His nature is all that is essential to it, or essential elements of it. All that is essential to religion is essential in his nature. Man, then, is it all, and

all that is essential to religion is given without assuming any existence beyond him. Do not tell us, then, that to religion it is necessary that there should be a God out of man, for to religion, in your sense, it is not necessary. Man is enough for your purpose. With man, therefore, try and content yourself.

This conclusion is inevitable, when the essential elements of religion are made essential elements of human nature. The Transcendentalists, we are willing to admit,—for we were ourselves the first in this country to set forth on this point the doctrine we have ascribed to them,—have been governed by good motives, and have really wished to defend religion against the infidel. But they have begun at the wrong end. That man is led by the wants of his nature to seek after some support, and by his reason to recognize a God who has made him and for whom he should live, we do not deny,—though we do not believe, that, as a matter of fact, he first attained in this way to the idea of God; for the belief in the existence of God is too early found, too universal, and too firmly rooted in the human mind, to have originated in so long and so difficult a process. That man's own experience of his own insufficiency, of his nothingness, of the fact that he is everywhere limited, hemmed in, which may be called a sense of dependence, and which all must, to a greater or less degree, experience, is among the first and chief causes that lead him “through nature up to nature's God,” we are willing to admit, and much that Mr. Parker says on this head, when not taken in support of his theory, is no doubt true, and even impressive; but the doctrine, that religion is a fact of our nature, or has its origin in our permanent nature, if it mean any thing more than a rhetorical flourish for the fact, that the constantly recurring facts of human experience have a strong tendency to impress us with a sense of our own dependence, and to lead us to look out of ourselves for some independent support,—which, after all, we suspect, may be all Mr. Parker really means,—is essentially repugnant to the very idea of religion. The sense of dependence and idea of its object are not elements of religion; they are simply facts which lead us to seek religion, and which, perhaps, facilitate its acceptance and observance.

To place religion in these is to deprive it of all moral character, and to render it in itself nothing worth. Mr. Parker may extol the religious sentiment and idea as he will, but, as he defines them, they do not necessarily involve a single

moral or religious conception. Man is religious, not by virtue of his *nature*, but of his *acts*. He is placed, not by his *nature*, but by his CREATOR, under a law ; and he is religious only in obeying that law, and in obeying it *because* it is God's law. The natural powers by which he obeys, so far as his obedience depends on himself as the obedient subject, are the same as those by which he obeys his parents or the magistrate. He must have reason, by which to perceive the law, and to perceive it as God's law,—and will, by which to will its obedience ; but these are not powers brought into play only by religion ; they are brought into play in every act which is properly an *actus humanus*.

The Transcendentalists, overlooking this fact, — that religion, so far as it depends on man, depends on the rational and voluntary nature, — seek to find its origin in the sensitive nature. Having begun with the principle, that reason and will are to be discarded, and sentiment only retained, and having ascertained that sentiment operates instinctively without will or reason, they have fancied it would afford a more solid and respectable foundation for religion than the inductions of reason and the resolutions of the will. What they really want is to find an origin for religion which is under shelter from human will and reason. This is obvious in all their writings. Thus, Mr. Parker resolves religion into a sentiment and idea both given by our nature, independently of all exercise of will or reason. Placed in the instinctive nature, they really believe religion is raised above us, because, according to them, the instinctive nature is always to be regarded as supreme and authoritative.

But if we examine this doctrine more closely, we find, that, though it adopts, now and then, religious names, it embraces no religious ideas. "The legitimate action of the religious sentiment," says Mr. Parker, "produces reverence." — p. 44. The religious sentiment is the sense of dependence. Where is the proof that the sense of dependence produces reverence ? But suppose it does. What is the quality of this reverence ? Like produces like. The reverence that springs from a sentiment must be itself a sentiment. It is a sensible emotion. It may be well enough as far as it goes, but it is not reverence in the religious sense. Religious reverence is not a sensible emotion, though it may be accompanied by such emotion, but an affection of the rational and voluntary nature. Even admitting that the sense of dependence should legitimately produce

reverence, it would, then, be only a sensible reverence, possessing in itself no religious character.

But this reverence "may *ascend* into Trust, Hope, and Love, which is according to its nature, — or it may descend into Doubt, Fear, Hate, which is *against* its nature. It thus rises or falls as it coexists in the individual with wisdom and goodness, or with ignorance and vice." — p. 44. A man may be religious, either with wisdom and goodness, or with ignorance and vice ! Religion can combine and coexist with either. A very accommodating thing, this religion of yours, and worth writing books about ! But let this pass. What is the proof that it is more *against* the nature of reverence to descend into doubt, fear, and hate, than it is to rise into trust, hope, and love, when once it is admitted it *can* so descend without ceasing to be reverence ? It would relieve the monotony of Mr. Parker's book, if he would now and then prove an assertion.

But the trust, hope, love, into which reverence *may* rise, what are they ? Affections of reason and will ? Not at all. They are the products of a sentiment, and belong to the sentimental nature. They are not, then, though Mr. Parker writes their initials in capitals, religious affections. They are sensible emotions, or instinctive affections, — not the result of rational apprehension of their object, and voluntary confidence in him and preference of him. They do not, then, rise to the religious order, and are, taken in themselves alone, worth nothing. But even pass over this. Are they produced *for the sake* of God, and offered to him *because* his due ? In trusting, hoping, loving, do we ourselves act, and act *propter finem*, and not merely *ad finem* ? According to Mr. Parker's whole doctrine, in them we do not properly act, — we but follow our nature, and therefore really render God no service because his due, and therefore perform no religious act ; though the acts of trust, hope, love, when done for the sake of God, are unquestionably among the most acceptable acts we can perform.

Here is apparent the grand defect of Transcendentalism. It tries to find a religion which borrows nothing from reason and will, and which will go of itself, requiring us to trouble ourselves no further about it than to leave it alone and let nature do her work. In this they are consistent with themselves. Religion should, on their principles, like every thing else, be reduced to instinct, and, like Dogberry's reading and

writing, "come by nature." But they should know, that, however good what thus comes may be, it is not religion, and should never be called by that name. Whether they are right or wrong in commending what they thus get is not now the question. The simple question before us is, whether what they dignify with the name of religion is what we are to understand by that venerated word. We think we have shown that it is not, and, if for no other reason, for the reason that in religion we offer a service to God *because* believed to be his due, and his due from us ; whereas, in what they propose as religion, we merely follow our nature, and do what we do, not because we see its justice and will it, but because our instinctive nature prompts it. In their religion we act merely *ad finem*, and our acts are, properly speaking, not *human* acts ; in religion as we must understand it, if we retain it at all, we act always *propter finem*, therefore not as instinctive, but as rational and voluntary agents. Here is a broad line of distinction, which separates the Transcendentalists totally from the religious world. Religion is a *virtus*, and it demands that we remain and act as *MEN*. Transcendentalism would sink us from men, from beings of rational nature, that is, persons, to mere *automata*, or, at least, to mere sensitive plants. For ourselves, we prefer to remain as we are, of rational nature, and to act as rational beings. If the Transcendentalists do not, if they prefer to sink into the category of mere things, be it so ; they have not, if they so prefer, far to sink ; nor could their responsibility be great, should they remain even as they are.

In our next Review, God willing, we shall close our examination of Transcendentalism, and be prepared to enter upon the discussion of open, avowed infidelity. Thus far all we have said, whether against High Church or Low Church, No-Church or Transcendentalism, is merely preliminary to the discussion of the real question for our age. Disguise the matter as men will, the real question of the age is between Catholicity and Infidelity. Protestantism, with its Protean forms, would excite only universal derision and contempt, did it not afford a *quasi* shelter for the multitudes who wish to conceal their doubts both from themselves and their neighbours. These multitudes are ashamed of their doubts, have a lurking sense that they are wrong, and that they ought to be believers ; they therefore seek to hide their doubts from themselves and from one another. To this end, they catch, as

drowning men at straws, at one form of Protestantism or another ; but most of them feel that they do catch at straws, and nothing else. Protestantism is incapable of satisfying, for a single moment, a mind that thinks and knows how to reason. It needed not to have been born and bred a Protestant to be aware of this. A few women among the Protestants, who silence their doubts by their gentler affections or their religious dissipation, may fancy that they are firm believers ; but the great mass of the world, out of the Church, are really at heart, we will not say disbelievers, but doubters. The great question, deny it as they may and probably will, which they want settled, is, whether Almighty God has actually made us a revelation of the supernatural order. We know they will not own this, for, as we have said, they are ashamed of their doubts, and do not like to avow them ; but if they lay their hands upon their hearts and answer truly, they will confess that we have stated the real question they want settled. Once recall them to faith in the great fact of the Christian revelation, and it will require no labored arguments to bring them into the Church. The only two armies now on the great moral battle-field of the world are those of Catholicity and Infidelity, and between these the great battle is to be fought. We have felt this from the first, and have entered into the discussions we have, because we wished to carry all the outworks before attacking the citadel. These we think we have now pretty much carried, and whoever will read fairly the articles we have written against Anglicanism, No-Churchism, and Transcendentalism, will be troubled to find a single stronghold in which he may intrench himself between the Roman Catholic Church and infidelity.

The next article on Transcendentalism will commence the war on infidelity, by showing that the facts, or at least a portion of the facts, of the religious history of mankind are not explicable on any hypothesis which excludes the supernatural intervention of Providence, and, therefore, that, on the plainest principles of inductive reasoning, we must admit the supernatural order, and that God has made us a revelation of it. In the mean time we would say, that we, as Catholics, are too well instructed to rely on argument alone for the conversion of unbelievers. No matter who plants and waters, 't is God alone who gives the increase. The fervent prayers of the faithful, offered in secret, in the solitude of the closet or the cell, will avail more than all the elaborate arguments ever constructed ;

and one reason why the conversion of unbelievers is not more rapid is because we rely upon ourselves, upon our wisdom and strength, upon human efforts, rather than on Him without whose aid and blessing all labors are thrown away.

ART. II. — *Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Review*.
No. VII. Andover. Allen, Morrill, and Wardwell. August, 1845.

THE periodical here introduced to our readers is a quarterly journal, somewhat larger than our own, published at Andover, Massachusetts, and "edited by B. B. Edwards and Edwards A. Park, Professors in Andover Theological Seminary, with the special coöperation of Dr. Robinson and Professor Stuart." It is the most elaborate, erudite, and authoritative organ of the Puritan or Calvinistic denomination of Protestants we are acquainted with, though it wants the lively and interesting character of *The New Englander*, another organ of the same denomination, which is published at New Haven, in Connecticut. It is able, but, upon the whole, rather heavy. It appears to be made up, in great part, from translations, learning, and ideas from the modern Rationalists, Supernaturalists, and Evangelicals of Germany, and its pages bear very unequivocal evidence that its contributors have made considerable proficiency in "High Dutch."

But our present concern is not with the journal, but with the third article in the number before us, on the *Intellectual and Moral Influence of Romanism*, — a Dudleian Lecture, delivered before the University of Cambridge, last May, by Professor Edwards A. Park, of Andover Theological Seminary, and one of the editors of the *Review* itself. We have heard Professor Park spoken of as a profound thinker, an able reasoner, and an eminent scholar, and been assured that he holds a high rank among his brother professors. His Lecture has evidently been elaborated with great care, and, considering the importance of the question it discusses, and the distinguished body before whom it was prepared to be delivered, we may reasonably presume it to be a fair specimen of what he is

able to accomplish. He has done here, probably, the best he could. If so, we cannot help thinking that it requires no extraordinary abilities or attainments to be a distinguished professor in Andover Theological Seminary ; for the Lecture, though it makes some pretensions to a philosophical appreciation of principles and tendencies, is characterized by no remarkable depth or acuteness of thought, force or justness of reasoning, extent, variety, or accuracy of scholarship, novelty of view, originality of illustration, clearness of method, precision, strength, or beauty of expression. From a commonplace lecturer against "Popery" it would be respectable ; but we are not able to discover in it any thing to indicate the distinguished professor, or that in the seminary in which its author can be a distinguished professor there prevails any but a low tone of thought and feeling.

In a community accustomed to close, vigorous, and just reasoning, — accustomed to demand a reason before believing, and not to believe without a tolerable reason for believing, and in which the real principles and history of Catholicity were passably known, — this Lecture could only excite a smile at the author's simplicity or temerity, and would deserve and receive no answer. But, unhappily, ours is not such a community. Our *enlightened* community has a remarkable facility in disbelieving against reason, and in believing without reason. It will believe any thing against Catholicity, on the bare assertion of an individual whose oath, in a case involving property to the amount of five dollars, it would not take, — and not believe any thing in its favor, though sustained by evidence the most conclusive. Consequently, we have heard this Lecture, in which there is nothing from beginning to end but bare assertion, unsustained by the least fact or argument, highly commended, as a masterpiece of philosophical investigation and of logical argument, — a triumphant refutation of the claims of the Catholic Church ; and one of our editors, a most malignant enemy of Catholicity, goes so far as even to intimate in one of his papers, that, if its reasoning should be fairly met and refuted, he would almost or quite turn "Romanist" himself. We hope, however, in this the editor is joking ; for we should be sorry to gain a convert on such easy terms, — fearing he would hardly be worth having, and that he would be one in whom the word would soon wither away. Nevertheless, this indicates the state of our community, and shows, that, however intrinsically undeserving a serious reply the Lecture

may be, it yet, under existing circumstances, requires to be refuted, so far as what is without principle can be refuted.

The design of the Lecture, as the author himself tells us (p. 452), is to "attempt to show that the *essential* tendencies of Romanism [Catholicity] are injurious to the mind and heart of man." Its design is not to show, that in the history of the Catholic Church, reference being had to the conduct of Churchmen, and not to what the Church officially teaches and commands, there has been much evil,—many depravities of mind and heart, justly deplorable, justly censurable,—but that the *essential* tendencies of Catholicity are injurious; or that the injurious effects the author thinks he has discovered are not merely *accidents* of the system, growing out of the ignorance of the human mind and the depravity of the human heart, against which the Church always struggled, though unable at once to overcome them,—but that they are essential in her very nature, necessarily inseparable from her very existence and action. In proof of this, he alleges that Catholicity, 1. Discountenances the investigation of first principles; 2. Checks the instinctive longings of the soul for progress in the science of divine things; 3. Exalts the traditions of antiquity above our own perceptions of truth, and degrades the mind by communion with triflers; 4. Authorizes a worship which presents a low standard of thought and feeling; 5. Is deficient in candor, in truth, and in eminent philosophers and preachers; 6. Holds doctrines which have a peculiar tendency to be perverted; 7. Adopts mystical machinery, or asserts that the efficacy of the sacraments is *ex opere operato*; 8. Has a tendency to separate religion from good morals, or undervalues morality as distinct from religion, and thus gives a false idea of religion itself; 9. Is austere; 10. Engenders an exclusive and persecuting spirit; 11. Founds religion on faith instead of reason; 12. Is fascinating to all classes; and, 13. Is peculiarly injurious to a republic.

Here is a formidable list of charges, and some of them rather queer ones to come from a theological professor, who himself has a fixed creed, and is a professor in a seminary in which the professors are obliged to subscribe to a creed imposed, not by the Church even, but by the lay-founders of the professorships, and to renew their subscriptions every five years. But this is of small moment. It will be seen by the Catholic reader at a glance, that the Professor proceeds throughout on what logicians call a *petitio principii*, or begging the question. Set aside all those charges which are false

in fact, and those which can be urged only by an unbeliever, take only those which have some foundation in truth, and not one of them is or can be injurious to the mind, if the Church be what she claims to be. They could be injurious only in case the Church were a human institution, fallible, and unable to teach with authority. When, therefore, he assumes them to be injurious, he assumes that the Church is a mere human institution, which we do not grant him, and which is the very point he should first establish.

Moreover, before proceeding to the direct consideration of these charges, we must demand of the Professor, by what authority he determines what is injurious to the mind and heart of man. He says the tendencies of the Church are injurious. We deny his assumption ; for the Church is infallible, and her teachings and commands are the infallible standard of what is true or false, right or wrong, good or evil, and therefore her tendencies cannot be injurious. Prove, then, the Church authorizes what you allege against her ; you do not prove to me that she is in fault, but you prove to me, infallibly, that what you allege is not evil, but good. But the Professor replies, that he denies the infallibility of the Church, and adduces these very facts to prove that she is not infallible. Very good. But he must prove that the tendencies he alleges are false and injurious tendencies, before from them he can conclude any thing to the prejudice of the infallibility of the Church. Now, we demand of him, by what authority he pronounces this or that tendency injurious. He must do it by some authority or by no authority. If by no authority, then he has no authority for what he says, and we are under no obligation to entertain it. If by some authority, that authority must be fallible or infallible. If fallible, it will not answer the purpose ; because it may turn out that he calls good evil. It cannot set aside the authority of the Church, for, at best, it is only a fallible authority against a fallible authority, and, for aught the Professor can say, the mistake may be on his side, instead of being on the side of the Church. If infallible, what is it ?

The Professor says (p. 451), “ The character of a religious system may be known, first, from the relation of its principles to the standard of reason and Scripture ; secondly, from its influence on the soul of man.” The second method is the one he adopts. The character of Catholicity may be learned by its influence on the soul of man. The essential tendencies of Catholicity are injurious to the soul. From this he con-

cludes against the Church. We grant the Church must be bad, if her tendencies are injurious to the soul. But here is a previous question to be disposed of, namely, By what authority does he pronounce her tendencies, admitting even that they are what he alleges, injurious to the soul? He assumes that he is able to say what is or is not an injury to the soul. He must have, then, a standard by which he determines what is good or evil to the soul. Now, what is this standard? Suppose he declares a given tendency injurious to the soul, and the Church declares it wholesome to the soul, — where is the authority to determine which is right? He and the Church are at issue. Which am I to believe? Professor Park against the Church, or the Church against Professor Park? If the two authorities be equal, there can be no decision. If one is paramount, which is it? Is the Professor fallible? Then his authority is not of itself a sufficient motive for setting hers aside, for hers is only fallible, and is probably, at worst, as good as his, and may be better. Is he infallible, and is it impossible for him to err in his judgment, and mistake the character of a tendency? If so, he must establish this infallibility in the outset; for it is not a self-evident fact, to be taken for granted. We demand, then, once more, his authority for pronouncing an essential tendency of the Church injurious to the soul.

Will the Professor appeal to reason? The appeal is good, if reason have jurisdiction in the case; but we deny that reason has jurisdiction in the case. An influence may be injurious to the soul, on the supposition that it has only a natural destiny or is to perish with the body, — and not be injurious, but wholesome, on the supposition that the soul has *no* natural destiny and is to live for ever. Reason, by her own light alone, has jurisdiction only in questions relating to the natural destiny of man, for she cannot go out of nature. She can pronounce concerning good or evil to the soul, if its destiny, as our religion teaches us, be not natural, but supernatural, only as she borrows her light from revelation. The good of the soul is in realizing the end for which it was made; the injury of the soul is in being hindered or diverted from realizing that end. Before, then, you can say any particular influence is injurious to the soul, you must be able to say for what end the soul was made, and that the influence in question tends necessarily to divert it from the realization of that end, — two facts, which you must obtain, if you obtain them at all, not from reason, but from supernatural revelation. Therefore, we say, reason has not ju-

risdiction in the case. If, then, the Professor summons us, on this question, to plead at the bar of reason, we shall plead want of jurisdiction in the court.

But may we not, from the tendencies of a religious system, conclude to the character of the religious system itself? Yes, *if you are able to determine the real character of the tendencies by an authority to which both the system and its tendencies are bound to answer, — not otherwise.* Here is the fact the Professor forgets. He assumes to judge the tendencies of the Church, and then assumes his judgments of these tendencies as the standard by which to try the Church. We call upon him to go a step farther back, and establish the validity of these judgments, by showing us the authority on which they are founded, and that that authority is sufficient to authorize us to receive them as infallible. In assuming them as the standard by which to try the Church, he forgets that the Church denies his ability to form valid judgments in the premises, and therefore that he must begin by showing that he can, and showing it, too, by an authority which the Church, as well as he, must acknowledge to be ultimate. Till he does this, his judgment of what is or is not an injurious tendency is of no authority, and his conclusion from it for or against the Church is deserving of no attention; for it is a mere *petitio principii*. This is a fact which all our Protestant doctors overlook, and which proves that they themselves have made less proficiency in the investigation of first principles, at least of logic, than they flatter themselves.

Will the Professor fall back now on his first-named method; namely, the principles of reason and Scripture? Not on reason alone, for we have just precluded him from that. On reason *and* Scripture? Well; will he fall back on them as the court, or as the law which is to govern the decisions of the court? Not as the court, for they are not a court, and cannot be, any more than the statute-book is, or can be, a court. Then as the law? Very good. But the law authoritatively declared, or declared without authority? Without authority? Then we deny it to be law. With authority? Then what authority? The authority of reason? Then, whose reason? Yours or mine? Not mine; for, if so, I should be both defendant and judge of the law; and to this you cannot be required to assent. Not yours; for, if so, you would be both plaintiff and judge of the law; and to this I cannot be required to assent. Whose reason, then? The reason of the court? But where and what is the court, if the Church is set aside?

Here we come back to the question with which we started, — On what authority does the Professor assume his judgments of the tendencies of the Church to be valid against hers ? If his own, he only pits his infallibility against hers, and we know beforehand that he is not infallible. If he says some other body, he only predicates of another body the infallibility he denies to her ; and then comes up the question of the infallibility of that other body. We may deny it as we do his, and then nothing is decided. Infallible authority there must be somewhere, or there is no decision of the question. We demand of the Professor, what and where is this authority ?

If the Church be from God, and infallible in her teachings and commands, we know that none of her essential tendencies can be bad ; for her teachings and commands constitute the rule of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and evil. It is no matter what you prove she teaches and commands ; for, if it be clear that she teaches and commands it, we will maintain that it is true, right, and good, against all gainsayers, even to the dungeon, exile, or the stake, if need be. Nay, you are precluded from calling it false, wrong, or injurious ; and if you so call it, you arraign Almighty God himself, and charge him blasphemously with falsehood and evil. It matters nothing in this case, that her teachings run athwart your prejudices, or that her commands shock your sensibilities ; for her authority is higher, more ultimate, than yours. What more contrary to our ordinary notions of justice and humanity than the command given to the Israelites, through Moses, to conquer and possess the land of Canaan, and to extirpate by the sword its inhabitants, — men, women, and children ? Yet the Israelites were justifiable in obeying it, — nay, were bound to obey it ; for it was the express command of God, and the commands of God constitute right and create obligation. Yet, without such command clearly given, the Israelites would not have been justified in doing what they did. So, many things the Church commands would not be right or obligatory, if commanded by any other body, — as the execution of a criminal is an act of justice, if commanded by the sovereign authority, but a murder, if done without such authority. This is all clear and undeniable, if you concede the Church to be from God, to be authorized by him to speak in his name, — or, rather, if she be as she claims, and as all Catholics believe, the organ through which he himself speaks, teaches, and governs. If this be conceded, you have nothing to do but to submit, receive the command, and obey it, on peril of rebellion against God and your own damnation.

Now, this conceded, as it must be, the Professor, before going into the investigation of the essential tendencies of the Church, must deny the authority of the Church ; for, till the authority of the Church is set aside, the character of her tendencies is not an open question. In concluding from the character of the tendencies to the authority of the Church, he is guilty, as we have said of a *petitio principii*. Thus, —

This is an essential tendency of the Church ; but this tendency is injurious, therefore the Church is injurious. But, if injurious, she cannot be from God, and infallible. Therefore, the Church is not from God, and infallible.

But to this we reply, by denying the minor ; no essential tendency of the Church can be injurious, because the Church is from God, and infallible ; but this is an essential tendency of the Church ; therefore, this tendency is not injurious.

Now, the Professor, it will be seen, in his minor begs the question in dispute. In it he does not disprove our major, but simply assumes it to be false ; and if he concedes our major, his minor cannot possibly be true. He must, then, disprove our major, that is, the infallibility of the Church, before he can proceed to the proof of his minor. We suppose the Professor is well enough acquainted with logic to understand this ; if so, he will see the question between him and us cannot turn on the character of the tendencies of the Church, but must turn on the authority and infallibility of the Church ; and this, in fact, is the only question there is or can be between Catholics and Protestants ; for the infallibility of the Church closes all debate on the other questions they may raise. The debate is all in the Church question, Is the Church from God, the organ through which he himself teaches and governs ? If yes, all is settled. If no, all remains *in statu quo*, and the Protestants must show us some such organ, or we must grope our way along in the darkness as well as we can, by the feeble ray of reason, which only serves to make the darkness visible. Doubtless, the Church must vindicate her own claims, and prove, by sufficient evidence, that she is the organ of the Divine Word ; for the law does not bind till sufficiently promulgated, that is, so promulgated that by the prudent exercise of reason there can be no uncertainty as to what it is. But this she does, and we are ready to show that she does it, whenever the question shall be fairly raised.

But having made these observations by way of protest against

the method of argument, if argument it can be called, which the Professor pursues, and in order to show that he merely begs the question, we proceed to the direct consideration of his list of charges. We, of course, within our limited space, cannot consider them at so great a length as might be desirable, and must content ourselves with brief replies ; but we will endeavour to make them, if brief, conclusive.

I. Catholicity is injurious to the mind, because it "discountenances the investigation of first principles." — p. 453. If this means, that Catholicity discountenances the investigation of first principles of science, in so far as they come within the legitimate province of science, we deny the assertion ; for whoever knows any thing of the principles or history of the Church knows that it is not true. If it mean, that Catholicity discountenances the investigation of first principles, as principles or articles of faith, so far as to ascertain what they are, and the extrinsic motives of receiving them as principles or articles of faith, we also deny the assertion. If it be meant, simply, that the Church discountenances the investigation of the principles or articles of faith, for the purpose of ascertaining their intrinsic truth, we admit the charge, but deny that it is injurious ; and furthermore allege, that, if it be an injury to the mind, it is an injury which must be objected not to Catholicity alone, but to all divine revelation, to be received as authority ; and therefore an objection to which the Professor, unless he is an infidel, is himself as obnoxious as the Catholic.

The articles of faith are received on the authority of God revealing them, and are to be taken as first principles ; this we admit and contend. But the question, whether God has revealed them or not, is open to investigation. Here Catholicity discountenances no investigation of first principles. The question, whether they are intrinsically true or not, is not an open question ; because, 1. The articles of faith are mysteries, and their intrinsic truth lies out of the range of investigation ; and because, 2. If they are revealed by God himself, there can be no question of their intrinsic truth ; for God cannot reveal what is not intrinsically true, since he is *prima veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, et in dicendo*. Once ascertained to be articles of faith, that is, God's word, — and if not God's word, they are not articles of faith, — they of course cease to be subjects of investigation, and are to be taken as first principles, as primitive *data* from which we are to reason, and to which we are to conform in our reasonings, as the geometrician must

reason from, and conform to, the axioms and definitions of his science. But this we deny to be an injury to the mind.

1. Nothing can be an injury to the mind that does not deprive it of some one or more of its natural rights. But over the articles of faith reason has no natural rights, never had any, never can have any; because they lie out of her province, and belong to the supernatural, where her authority does not extend. In denying her the right to investigate the truth of these, we do not restrict her rights, nor in any sense abridge her domain or her authority. She is left in possession of all her territory and of all her original sovereignty.

2. The articles of faith are not taken from the dominions of reason, but they are certain grants made gratuitously to her, extending, instead of abridging, her authority, and therefore serve, instead of injuring her. By their means, she can extend her authority over an immense region, where without them she could have no authority at all. They enlarge her power, and therefore cannot injure her. They furnish her with first principles for the science of theology, without which the science of theology could not exist. Is this an injury to the mind? Why not say it is an injury to the mind to have first principles at all? Are his axioms an injury to the geometriician? Is there any science that supplies its own first principles? Is it an injury to the mind to be able to cultivate the science of theology? But as the science cannot exist without these articles of faith as first principles, and as it cannot of itself furnish its first principles, since no science supplies its own first principles, how say it is an injury to the mind to have them furnished?

But admitting that it is an injury to the mind to be debarred from investigating first principles, that is, from investigating the intrinsic truth of God's word, and ascertaining whether God speaks the truth or not, it is an injury which is done, not by Catholicity alone, but by every system which admits divine revelation at all. If we admit divine revelation at all, we must admit it as ultimate on all matters which it covers. No matter in what symbol that revelation is to be found, — in the decrees and canons of the Church, in the Apostles, the Nicene or the Athanasian Creed, in the Old and New Testaments, in the Thirty-nine Articles, the Augsburg, Helvetic, or Westminster Confession, the Five Points of the Synod of Dort, the Saybrook Platform, or the New England Primer, — if admitted to be divine revelation, it is final, held to be infallible, and no

investigation into its truth can be permitted ; for it is not permitted to go behind the word of God, and ask if the word be true, since that would be asking, Does God tell the truth ? — a question no one can ask without blasphemy. The Professor, if he admits divine revelation at all, condemns himself if he brings this as a charge against Catholicity, and must contend that not Catholicity only, but the very idea of divine revelation to be received in any case as ultimate authority, is injurious to the mind of man. If his objection, then, has any force, it is only in the mouth of an infidel that it has it. Is it on infidel ground that our theological Professor wishes to take his stand ? If so, let him avow it, and perhaps he will find he has a question to settle nearer home, — unless Andover Theological Seminary is prepared to put down Catholicity at the expense of Christianity itself.

But the real gist of the Professor's objection we suppose to be, that such is the state of the question with regard to the evidences of religion, that no articles of faith can rightfully be imposed or received as first principles. "Our Maker," he says (p. 452), "intended to leave the evidences of religion such as to sharpen the intellect. He designed to invigorate the reason by allowing arguments of *real* weight to exist in favor of what may be proved, upon the whole, to be false, and in opposition to what may be proved, upon the whole, to be true. But the Romish idea of the infallibility of the Church is, in itself and in its results, at variance with the nature of moral reasoning, and incompatible with a due regard to the evidence which exists for and against the truth." This passage, if analyzed, will be found to contain four assumptions : 1. To sharpen the intellect, or, what is the same thing, invigorate the reason, is, in itself considered, a good. 2. That the mind is really invigorated, not by the possession of truth, but by the search after it and difficulty of finding it. 3. That arguments of *real* weight may exist in favor of falsehood and against truth. And, 4. That faith rests on moral reasoning, which does not, and cannot, exclude uncertainty as to its truth or falsehood. The first three are evidently false, and the last begs the question, and denies the possibility of faith.

1. The cultivation and improvement of the mind in the service and for the sake of God is a good, but not in or for the sake of itself, as the Professor assumes, when he makes sharpening the intellect or invigorating the reason an end which Almighty God himself contemplates in adjusting the evidences of

religion. God is good, and can contemplate, in what he does, no end, as an end, which is not good in and for the sake of itself. Such must be sharpening the intellect, if he contemplates it as an end. But it can be a good only on condition that the development and perfection of our faculties is in itself good, and this can be good only on condition that the development and perfection of our faculties is the end for which we were made ; which is false. That this is a good cannot be sustained from the Sacred Scriptures, the only authority beside reason to which the Professor can appeal ; for they nowhere assert it, but the contrary. They are not the acute in intellect, the vigorous in reason, but the pure in heart, who shall see God. The Sacred Scriptures never commend mere sharpness of intellect, mere vigor of reason ; for, if they did, they would commend, by implication, Satan himself, who, probably, in acuteness of intellect and vigor of reason is an over match for even our able and learned professors of Andover Theological Seminary themselves. The Scriptures do not commend the merely intellectual, the subtle reasoners,—men ever disputing, doubting, learning, never able to attain to the knowledge of the truth,—but the simple, the docile, who with meekness and humility receive the ingrafted word, and obey it with all fidelity and alacrity. We recommend the Professor to read and meditate 1 Cor. i. 19–31. If he will do so, he will, perhaps, not be ambitious of repeating this first assumption.

2. So far as the mind is really improved, invigorated, in the sense in which to sharpen the intellect, or invigorate the reason, is not an evil, but a good, it is not done by the search after truth and the difficulty of finding it, but by the possession of truth. Truth is the appropriate food of the mind ; and as well say the body is sustained and invigorated by the search after food and the difficulty of finding it, instead of eating and digesting it, as say that the mind is invigorated by the search after truth and the difficulty of finding it, and not by possessing it. The mind does not suffer in presence of truth, but in its absence,—in the darkness of doubt, and the hell of falsehood. There it loses its vigor, its acuteness, becomes enslaved, bound hand and foot. It is the truth that liberates it,—*veritas liberabit vos*,—that restores it its strength, sanctifies it, and secures its free and healthy action.

The Professor reasons on the supposition, that the mind, as soon as it comes into possession of truth, loses its motive to exertion, relaxes its energy, and sinks into inanity and death.

He concludes from what is unquestionably the effect of false doctrines on the mind, which it is compelled by authority to embrace, and forbidden to examine, to the effect of truth. But his conclusion is evidently false ; for truth has a vivifying, strengthening, and sanctifying influence on the mind that receives it ; or else how sad must be the condition of the saints in heaven, who are to see the truth as it is, in itself, and spend an eternity in its immediate possession and contemplation ! The Professor probably forgot himself, when he undertook to show that doubt, uncertainty, and falsehood were more beneficial to the mind than truth ; or rather, he chose to assume principles on which it would be easy to overthrow Catholicity and defend Protestantism. When a man has the making of his own first principles, he must be an unskilful workman indeed, not to make them to suit his purpose.

3. Arguments of *real* weight are solid arguments, founded in truth, therefore true ; for what is not *true* is not *real*. The Professor's third assumption is, then, that truth may exist in favor of falsehood, and against truth ; for he says arguments of *real* weight exist in favor of falsehood and against truth ! This looks very much like contradicting the first principle of all philosophy, namely, the same thing cannot both be and not be, — called, by metaphysicians, *the principle of contradiction*. Did our Professor make his theology before his philosophy ? He must be on his guard, lest he raise a suspicion that even Protestantism does not exert a remarkably wholesome influence in sharpening the intellect and invigorating the reason.

4. The fourth assumption of the Professor is, 1. A *petitio principii* ; for it asserts that the evidence for and against the truth is such that the articles of faith cannot be affirmed with infallible certainty, that is, so as to preclude all room for doubt whether they are the word of God or not. But this the Church denies ; for she alleges they can be so affirmed, and that she so affirms them. We have here merely the Professor against the Church, and the Church against the Professor ; and our old question comes up, Which am I to believe ?

But, 2. There is an assumption here that the articles of faith are exposed to uncertainty. But, if so, they cannot be articles of faith ; for faith is not compatible with uncertainty, since the property of faith is to exclude all uncertainty. Admit the Professor's assumption, then, and it excludes faith. His objection to the Church, then, is that she asserts the possibility of faith. Is this the objection of a believer in divine

revelation, or of an unbeliever ? Does the Professor mean to deny the possibility of faith in the word of God ? If so, his objection lies against all who contend for faith in God's word, no less than against Catholicity. The Professor should beware what arguments he uses, lest he find himself in the condition of Sir Hudibras, whose gun,

" Aimed at pigeon, duck, or plover,
Recoiled, and kicked its owner over."

Again, the Professor's reasoning is based on the supposition, that faith rests on moral reasoning, and that moral reasoning does not exclude all uncertainty. But, in the first place, faith rests, not on moral reasoning, but on the veracity of God. God has said ; therefore I believe. In the second place, the authority on which I take the word to be the word of God does not rest on moral reasoning, but also on the veracity of God. The Church declares it to be the word of God ; therefore I believe it to be the word of God. God has commissioned the Church in his name, and promised to speak in her speech ; therefore I believe the Church. The fact, that God has so commissioned the Church and given this promise is the only question to be settled by moral reasoning ; and here moral reasoning may give as high a degree of certainty as I have of my own personal existence or identity, as we proved in our essay on *The Church against No-Church*, and are ready to prove again, when properly called upon. Therefore, I may be as certain what the Church propounds to me is true, as I can be that God cannot lie, or as I am of my own existence or identity. Deny this, and you deny the possibility of faith ; for faith is not a balancing of probabilities, and the conclusion that upon the whole, all things considered, *this* is most probable, most likely to be true, therefore I *think* it is true, though of that I am not *quite* certain ; for if it be not absolute certainty, a certainty which leaves no reasonable ground for doubt, it is not faith, as we see by the definition of faith itself. The whole question, then, resolves itself into this :— Is the evidence which exists for and against the truth such as to warrant faith ? If you say yes, your objection falls to the ground ; if you say no, you are an unbeliever, and therefore have a quarrel to settle not only with us, but with all who profess to have faith in Christianity as the word of God.

Lastly, the Professor speaks of the dogmatic spirit the idea of the infallibility of the Church encourages. Encourages in what or in whom ? In the Church ? If she be infallible, she

has the right to speak with dogmatic authority, and you must set aside her infallibility, before you can bring that as an objection to her. In individual Catholics? We deny the assertion. For, in admitting the infallibility of the Church, they necessarily deny to themselves the right or even the disposition to dogmatize. How can I dogmatize, when I am bound to take my faith from the Church, when I confess both her right and her ability, and her exclusive right and ability, to propound the faith, and find my merit in obedience to her? If any thing does or can check the spirit of dogmatism in individuals, it is this. The charge against Protestantism of encouraging a spirit of dogmatism in individuals would come with much more grace and truth from us; for the very nature of Protestantism—since it has no ultimate authority from which all are bound to take their faith, and since it proclaims the principle of private interpretation—is to encourage almost every man, woman, and child to dogmatize, to say, “This is the word of God, and you must believe this or be damned; no, that is n’t the word of God, this is the word of God; believe what I say is the word of God, or you’ll be damned.” This is the spirit of dogmatism, and the history of Protestantism is little else than a history of this spirit, and its deplorable effects. The Professor knows this, and, if he understands any thing of the relation of causes and effects, he knows wherefore it is so, and wherefore there cannot be, and never is, any spirit of dogmatism among Catholics. The Catholic never dogmatizes; he but teaches what he is commanded by his Church to teach; and you will rarely, if ever, find a Catholic writer, who lays down a proposition, without attempting, at least, to sustain it by competent authority or appropriate evidence. “Catholic theologians compare,” says the Professor (p. 543), “the evidences for their theology to those for their personal existence and identity.” If he means theology, as he says, this is false, utterly false; for no Catholic theologian pretends this, since every purely theological question is open to discussion. If he means *faith*, when he says theology, we ask the Professor if he is prepared to maintain the negative of what he condemns,—that the certainty afforded by the evidences there are for the word of God is a less degree of certainty than that we have of our own existence and identity? What the Professor says, on the same page, about “the deadness and corruption which come from an unthinking reception of a *human* creed,” we cheerfully accede to, and could find in the history of our beloved New

England much to confirm it ; but who told him the creed enjoined by the Catholic Church is a *human* creed ? Does he not see that he begs the question ? A humanly imposed creed, we admit, is destructive ; a divinely imposed creed is not destructive, but wholesome, and essential to the life of faith. Does the Professor suppose we do not condemn all man-made and man-imposed creeds as much as he does, ay, and more too ? Does he not know that we strenuously maintain that nothing but God's word is or can be an article of faith ? We will spare him all necessity of reasoning against *human* creeds. Show us our creed is imposed by human authority, and it suffices ; we abandon it at once. But no begging of the question. You are trying to prove our religion is hostile to the mind ; be sure, then, you vindicate the wholesome effects of your own, by reasoning clearly, honestly, and justly.

II. The second allegation is, that Catholicity “ checks the instinctive longings of the soul for progress in the science of divine things.” “ The spirit of the Reformation is that of improvement ; the principle of the Romanists is that of hyper-conservatism.”—p. 453. We thank the Professor for this. We have hitherto heard it urged that the fault of Rome was that of departing from the faith, corrupting it by her innovations, adopting new articles of faith, new sacraments, and imposing new conditions of salvation, unknown in the primitive ages of Christianity ; and that the glory of the Reformers was not in attempting improvements in the Christian system, in undertaking to perfect what Almighty God had left incomplete, but in reviving primitive faith and worship, which had been lost through the usurping and innovating spirit of Rome. Sure are we that we have read all this in Luther, in Calvin, in Zuingle, in Melancthon, in Œcolampadius, in Bucer, in Beza, in all the fathers of the Reformation whose writings we have chanced to look over, and we do not remember ever to have stumbled upon a single passage, in any one of them, that even intimates that the sin of Rome was that of hostility to progress in the science of divine things. Even in later times, when we read in Owen, and Robinson, and others, passages which urge a progress on Luther and Calvin, it is always a progress in restoration, or, as the militia captain has it, an “ advance backwards,” a progress in throwing off more and more of Babylonish error and corruption, and recovering more and more of the primitive truth long

hidden beneath the rubbish of Rome. Sure, we had seen it written, as it were, over the entrance of every Protestant conventicle, "PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY RESTORED HERE." But now it seems that the sin of Rome is hyperconservatism, that she has too scrupulously adhered to primitive usage, and too scrupulously preserved the sacred deposit committed to her charge from all alteration, from all the attempts of the innovators. So, on the authority of Professor Park, a child of the Reformation, glorying in his parentage, we must say the Reformers lied; said one thing and meant another; that, instead of restorers, they were innovators. It would be indecorous for us to contradict the Professor on this point, on which his authority is so much better than ours. We presume him to be correct, and that the Reformers were, as Catholics have always alleged, mere innovators, men who could no longer submit to primitive usage and worship, but wished to improve them, and to recast the Gospel in their own image. Hyperconservatism! We thank thee, Professor Park, for the word, and trust we shall hear no more about Roman corruptions, innovations, and departures from the faith. The Romish principle is that of hyperconservatism; the spirit of the Reformation is that of improvement, that is, of change, of innovation,—for only by change and innovation is improvement effected. Was the Professor prudent in saying this, and was he not in saying it thinking rather of the demands of Cambridge than of the pretensions of Andover?

But let us look the objection in the face. Catholicity checks the instinctive longings of the soul for progress. Progress in what? in what sense? and by what agency? The Professor either admits that Almighty God has made us a revelation of truth to be received on the divine veracity, or he does not. If he does not, he is what all the world call an infidel, and his quarrel, as we have said or intimated more than once already, is not with us alone, but with all who profess to believe in divine revelation; and, moreover, if he denies all revelation, he gains nothing to progress, for the matters covered by revelation are matters which lie out of the range of natural reason, and therefore reason, however free, bold, vigorous, persevering, can of itself make no progress in them. If he admits that Almighty God has made us a revelation, he must believe that the revelation is perfect or imperfect, that is, complete or incomplete. If perfect, it requires and can admit of no progress; for progress is from the imperfect to the perfect, and is not

predicable of what is already perfect. If he contends that it is imperfect, that is, that Almighty God has left it incomplete, unfinished, he must say its completion is to be effected by divine agency or by human agency. He cannot say it is to be effected by human agency, because the revelation is not only of things of God, but is made by God himself; and to assume that man can make it, take from it, or add to it, is to deny that it is divine revelation, and to assert that it is human revelation. Therefore, even admitting the revelation to be insufficient, incomplete, unfinished, *man* can do nothing towards completing, finishing it, or rendering it less insufficient. There is, then, no room in divine revelation for the instinctive longings of the soul for progress to express themselves. They are checked, we grant; not by Catholicity, but by the nature of things; because the progress, if progress there is to be, depends not on human will and effort, but on the divine will and bounty. We are taught in the Holy Scriptures to look not to ourselves, but to Jesus Christ as the author and finisher of our faith; and it depends wholly on God, not on our will nor on our merit, whether God shall reveal to us more truth or not, — for the simple reason, that revelation is a divine act, proceeding solely from the free will and gratuitous grace of God.

There can, we may assume, then, be no progress in divine revelation, as the object of faith, effected by human agency. Then progress here is not a thing we are to contemplate or labor for. If there are to be new and “greater Messiahs,” as the Progressists and Transcendentalists blasphemously dream, it belongs not to us to raise them up, anoint, and send them forth, but to God alone. This, we presume, the Professor will admit, and therefore we presume it is not progress in divine revelation that he contends for. In what, then, does he demand progress? In the extension of faith, and its more thorough application throughout the world to the government of the life and conduct of all men? But in this respect the Church checks no instinctive longings of the heart for progress; for here she commands progress, and, by all her ministries and missionaries in all parts of the world, and by her unremitted efforts against all hostile influences, is constantly struggling to effect it. If this is what the Professor means, his charge against Catholicity is false, — as the number and activity of Catholic missionaries, and the general zeal of Catholics to spread their faith, and to bring all men to it and under its influence, may abundantly prove.

But the Professor says, "Progress in the *science* of divine things." The science of divine things is not faith, but theology, which, from conclusions obtained by reason from the articles of faith as first principles, seeks to produce, elucidate, strengthen, and defend faith, and also to determine its application to practical life, which takes in the whole science of morals, theoretical and practical. The assertion of the Professor, then, is, that Catholicity checks the instinctive longings for progress in theology, speculative and practical, or dogmatical and moral. But if this is what he means, his assertion is false from beginning to end, and he offers, and can offer, not a single fact in the principles or in the history of Catholicity to give it even a coloring of truth.

Progress in the first principles of theology is not admissible, we grant ; because the first principles of theology are articles of faith, that is, divine revelation, and in that we have just seen there is no progress to be looked for, at least from human agency, and for progress in them the Professor cannot contend. But in the deduction of conclusions from these principles, in their scientific arrangement, illustration, and application, the Church imposes no limits to our progress but those of the human mind itself. This the Professor knows, and even admits. "We are, indeed, assured by Romish divines, that the science of theology may be advanced." — p. 454. "But Romanism (Catholicity) is so minute in its prescriptions, as to intersect the lines of advancement in almost every point, and whatever of expansion it does not prevent it leaves sickly and ill-shapen." — *Ib.* The only prescriptions of the Church in relation to theology are articles of faith. She does not allow you to impugn an article of faith, either directly or indirectly ; but so long as you do not do that, and proceed, not in a rash, but in a modest and reverent spirit, she leaves you perfect freedom. No prescriptions intersect the line of your advancement but the principles and definitions of faith ; and these, if true, cannot hinder your progress, but must aid it, according to what the Professor himself says, — "Truth is nature, and never enslaves the mind which it controls." — *Ib.* No injury, then, can come to the mind, and no check to progress, if these prescriptions be true, that is, the word of God, as the Church alleges. Then they are not objectionable as prescriptions, but as *false* prescriptions. If, then, you object to them simply as prescriptions, your objection is without weight ; if as false prescriptions, you beg the question.

“ We are but mocked, when we are told that we have powers for research, and may exert them, and may use the multiplied helps of modern science in the pursuit of truth, still we must not cross a single boundary which the assembled bishops have prescribed ; we may go on freely, so long as we are hemmed in by the canons and anathemas of Nice, Chalcedon, and Florence.”— pp. 453, 454. Not at all, if the boundary prescribed by the bishops be such as truth prescribes ; not at all, if the canons and anathemas are according to God’s word. God’s word is truth, and “ truth never enslaves the mind which it controls.” You must first show that the boundaries prescribed are false, and the canons and anathemas are not according to God’s word, before your argument is any thing more than a *petitio principii*. Catholicity affirms that the bounds prescribed are bounds which the truth itself prescribes. If so, they are landmarks, guides to the traveller, first principles, *data*, furnished the theologian in the demonstration of truth, and are as useful to him as the axioms and definitions are to the mathematician. They are injurious only on the supposition that they are false, which you are not at liberty to take for granted.

The Professor’s argument may be retorted. We are but mocked, when we are told we have powers, &c., still must not cross a single boundary prescribed by *divine revelation* ; we may move on freely, so long as hemmed in by the canons and anathemas of *God’s word*. If the Professor admits revelation at all, be what may its organ, the principle of his objection bears as hard against himself as against Catholics. If he does not admit revelation at all, he should say so, tell us plainly that he stands on infidel ground, and objects to the Church because she asserts that Almighty God has made us a revelation, which we must believe, and in no case disbelieve. *Qui crediderit, salvus erit ; qui vero non crediderit, condemnabitur.* — St. Marc. xvi. 16. It is worthy of note, that the Professor finds himself unable to bring an objection against Catholicity that is not equally an objection to Christian revelation itself. And yet we hear men, who think they are Christians, commending his Lecture ! How short-sighted is error, and how hard it is for those who have departed from the truth to maintain consistency, to avoid arguments, which, if admitted, are as fatal to themselves as to their opponents !

The Professor had no occasion to prove that bounds prescribed by men, restrictions imposed on thought by human authority, are injurious to the mind, fatal to its free and healthy

action, and incompatible with progress in science. Catholics know this, and assert this, as well as he, and are far more strenuously opposed to all human authority in matters of faith than he is, or any of his Protestant brethren are or ever have been ; for he, and even his brethren, if they carried out their principles, would allow us *only* a human authority for our faith, either the authority of our own minds, or that of others. What he should have proved, to have proved any thing to his purpose, is, that the Church speaks with a merely human authority, and that the articles she imposes are not the word of God, and therefore not to be taken as articles of faith. That is, he should, as we told him in the outset, have raised the question of the authority and infallibility of the Church. If the Church be not authorized to speak in the name of God, if she have not from God the promise of infallibility, if, in a word, it be not God himself that speaks in her speech and decides in her decision, we grant all you contend for, and as much more as you please ; but otherwise, we deny it, and you yourselves must deny it also ; “ for truth is nature, and never enslaves the mind which it controls.”

III. The third charge alleged is, that Catholicity “ exalts the traditions of antiquity above our own perceptions of truth, and degrades the mind by communion with triflers.” — p. 454. The first part of this charge is false. The Church does in no instance exalt the traditions of antiquity above our own perceptions of truth, or require us in any instance to deny or to doubt the truth of our perceptions ; for, if she did, she would exclude us from the number of teachable subjects. She teaches us truths which lie out of the range of our perceptions, and above them, — truths which we can receive only from supernatural revelation ; but never any doctrine which contradicts or supersedes our own perceptions of truth, or in any sense weakens the certainty or importance of the truth we perceive naturally. To be above reason is not to contradict reason ; and it is not easy to see how it can injure the mind to supply it gratuitously with first principles, by which its domain is almost infinitely extended, and which, except as supernaturally furnished, it has not and cannot have.

1. The Church commands us to believe traditions of antiquity as the word of God, we admit. If these traditions be false, to command belief in them is to injure the mind ; if they are true, really the word of God, it is not to injure the mind ;

for truth never injures. The Professor must show them to be false, unauthorized, before, from the fact that the Church commands us to believe them, he can conclude that she injures the mind. This he has not done, hardly even attempted to do.

If we object to the traditions of antiquity because they are *tradition*, we must object to the Christian revelation itself. A tradition of antiquity is something delivered, transmitted, or handed down to us from ancient times. The Christian revelation itself is, therefore, necessarily a tradition of antiquity, for it was made in ancient times, and could, in the nature of things, reach us only as delivered, transmitted, or handed down to us from ancient times. To contend, then, that the Church injures the mind simply because she commands us to hold fast the traditions of antiquity is, in principle, to contend that she injures the mind in commanding us to receive the Christian revelation as the word of God, and forbids us to disbelieve or impugn it. Does it injure the mind to be required to believe and to be forbidden to disbelieve the word of God? If not, it cannot injure the mind to be required to believe and forbidden to disbelieve traditions of antiquity, simply because they are traditions.

But the Professor will distinguish, we suppose, between tradition as contained in the written word, and oral tradition, insisted on by the Church. The latter injures the mind, the former does not. But he cannot avail himself of this distinction; because, 1. His objection was not to the mode of transmission, but to traditions of antiquity as traditions; and because, 2. The oral traditions of the Church can no more injure the mind than the written traditions, if they be equally true, equally portions of God's word. The question must turn, then, on the truth or authority of the tradition, not on the fact of its being written or unwritten.

But the Professor may say, again, that the traditions he objects to are traditions of *men*, not of the word of God; and we cannot be commanded to believe the traditions of men, without injury to the mind. But this would be a plain begging of the question. The Church concedes you, nay, teaches you, that the traditions of men are never to be taken as articles of faith, and that you cannot be rightfully required to believe them. She goes as far as, and even farther than, you in condemning their authority. But who told you that what she commands us to believe *are* traditions of men? She denies it,

and asserts they are not traditions of men, but traditions according to Christ, divine revelations, which she received in the beginning, and is divinely commissioned to teach ; you must prove, then, they are traditions of men, before, from the fact that the Church enjoins them, you can logically infer, that, in so doing, she injures the mind. If human traditions, they *may* injure the mind, we grant ; if divine, they cannot.

But, in point of fact, scarcely an article of faith, and not one of the primary or fundamental articles of faith, which the Church teaches, depends on unwritten tradition alone, or is not expressed or implied in the Holy Scriptures. The Church teaches nothing contradictory to the Holy Scriptures, and nothing not either contained in them or perfectly in harmony with their contents. What Protestants allege about Catholic disregard or neglect of the Bible is false and slanderous. Catholics hold the Bible in altogether higher veneration than does any class of Protestants, and make altogether more, as well as a better, use of it, in whatever relates to faith, morals, or devotion. Catholics are the only people that can afford to take the Bible throughout as the word of God, and understand its language in its most plain, easy, and natural sense ; for it is only Catholics who can find in its teachings a uniform, connected, and consistent system of doctrines, without doing violence to its language. Interpreted on Catholic principles, the Bible, though not without difficult passages, can be received and venerated as the word of God. On the principles of any Protestant sect, it is a book of riddles, contradictions, and often of no meaning at all, or of a meaning remarkable only for its want of depth. Catholics are taught by the Church that the Sacred Scriptures are the word of God, and they are excited to study them as the most abundant sources from which is to be drawn purity of morals and of doctrine, and are told by the highest authority, that, as such, they are to be left open to every one. Their interpretation is free, so long as the interpreter does not wrest them to teach what is incompatible with sound doctrine,—a restriction, in principle, which is put upon their interpretation by every Protestant sect ; for no Protestant sect permits its members to interpret the Bible so as to impugn what it calls sound doctrine, or does not visit with its censures those of its members who chance to do so.

But the Professor seeks to sustain his charge against Catholicity as injuring the mind, by alleging that she “lays down her instructions in a creed,” and “elevates the digests of her

councils to an infallible standard of truth."—pp. 454, 455. But, admitting the allegation, we deny the conclusion. The creed, if God's word, is true, and therefore cannot injure the mind, as we have agreed. It can injure the mind only on condition of its not being the word of God, or because not enjoined by the competent authority. But this is nothing to the Professor's purpose; for he does not object to the creed that it is injurious because false, or imposed by incompetent authority, but simply because it is a creed; and he cannot do so without denying the authority and infallibility of the Church,—which would be a mere begging of the question. A creed imposed by men injures the mind; but a creed imposed by God himself cannot injure the mind, for it is truth. You must prove, then, that the creed taught by the Church is imposed by men, by human authority, as we said in the case of traditions, before from the fact that it is a creed you can conclude to its injurious influence.

But the Professor either admits the Christian revelation, or he does not. If not, he is an infidel, and his quarrel, as we have before told him, is not with Catholicity alone, but with all who profess to receive that revelation as ultimate authority on the matters it covers. If he does admit the revelation, his admission of it is itself a creed, more or less definite, but still a creed; for he admits it as something he must believe, as authority in no case to be questioned or impugned. The idea of revelation itself, as a matter to be believed and obeyed, then, necessarily involves the idea of creed, a *credo*. You cannot, then, say that a creed, because it is a creed, injures the mind, without saying that the Christian revelation itself injures the mind, which no Christian will, or dare, say.

But, perhaps, the objection is not to a creed as such, but to its being condensed, methodical, compressing the faith within a narrow compass. This seems to be the gist of the Professor's objection. But the revelation is made that it may be believed; condensing its substance into a few propositions, easily ascertained, and easily remembered, simply facilitates the apprehension and knowledge of what it is we are to believe. Is this an injury to the mind? Is it an injury to the mind to be able easily to seize the propositions which it is to believe without doubting, and in all its operations on divine things to take, as first principles, primitive *data*? If the Professor is prepared to maintain the affirmative, we shall not take the trouble to contradict him.

But the Professor, in what he says on this point, conveys a false impression. His language is vague, indeterminate, and may receive almost any interpretation the future exigencies of his argument may render expedient ; but its natural interpretation is, that the Church draws up a creed, into which she compresses the theological instructions of her fathers and doctors and her digests of the councils. But this is not the fact. In the first place, theological instructions, properly so called, are not embraced in the creed ; for the creed embraces only what is of faith ; and theology, whether of fathers or doctors, is not of faith. In the second place, the Church denies that she does or has authority, properly speaking, to impose a creed. She teaches the creed, but she did not and does not make it. She received it from Almighty God through the Apostles, and simply teaches what she has received, and been commanded to teach, and which she has no authority to alter, add to, or take from. She does not, then, condense her instructions into a methodical creed. She received them so condensed. The councils, again, do not give us digests of doctrine, but simply definitions of what is, and always has been, the creed, or the articles of faith on certain points on which controversies have arisen. They do not add to the creed, they do not take from it, nor in any sense alter it ; they but tell us what it is and always has been. To this the Professor cannot object, unless he carries his objection farther back, and objects, not to the Church for teaching the creed, or for requiring us to receive the decisions of councils as infallible truth, but to the Church herself, that she has not received but has made the creed, and that her councils are fallible. But this he is not at liberty to do in his present line of argument, as we have shown him over and over again. He alleges the Church does so and so, and thence concludes the Church injures the mind. But if the Church has from God authority to do so and so, what she does cannot injure the mind. Before her conduct can be alleged to be injurious to the mind, it must be proved that she acts from mere human authority, and when that is done, no Catholic will attempt to defend her conduct. The Professor proves nothing till he proves that, and when he has proved that he has proved all.

But by what right does Professor Park inveigh against creeds ? He belongs to Andover, not to Cambridge. He is a Protestant ; and every Protestant sect, unless it be the Unitarians, and one or two minor sects, to which the Professor

would refuse to grant even the Christian name, it is well known, has its creed, a creed strictly enjoined, and which must be received on the pains and penalties of heresy. He is a Calvinist, and the Calvinists universally have a creed, or rather many creeds, professedly drawn up under the dictation of the Holy Ghost, and fitly emblemed by the weathercocks on their meeting-houses. He is a Congregational clergyman, and of that branch of the Congregational churches that have a creed, insist on a creed, and have been fighting for a creed with the Unitarians this last thirty years. And, finally, he is a Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, which has a special creed, now lying before us, by the constitution of the Seminary "strictly and solemnly enjoined, and left in charge, that every article of it shall for ever remain entirely and identically the same, without the least alteration, addition, or diminution," and which the Professor must subscribe, and promise "solemnly to maintain and inculcate in opposition to *Papists*, *Arians*, *Pelagians*, *Antinomians*, *Arminians*, *Socinians*, *Sabellians*, *Unitarians*, and *Universalists*, and to all other heresies and errors, ancient or modern." The constitution of the Seminary also adds,—"The preceding *Creed* and *Declaration* shall be repeated by every Professor on this foundation, at the expiration of every successive period of five years; and no man shall be continued a Professor on said foundation who shall not continue to approve himself a man of sound and orthodox principles in divinity agreeably to the aforesaid creed." And this man does not blush to arraign the Catholic Church because she teaches a creed! Whatever a Unitarian or an infidel might say against creeds, Professor Park is not—till he liberates himself and takes his stand with them—the man to open his mouth. He is bound hand and foot; and a sense of shame, if nothing else, should have restrained him from calling any other man a slave,—especially from calling freemen slaves.

2. To the second part of this third charge we have not much to reply. The "triflers," communion with whom, according to the Professor, degrades the mind, are the Fathers and Schoolmen,—such "triflers" as St. Justin Martyr, St. Irenæus, Tertullian, before he became a Montanist, Clemens Alexandrinus, St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory Nyssen, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, St. Leo the Great, St. Gregory the Great, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, Albertus Magnus, St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas of Aquin, Duns

Scotus, and hundreds of others hardly their inferiors ! The only reply we have to make to the modern professor who can call such men as these "triflers" is to say, that he gives unequivocal evidence that his mind has not been *degraded* by communion with them. "To revere," says the Professor, "their Gnostic or Platonic fancies, as a standard of thought, is a cause as well as the effect of a vitiated taste and unreasonable judgments."—p. 455. Very likely ; but where or when does the Church require us to revere "Gnostic or Platonic fancies ?" The Fathers, all with one accord, we had supposed, struggled against the Gnostics ; and St. Justin Martyr, in his *Second Discourse to the Greeks*, gives us one of the most masterly criticisms on Plato extant. Very few of the Fathers were Platonists before their conversion ; and not one of them, so far as we recollect, retained, after his conversion, what may properly be termed a "Platonic fancy" ; and furthermore, no Father is held to be of authority any farther than his teachings have been received by the Church. The great charge usually urged against the Schoolmen is, not that they were Platonists, but servile followers of Aristotle ; and this is the charge urged by the Professor himself. "Some of her theories are literally made up of Aristotelianism."—*Ib.* But one cannot follow Aristotle, and, at the same time, revere the "fancies" of Plato "as a standard of truth." Moreover, the Church has no *theories*, enjoins no *theories*. Theories belong not to the Church, but to theologians, whose teachings are not of faith. The assertion, that even a theologian, of any consideration among Catholics, ever adopted a theory literally made up of Aristotelianism, would be false. No theologian of the Church ever regarded either Aristotle or Plato of the least authority in theology ; and when the Fathers and Schoolmen quote one or the other, it is as an argument *ad hominem*, or on a point, not of theology, but of philosophy.

Speaking of the Schoolmen, the Professor says, "They were *acute* rather than wise men."—*Ib.* We thought the Professor began by commending acuteness of intellect, and making it a charge against the Church that she hindered, or did not provide for, "sharpening the intellect." But now it seems her sin is that she sharpens the intellect too much, making men acute rather than wise. We wish the Professor would agree with himself what is the real sin of the Church, and not urge objections which overthrow one another, lest we be obliged to question both his wisdom and acuteness in urging them. If the

Church is unfavorable to acuteness of intellect, how did those Schoolmen contrive to become such acute men? And, if to sharpen the intellect be a good, contemplated by Almighty God in adjusting the evidences of religion, why do you find fault with the Schoolmen *because* they were acute? You should better digest your own doctrines, and become more consistent in your objections, before undertaking to pronounce *ex cathedrâ* on Catholicity.

IV. The fourth charge against Catholicity is, that it injures the mind by authorizing "a worship which presents a low standard of thought and feeling." — p. 456. If the Church authorizes such a worship, she may not advance the mind much; but even then it does not follow that she injures it, unless the standard she presents is in the way of a higher standard. High and low are relative terms. If, without the Church, the mind would have a higher standard than she presents, then she injures it; if, without her, it would have only a still lower standard, then she does not injure it, but benefits it. The Professor, before he makes out his case, then, must not only prove that her standard is low in comparison with some ideal standard, but that it is substituted for a higher standard, which the mind, but for it, would have. But this he has not done; therefore his assertion, so far as he is concerned, remains an assertion, and nothing more, — an assertion which we have as good a right to deny as he has to affirm. As proofs of his assertion, the Professor adduces, — 1. The honor and invocation of saints; 2. The use of pictures and statues; and, 3. Certain miscellaneous charges, defying classification, but which can as well be arranged under the head of *Mere Externals of Catholic Worship*, as under any other.

1. The question is not now, whether the honor and invocation of saints are authorized by Almighty God or not, but whether honoring and invoking the saints tends to injure the mind. When we honor or invoke the saints, we are led to make ourselves acquainted with their lives and characters, to meditate on their heroic virtues, and to strive to imitate them. Where is the injury to the mind in this? What harm would it do our widows, wives, or daughters to meditate on the exalted virtues of the Mother of our Lord, — the Blessed Virgin, — or on the virtues of St. Catharine, St. Elizabeth, St. Monica, St. Bridget, or St. Theresa? Would it do them more harm than to meditate on the virtues of Aspasia, Laïs,

Sappho, Madame Roland, Lady Russell, Caroline Fry, or Harriet Newell ?

But this, the Professor may say, is not to the point. He who communes directly with God himself communes with a higher standard of thought than he does who communes only with St. Nicholas, St. Xavier, and St. Cecilia. Admitted. But this is not the question. The real question is, Does communion with the great, the good, the saintly, made such by the grace of God, tend to divert the mind from God himself ? The Professor, to sustain his objection, may say that it does ; but we tell him his assertion is contradicted by all experience. While in the flesh, we are obliged to commune with God through a veil, for we do not now see him face to face ; and we are led to him by his manifestations of himself. Thus nature herself, as displaying his eternal power and divinity, leads us to acknowledge him, and to look to him as our beginning and end. But what brighter manifestation of the Divinity on earth than the lives of the saintly men and women who have lived in the most intimate communion with him permitted, and who in their lives exhibit nothing but continued miracles of his grace ? When are we most thoughtful, most impressed with God's presence ? and when send we forth the warmest ejaculations of prayer, praise, and thanksgiving ? Is it not when in personal intercourse with, or when reading the life of, some truly good and saintly man or woman ? Communion with such, instead of drawing off our minds and hearts from God, tends directly to lead our minds and hearts up to him, and we strive with new resolution and renewed energy to love and serve him as his saints do or have done. When is the young soldier fired for the battle, if not when communing with the renowned hero, listening to the recital of his dangers, trials, escapes, prowess, and victories ? So is the soldier of the cross fired for the spiritual combat by contemplating the lives of those who have fought and won, by listening to their trials, their temptations, their struggles and their victories, — how God was always with them, even when hiding his face from them, his arm was always under them to uphold them, and his grace always sufficient for them. O God ! let me imitate them ! and ye who have ended your mortal combats, and now sing your songs of triumph around the throne of God, pray for me, that I too may fight on, overcome, and at last join your blessed throng !

On the same principle on which the Professor condemns the invocation of saints and the honor we pay them, he should con-

demn all biography of great and good men and women ; for the study of their lives would tend to draw off our minds from God, and to rest them on the creature, whose excellence was all borrowed from God. Yet we cannot much blame the Protestants for trying to find fault with the honor we pay to the saints ; for they, alas ! have no saints to honor. Luther, Calvin, Beza, Cranmer, John Knox, even Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards, were at best but indifferent saints ; and Henry Martyn, Brainerd, and Harriet Newell will hardly do to canonize. An eminent Congregational clergyman, a well known author, some of whose works are text-books in several American colleges, and who is himself a Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in a New England college, informed a friend of ours, that he commenced, some time since, collecting the lives of eminent Christians. " When I began my collection," said he, " I thought I should find two or three in the Roman Catholic Church whom I might possibly insert in my list, — say Fénelon, and one or two others ; but I have ended with the full conviction, that the highest type of Christian perfection is to be found exhibited nowhere out of the Roman Catholic Church." Such will be every man's experience, who, with some appreciation of what Christian sanctity is, engages in and prosecutes the same undertaking. The Roman Catholic Church is the only church that bears the note of sanctity. In losing Unity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity, the sects lose also Sanctity ; and when — as most of them do — they profess to believe "*sanctam ecclesiam catholicam*," they must mean some church beside their own contentious body.

The Professor has no occasion to talk to Catholics about the ennobling effects of spiritual communion with God. Just as if he could teach them any thing on this subject, — he whose sect has never produced even one respectable ascetic work, and whose best ascetic works are stolen and diluted from us ! Just as if, because we pray to the saints, we pray to God less ! All our prayers are directed to God ; even those to the saints close always by ascribing the honor to the ever living and ever blessed Trinity.

Nor need he presume *quite* so much on the ignorance of Catholics. No Catholic is so ignorant, so poorly instructed in his religion, as to pay to the saints that worship which is due to God alone. We honor the saints for their heroic virtues, and, in so doing, honor God, to whose grace alone they owed their virtues. We pray to the saints, but not that they may do for us

that which only God can do, not to perform for us what they cannot perform ; but to assist us with their prayers, as the Professor prays for his congregation at its request, or asks a brother or sister to pray for him. We make this request of sinful mortals like ourselves ; how much rather of the saints who are freed from sin and stand near the throne ! If, in the first case, we rob not God of his glory, why shall it be said we do in the last ?

2. The use of “ pictures and statues ” cannot injure the mind, if communing with the saints does not ; for they only serve to remind us of the saints, and to bring more vividly to our recollection their virtues and eminent sanctity. We honor them, indeed, as the Professor honors a picture of John Calvin, President Edwards, or of his wife ; as the patriot does the picture or statue of Washington ; the soldier, of Alexander, Cæsar, or Napoleon ; the Democrat, of Andrew Jackson ; the Whig, of Henry Clay ; the pious son, the picture of his mother ; or the lover, the picture of his mistress ; — not as material things, but for the sake of what they represent or bring to our minds and hearts. We see no injury to the mind here. The statue or picture simply recalls to our minds and hearts a worth we delight to honor and which we ought to honor, or virtues which it is our duty to strive to imitate.

So the image of the crucifixion, the cross, the sign of the cross, serve to recall the mystery of the incarnation, the life, death, and sufferings of our blessed Saviour, the great work of the Atonement, to point us to the great Source of all merit, to remind us that we are to bear the cross, are to fight under it as our banner, and for it and in it to triumph. Where, in all this, is the injury done to the mind ? Is it an injury to the mind to reflect on the great mysteries of man’s redemption, or to have the attention, if but for a moment, directed frequently to their contemplation ? The insinuation, that Catholics worship pictures, images, or the crucifix, is old, we admit, but is false. No Catholic believes there is any virtue in them, or ever addresses any prayer to them ; for he is taught in his catechism, and he knows of himself, that they have no life or sense, and therefore no power to assist him. As well might we charge the people of Massachusetts with being Fetichists, as the Professor charge us with worshipping images. We go into the State House in Boston, into the Representatives’ Hall, and right in front of the Speaker’s chair we see suspended the carved image of a codfish. We watch ; every time the Speak-

er rises, he bows gracefully, or ungracefully, to this image of the codfish ; thus apparently paying it his reverence, and, as it were, asking its permission to put the motion, or to decide the question of order. "What stupid creatures these Massachusetts people are !" we exclaim ; "what wretched idolaters ! how they debase the mind ! Why, they officially worship a carved codfish !" "O, no," says a grave legislator, "we do not worship the codfish, nor the image of the codfish. But we hang up that image there to remind the General Court of the great importance to the Commonwealth of the codfishery, and that they are to take care that in none of their legislative acts they injure it." "A mere Jesuitical refinement, intended to dupe the ignorant and unthinking ; perhaps *you*, who are a man of some sense, may so understand it ; but the mass of the members of the General Court do not and cannot." "But ask them ; they will all give the same answer." "No matter for that ; they have all been trained to give that answer, so as to screen the people of Massachusetts from the charge of worshipping a carved codfish. I know better. I tell you, you do actually worship the carved codfish. See there ! the Speaker is even now bowing before it." Yet the answer of the legislator would be perfectly true and conclusive ; and my reasoning and assertions would be false. The reason assigned for putting the image there is a good one. But if Massachusetts may, without idolatry, suspend in her State House the carved image of a codfish, to remind the General Court that it is not to sacrifice the codfishery, why cannot I, without idolatry, place on my desk before me, as I write, an image of the passion of my blessed Saviour, that, when I raise my eyes from the paper, I may be reminded of him who died for me, of what he suffered for me, whence my redemption comes, where is the source of all merit, whose virtues I am to honor and to strive to imitate, and for whose sake ? If it be said, in return, this may do in my case, but that it will not in that of less instructed Catholics, for they will stop with the image and worship that instead of him who died on the cross, we answer, that too much is presumed on the ignorance of Catholics. Catholics are not quite so stupid as the Professor imagines, and we assure him that we do not believe even the most ignorant class of Protestants themselves would be unable to distinguish between an image of the crucifixion and him who was crucified. But if so, the argument from their inability to that of Catholics would not be conclusive. If the Professor, searching the world over, will find a

Catholic, who has made his first communion, that does not know that supreme worship is due to God alone, — that is besotted enough to pay religious worship to any picture, image, or material thing, or to pay, even to a saint, that adoration which belongs only to God, — or that cannot, or does not, make all distinctions necessary to save him from the charge of idolatry in form or in substance, — we will yield him the argument. Produce, then, a Catholic that pays divine honors to an image or picture, to a saint or any created being, or for ever after hold your peace.

But be on your guard. No matter what strong language you may hear the devout Catholic use in addressing praises to the Blessed Virgin or to a patron saint, you are never from it alone to infer an idolatrous sense. The poet is permitted to call even a mortal woman, a sinful woman, who is little else than flesh and blood, divine ; and the lover celebrates his mistress in terms as strong as any we can find in which to celebrate the praises of our Redeemer. And yet neither is accused of idolatry. If we would worthily celebrate her whom an angel pronounced “ full of grace,” who was found worthy to be the Virgin Mother of him “ who is God over all,” — or if we would worthily celebrate the virtues of a beatified saint, whom God himself delights to honor, we must use the strongest terms human language affords, and even then our language is too feeble for our thought. We can use no stronger terms when we celebrate the praises of God, for stronger terms we have not. It is not that we exaggerate the praises of the Blessed Virgin or of the saint, but that we fall lamentably short in the expression of our praises to God. No tongue can adequately praise him ; no, not that of angel or highest archangel. The strongest terms that language furnishes, aided by the loftiest strains of soul-enkindling music, fall far below what the devout soul feels in the presence of her God, and are infinitely inadequate to their object. We cannot speak his praise ; — we would do it ; we would give the universe a tongue ; we would touch its heart with fire from God’s altar. We would bid it speak, and speak for us, but all too feeble ; we fall prostrate, and speak only in our *silence*. Draw no inference from the language you may hear, for, if you do, you will deceive yourself. You must penetrate to the intent of the speaker. You must bring a Catholic, that, by his words and acts, intends to pay the honors to a creature due only to the Creator, and that cannot, or does not, when questioned, distinguish as clearly between what he

pays to the creature and what he should pay to the Creator, as a Protestant can between the reverence due to a parent or magistrate and that due to God, or you bring not one we will acknowledge to be an idolater. Bring forward some such person, or stand convicted before the world of consummate ignorance or of consummate falsehood.

The Professor is mistaken in his assertion, that Catholics attempt to shadow forth by pictorial representations the infinite, eternal, and invisible God, or to express by picture or statue his divine essence. They do no such thing, and they give pictorial representations of only such visible forms as God himself has been known actually to assume. If the Father is sometimes represented as the Ancient of Days, it is not because that form expresses his character, but because he so appeared to the holy prophet Daniel, and the representation is authorized by the Holy Scriptures. If the Holy Ghost is represented by a dove, it is not because the dove emblems him, but because he himself chose that form and appeared under it at the baptism of our blessed Saviour. If the Son is painted in a human form, it is because, being man as well as God, that form is appropriate ; and, moreover, it was in the form of a man that he appeared, suffered, died, and rose for us. But in no instance does the Church authorize a pictorial representation as a likeness or emblem of the invisible God ; for it is as well known among Catholics as among Protestants, that there is nothing unto which God can be likened. Protestants must not be quite so hasty to conclude, when by accident they light upon a truth, that it is theirs by right of first discovery. Some traveller may have been there before them ; for they must remember they are not very old, and that it is only, as it were, yesterday that they set out on their travels. Considerable portions of the globe of truth had been discovered and occupied before they were even born. Brave men lived before Agamemnon. Luther and Calvin came too late to enjoy a monopoly of truth or virtue. The young think the old are fools, but the old know the young are fools.

3. We have no space to follow the Professor through his long string of naked assertions concerning the mere externals of Catholic worship. We deny, in the outset, his competency to judge of Catholic worship ; for it was designed to edify Catholics, and cannot produce its intended effect on infidels and heretics. He must be a Catholic, believe the Catholic creed, and love the Catholic Church as his spiritual Mother, be-

fore he can be in the condition to appreciate the truth, beauty, or appropriateness of Catholic worship ; for that worship must necessarily be altogether a different thing to the devout worshipper from what it is to the critical eye of the indifferent or hostile spectator.

We do not think, in a general way, the Catholic worship is very well calculated to edify those who go to *see* it and not to *assist* as worshippers. But this we do not regard as a reproach ; it is a commendation. If, for instance, the Catholic worship could edify the infidel and the heretic as well as the Catholic, it would have no special adaptedness to Catholic faith, dispositions, and wants, and therefore would not answer the end for which it was intended. We ourselves were strongly prejudiced against Catholic worship. Our Puritan tastes and habits, our love of simplicity and dislike of every thing having the least appearance of being designed for mere show or stage effect, made us feel a real repugnance to Catholic worship, as we knew it when a Protestant. So strong, indeed, was our repugnance, that for some time, even after we had become pretty well convinced of the truth of Catholicity, we obstinately refused to assist at Mass ; and when we did assist for the first time, setting aside the music and the sermon, which we could appreciate, we were only *not* disgusted. But now we seem to find the Catholic worship singularly simple, natural, and appropriate. We detect nothing in it not necessary, or, at least, highly useful. Protestant worship we find now to be formal, lifeless, and chilling. Not that we do not find it all that we ever did, all even that Protestants themselves find it ; but the spirituality revealed by Catholicity is so much higher, so much truer and more refined than a Protestant ever conceives of, that Protestant spirituality itself ceases to be spirituality, and becomes a cold, lifeless formality, a mere shadow without a substance. This is, indeed, but the experience of an individual, and it is merely as such that we give it, to go for what it is worth. It is worth, at least, as much as the Professor's bare assertions, proceeding as they do necessarily from Protestant ignorance and Protestant prejudice, which render it impossible for him to know what Catholic worship is, or the influence it is adapted to exert on the worshipper. If the Protestant reader will insist that he must make an allowance for our partiality to Catholicity, he must make at least an equal allowance for the Professor's partiality against it.

The gist of the charge is, that Catholicity presents a low standard of thought and feeling in the worship it authorizes.

“When a Protestant enters the sanctuary, he is made thoughtful by the words of prayer and the reading of the Scriptures; and we are unable to measure the degree of mental improvement which he receives from services thus adapted to his understanding. But the Romanist [Catholic] is not instructed by the reiteration of his stereotyped observances. He hears the Bible read in a language which imparts to him none of its meaning, and in some churches he cannot even distinguish the words of the Scripture lesson, for these are drowned in the tumult of the ringing of bells, and the pealing of the organ, which are designed to honor the recital of what would be more truly honored if it were made intelligible, or even audible. The rational Protestant is *instructed* by the sacraments. They were intended to be sermons to the mind, and thereby to the heart. But the genius of Rome has transformed them from symbolical discourses into a species of necromancy. They are described as operating, not by rational appeal, but by a kind of talismanic influence. Protestantism would sanctify men by the truth which enlightens the intellect; but Romanism [Catholicity] depends on the mechanical working of rites that supersede our own activity. Protestantism insists, first of all, on faith, by which man is to be justified, and faith involves a vigorous exercise of reason; but Romanism lays the chief stress upon external ordinances which can renovate the soul without a rational contemplation of the truth addressed to it.”—pp. 458, 459.

We have made this long quotation partly for the purpose of showing the Professor's method of argument, which consists in following one bare assertion by another, without one particle of proof but what is supplied by the knowledge or the prejudice of his hearer or reader. If that knowledge or prejudice should happen not to be in his favor, he would establish nothing; and yet the *Christian Examiner*—a Unitarian periodical, which we have been accustomed to consider at least tolerably fair in its criticisms—says of this Lecture, that it “may be characterized as exhibiting a remarkable vigor and condensation of thought and *powerful argument*, with copious and apt historical illustrations and references. It is original, profound, and impressive, dealing in subtle analysis, and appealing to great principles of human nature.”* Nevertheless, the Lecture contains not even the semblance of an argument, from beginning to end; it has not a single apt historical illustration or reference, for it has not one that is not in a great measure, if not wholly, false; it has not a single original, striking, or pro-

* *Christian Examiner*, September, 1845, p. 278.

found remark, and makes not a single appeal to a great principle of either revelation or human nature, nor to any thing else but the ignorance and prejudices of the author's hearers or readers. All the author's strength, all his merit, lies in his simply saying what those he addresses are previously prepared to receive as truth. We concede to the author the merit of adapting his discourse to his audience, which, when a man's object is, not to vindicate the truth, or to promote the glory of God, but to carry his audience with him, is, perhaps, a merit, — a merit such as may be aspired to by a rhetorician or a demagogue ; but not a merit very strongly coveted by one who has studied in the Christian school, and learned to value truth as "the pearl of great price," and to seek the praise of God rather than the praise of men.

Now, nothing can be more untrue than the general tenor and the particular statements of the extract we have made, so far as they bear on Catholicity ; and nothing better can be desired to show how low and *unspiritual* are the author's own conceptions. In the first place, the bells do not ring nor the organ peal during the recital of the Scripture lesson ; and, in the second place, the lesson for the day, the people, to a great extent, know by heart in their own language, and all have or may have it before them in a language they can understand.

But the passage extracted is worthy of notice as displaying a Protestant's conceptions of religious worship. It is remarkable how studiously the Professor keeps God out of sight. Prayers are offered, not to obtain a blessing from God, but to make the hearer thoughtful and to improve his understanding. They are lectures addressed to the hearers, and are to serve as intellectual exercises. Hence, a newspaper in this city once complimented a prayer offered by a famous Protestant divine, by saying, "It was the most eloquent prayer ever offered to a Boston audience." The sacraments, again, are sermons, symbolical discourses, addressed to the understanding, and their efficacy is in their appropriateness, as intellectual addresses, to enlighten the mind ; and yet, this same Professor makes it a grave charge against the Catholic Church, that she observes, from the earliest antiquity, certain symbolical ceremonies in administering the sacrament of baptism ! (note, p. 459.) The whole thought which runs through the statement is human ; and, according to the Protestant, the whole efficacy of divine worship consists simply in its being an intellectual exercise.

Prayer does not benefit us by calling down a blessing from God, but by exercising our mind or affections ; the sacraments impart no divine grace, but aid us only as an intellectual exercise. God, strictly speaking, answers no prayer ; the worship he demands of us is the medium or condition of no grant from him, but an exercise, which, if performed, may have a tendency to strengthen the mind and warm the heart. Here is Protestantism ; and it is easy to see that it embraces not a single religious conception, and acknowledges no principle which the veriest infidel might not admit ; and yet it is commended for its sublime spirituality !

Protestant worship is, by the confession of Protestants themselves, mere formality, consists merely in empty ceremonies. Baptism with them is nothing but a ceremony. It imparts no grace, impresses no character, is simply a ceremony of initiation into the Church ; and, in the case of adults, a mere ceremony initiating outwardly those believed to be already initiated spiritually. Ordination, as practised by Protestants generally, the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, is a mere ceremony, for it imparts no grace, no character, and no authority ; but merely witnesses the fact that the recipient takes upon himself the office of teacher, or that the congregation has called him to be its pastor. At least, this is all it is among Congregationalists, of which sect the Professor is a minister. Marriage, again, according to Protestants, is no sacrament, but a contract, and the solemnization by the minister is but a ceremony witnessing or declaring the fact of the contract. Hence Protestants call it "the marriage ceremony." So, also, what they call "the Lord's Supper" is purely a ceremony, the simple ceremony of taking a bit of bread and a sip of wine ; for they insist, and in their case very truly, that it is nothing but bread and wine they partake. It is a shadow, a symbol ; no real partaking of the Lord's body and blood, as they confess and contend. What is it, then, but a form, a ceremony, they observe, without any life or reality in itself ? The Protestant has no altar, no victim, no real sacrifice, and therefore nothing which is distinctively divine worship. He has nothing to offer to God ; and, according to his principles, he could worship God as well, as acceptably, as truly, and with as much benefit to himself, at home in his study, or abroad in the fields, and without a priest, as in the temple of God. But there is no worship of God where there is not a sacrifice, and no sacrifice without a priest, an altar, and the victim. The

sacrifices of prayer and praise and of a contrite heart are, indeed, due to God, and are necessary, if we would have our offering upon the altar profitable to us ; but they are not the distinctive act of divine worship, nor what distinguishes Christian worship from all others. They can be offered by a pagan or a Jew, and, if these were our only sacrifice, there would be nothing positive in Christian worship to distinguish it from the pagan or the Jewish ; and yet the blessed Apostle Paul tells us, "We have an altar whereof they who serve the tabernacle cannot eat."—Heb. xiii. 10.

Now, in contrast with this Protestant view, the Catholic worship presupposes always and everywhere a real presence. Under the form you are always to look for a reality. Baptism is a sacrament ; orders are a sacrament ; marriage is a sacrament ; and the Blessed Eucharist is a sacrament ;—and sacraments are not mere forms, insignificant signs, nor mere symbolical discourses, designed simply to shadow forth some moral or intellectual truth to the understanding, but signs significant, which impart to the recipient the reality they signify. The sacrifice of the Mass is not a mere sacrifice of prayer and praise, nor the symbolical offering of the Lamb that was slain for us ; but a real sacrifice, in which our blessed Lord, in a mystical, but in a real, manner, is actually present on our altars, and actually offered to God, himself being both priest and victim. The Communion, again, is not a symbolical communion, not the figurative reception of the body of our Lord, which our faith is to perform the miracle of converting into his real body ; but an actual partaking of the real body and blood of our blessed Saviour. Here all is real, nothing merely figurative ; substantial, not merely formal. The ceremonies usually observed in administering the sacraments, or in celebrating the most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, are few, and only such as are well adapted to dispose the minds and hearts of those who receive the sacraments for their worthy reception, or those who assist at the most Holy Sacrifice to assist with proper affections and recollection. Now, take the Protestant view of Protestant worship, and the Catholic view of Catholic worship, and we ask, which is the least formal, and which presents the highest standard of thought and feeling ?

"But the genius of Rome has transformed the sacraments into a species of necromancy." This remark betrays the Protestant thought, and shows that in the sacraments the Protestant looks for no virtue, believes in no efficacy, but what is

supplied by the recipient. They, then, do not lead the Protestant directly up to God, nor bring God down to man. That is, they establish no direct communion with God, and therefore, according to the Professor's own principles (p. 456), should be condemned. It shows, too, the infidel thought with which the author writes. To regard the sacraments as channels of grace, through which the Holy Ghost operates for our justification, growth, and perfection, is to "transform them into a species of necromancy!" How completely has the Professor lost sight of God! How he sneers at the bare thought of expecting any thing from the Holy Ghost! A moment ago, he accused us of injuring the mind by separating it from communion with God; and now he accuses us of "necromancy," because we show him that we believe in communion with God!

"But Romanism depends on the mechanical working of rites that supersede our own activity." This is false. The Catholic in no sense believes in, or depends on, the "*mechanical* working of rites." The efficacy of the sacraments is not mechanical, but divine, and it is not the form, but the Holy Ghost operating through the form, that is efficacious; nor does this supersede our activity, for it demands the concurrence of our activity with the operations of the Holy Spirit. Yet, so little faith has the Professor, so little does he understand of the genius of the Gospel, that, where any other agency than that of man is presupposed, he concludes it must needs be mechanical! A most learned doctor he, and a most devout believer! We may see here the real difference between the Protestant and the Catholic thought. According to the Protestant, God is nowhere present in Christian worship, save as he is present in nature, in every commendable affection or true thought; according to the Catholic, he is everywhere in the Christian worship, not only naturally present, but supernaturally present. By it we are brought into his presence in a supernatural manner, and therefore have a much more intimate communion with him than the Protestant even pretends to have. Consequently, according to the principles of the Professor himself, the Catholic worship should have, as it actually has, a more elevating effect on the mind than Protestant worship.

Now, it is this supernatural presence of God that scandalizes our Professor. He depends on the worshipper for the efficacy of the worship, or on the eloquence and skill of the

minister, and does not once expect God to do any thing supernaturally. The Catholic differs from him in this. The Catholic expects all from God. He worships, that he may pay to God what he owes, and that God may grant him the help he needs. When he prays, he does not pray to himself, or regard the effect which the prayer, as a spiritual exercise, may naturally operate in himself, although this is an effect not to be despised ; but he prays to God, and looks to God's bounty to answer his prayer, and confer on him the blessing he craves or needs. This is an important consideration, and shows that the Catholic believes in God's gracious providence, and that we may go to our God as children to a father, and not be sent empty away, or with no other benefit than the act of asking has produced within us.

Take this thought with you, and, for the "necromancy" of the Professor, understand the grace of God ; for "mechanical working of rites" of which he speaks, understand the operations of the Holy Ghost ; and you may see that what Protestants object to Catholic worship is but the effusion of their own infidelity. The priest faces the altar, not the people, because he prays to God, and not to them ; he speaks in a low, inaudible voice, or in a language they do not understand, because he speaks to God, not to them, and because his prayers are to benefit them, not by the edification which listening to them as popular harangues might afford, but by the blessings they obtain from God for them. They are *prayers*, not harangues, — and for the ears of Almighty God, not for the ears of the people. Here is the point. The prayer, in the estimation of the Professor, appears to be thrown away, if only heard by Almighty God!

The use of the Latin language is no objection, for we may presume our Heavenly Father can understand Latin as well as English. It is used in the Latin Church because originally it was the language of the people, because her liturgy was originally composed in that language, because it is well that the Church throughout the world should speak in one and the same tongue, and because all spoken languages are fluctuating and variable in the sense they give to their words, and, if the service were preserved only in them, the unity and integrity of the faith might be sacrificed. But every thing that is addressed to the people, every part of the service which it is necessary they should understand, is addressed to them in their own language ; and, moreover, the whole Missal is translated into English, and the simply English reader can follow the priest

whenever he chooses. If he does not choose, it suffices to join his intention with that of the priest, and engage in such special devotions as he finds most for his edification.

The ringing of bells, which the Professor seems to object to, he would soon find, if a Catholic worshipper, is no idle ceremony. The bell does not ring to honor a recital, but to inform the worshippers, who are not presumed to be watching the motions of the priest, and many of whom are so placed as to be unable to see him, at what part of the most Holy Sacrifice he has arrived. Instead of a disturbance or a tumult, it is a very necessary thing. The Professor is extremely hard to please. One moment, he objects that no respect is paid to the understanding of the people, and no pains taken to let them know what is going on ; and the next moment, he finds an objection in what is specially designed to let them know what is going on. Why did he not object right out, that Catholicity is not Puritanism, and therefore is to be rejected ? That would have been manly, and would have at least given a reason for finding fault with Catholicity.

But, after all, the real question to be answered is, Does the Catholic worship, taken as a whole, tend necessarily or naturally to lessen the importance of what is commonly called spiritual worship, that is, prayer, praise, meditation, and spiritual reading ? Does it substitute for these internal exercises mere outward observances, or does it even tend to do this ? The Professor may say what he will, but to this we answer emphatically, No, and we appeal to experience for our justification. The central point with the Protestant in his public worship is the sermon. We readily admit the sermon does not hold so prominent a place in Catholic worship as it does in the Protestant. The central point of Catholic worship is the most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. We do not go to church to hear Rev. Mr. Silvervoice, Rev. Mr. Prettyman, Rev. Mr. Greatman, or the Rev. Mr. Sonofthunder preach ; but we go to assist at the adorable Sacrifice of the Mass. But there is one means of instruction among Catholics of which the Professor is ignorant, namely, the Confessional. In the sermon the preacher must necessarily confine himself to general instructions and exhortations ; but in the Confessional the instructions, exhortations, or admonitions are particular, adapted to the precise case of the penitent, and therefore much more valuable, and not only because they are more appropriate, but because the penitent must take them to himself, and cannot

distribute them among his neighbours. The Catholic Church, therefore, if she make less use of the sermon than do Protestants, provides, by means of the Confessional, much more amply for the spiritual instruction of her children.

In the next place, those among us who most abound in prayer, praise, meditation, and spiritual exercises generally, are precisely those among us who are most scrupulous in their attention to all external observances. Read the lives of the Saints, those even whom the Professor must admit to have been eminently holy men, and you will find they of all men were the most observant of the very things in Catholic worship which the Professor condemns ; and you may in general measure a man's inward piety by the degree of devotion with which he observes the external worship. Find a man who disdains the external observances, and you may be sure you find a man who is deficient in charity, in good works, and who neglects prayer, meditation, spiritual reading, and mortification. But the reverse of this would be the fact, if the Professor's doctrine were true. Again, as a matter of fact, these exercises are much more abundant amongst Catholics than Protestants, as any one may know who has equal means of observing the practices of both. Take our servant-girls ; the Protestant, if professedly pious, will run much oftener to evening meetings, camp-meetings, revival-meetings, and concerts of prayer ; but the Catholic will spend much more time in private devotion, which, because private, may very often escape your observation. Spiritual or ascetic literature is almost exclusively Catholic. Protestants have no ascetic books worth naming. What is Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, by the side of the *Exercitia Christianæ Perfectionis* of Rodriguez, — *Pilgrim's Progress*, by the side of *De Imitatione Christi*, — Baxter's *Call*, by the side of *The Sinner's Conversion* by Salazar, — Scougal's *Life of God in the Soul*, Hervey's *Meditations*, Williston *On the Sacrament*, Upham's *Interior Life*, by the side of *The Spiritual Meadow*, *The Garden of Roses*, *The Sinner's Check-rein*, by Father Lewis, or the *Introduction to a Devout Life*, and *Treatise on Love of God*, by St. Francis of Sales, or the *Visits to the Blessed Sacrament*, by St. Liguori, or the ascetic works of St. John Climachus, Pope St. Leo the Great, Pope St. Gregory the Great, or of St. Bernard, and so many others we could enumerate ? But, if the Catholic worship tends to substitute external observances for inward piety, how happens it that the only works really spiritual, which indicate an intimate

communion on the part of their authors with the Holy Spirit, and which raise the reader from all that is low and earthly, temporal and perishing, to an intense longing and striving after the spiritual, the divine, the permanent, and the eternal, are by Catholics, and Catholics eminently devout in the Catholic sense? Then, again, the ascetic books most popular among Catholics, those which circulate widest, and are most prized and most generally read, are precisely the books which breathe the purest spirituality, insist most strenuously on inward piety and intimate communion of the soul with God. How does this happen, if our worship tends to substitute external observances for inward practical piety? Facts as well as philosophy are decidedly against the Professor. He has not looked so deeply into the subject as his friends seem to imagine. He has been misled by concluding from the effect which external observances, regarded as simple external observances, might have on a man without faith, to the effect they must have on one who has faith and believes in the supernatural presence and providence of God. He may also have been misled by not making sufficient allowance for the fact, that, while Protestants wear their piety on their faces, or hang it up for show, and take no inconsiderable pains to advise us of their devotions, Catholics are accustomed to obey the precept of their Master, to take heed when they pray not to be seen of men, and also to enter into their closet and to shut the door.

V. The fifth charge against Catholicity, as nearly as we can collect it, is, that the Catholic Church is deficient in candor, love of truth, and great philosophers and eminent preachers (pp. 463 – 465). In this the Professor pretends to establish, by an appeal to facts, the conclusions he had in the previous charges obtained from reasoning.

To the charge, that Catholic writers are generally deficient in candor, it is hardly necessary to reply. The author sustains his charge by no facts. He names, indeed, “Moehler, Klee, and Wiseman as distinguished for ingenuity rather than fairness.” Of Klee we cannot speak, for we are not acquainted with his writings. But of Moehler and Wiseman we can speak, and, though not enthusiastic admirers of either, we can testify to their singular candor and fairness towards their opponents. No Protestant writer ever showed so much fairness in treating of Protestant doctrines as Moehler has done; and though several attempts have been made to convict him of

misrepresentation, not one of them, so far as we have seen, has been successful. A writer in *The New Englander* begins by charging him with misrepresenting Calvin, but is forced in the end to admit that he has not misrepresented him. Dr. Wiseman has a mind of singular fairness, and a heart of great tenderness towards those who differ from him. But perhaps the objection is not that these men misrepresent their enemies, but do not state the Catholic doctrines fairly ; that is, do not state them as they have been stated by Protestants.* This is prob-

* This is, in fact, the real objection. "It is difficult," says the Professor, in a note (p. 463), "to mention any modern work more ingeniously fitted to produce an impression which, upon the whole, is incorrect, than Moehler's *Symbolik*. Its sophistry consists, first, in concealing the more obnoxious phases of the Catholic doctrine ; secondly, in the undue prominence it gives to such truths as have been defended by Romanists [Catholics] against the ill-judged attacks of Protestants ; thirdly, in its appeal to the writings of individual Protestants with the same freedom as to publicly authorized Confessions of Faith ; fourthly, in quoting the impassioned and extravagant remarks of Protestant controversialists, without attempting to modify those remarks by a reference to the circumstances or idiosyncrasies of the men who uttered them ; and, fifthly, tacitly assuming that the creeds and standard treatises of Protestants are as authoritative as those of the Romanists." There is no want of candor, we suppose, on the part of the Professor, in calling us *Romanists*, a name he knows we disown, and no insult in apologizing, as he does (p. 452), for now and then calling us by our true name. But this is a trifle. These charges against Moehler are unfounded. The first charge we deny ; he, in no instance, practises any concealment. There are no "obnoxious phases of Catholic doctrine" to conceal. We do not like Moehler's Germanism, and sometimes he pushes philosophy beyond its province, and his theory of development is too broadly stated ; but he has not stated the Catholic doctrine in too favorable a light, nor concealed any phase of Catholic doctrine which he could, consistently with his purpose, bring forward. He was not writing an exposition of Catholic doctrines in general, but of the particular doctrinal differences between Catholics and Protestants, and, so far as the Catholic doctrines are involved in these differences, he has kept no phase of them out of sight. To complain of him for not exhibiting the Catholic doctrines in the respect in which they did not concern the subject of his book is uncandid and unscientific. That he gives undue prominence to truths Protestants have attacked we should like to see proved. The Professor admits that Protestants have made "ill-judged attacks" on truths. We will try to remember this ; but we should suppose any attack upon truth at all would be *ill-judged*. The *third* objection is removed by the fifth. The creeds and standard treatises are known not to have the authority among Protestants that the authoritative expositions of Catholicity have for Catholics, and therefore Moehler does not rely wholly on them, but consults also the writings of prominent individual Protestants. But the charges of the Professor are somewhat singular. He first accuses Moehler of sophistry, because he consults individual doctors as well as authorized Confessions of Faith, and then accuses him of attributing too much authority to the Confessions of

ably the complaint. Whenever a Catholic gives a fair and candid statement of Catholicity, the Protestant is obliged to do one of two things, — either admit that he has ignorantly or maliciously misrepresented it, or contend that the Catholic states it better than it is. His self-love and pride of sect, and perhaps his convictions, will not permit him to do the first ; he is therefore compelled to do the latter, and to charge the favorable representation to the Catholic's ingenuity, want of candor, or readiness to sacrifice the truth. We can conceive nothing more uncandid or unjust than this. Protestants misrepresent Catholics ; Catholics expose the misrepresentation, and set

Faith ; that is, of relying too much on them, and holding Protestants too strictly to them. But whoever knows any thing of Protestants knows, that, if individual doctors were not consulted, no fair or just view of Protestantism could be obtained ; and we own we cannot see the sophistry, at least the unfairness, in assuming that Protestants really hold to what they solemnly profess in their Confessions. Do the Protestants regard us as sophistical, when we take them at their solemn profession ? The *fourth* charge admits the Reformers and Protestant controversialists made impassioned and extravagant statements. But does the Professor forget that the Reformers, Luther, and Calvin, and others, professed to be specially called of God, and to act under the immediate direction of the Holy Ghost, and that it was on this ground alone they attempted to justify their schism and heresy ? When a man puts forth such a claim, and when, on the ground of such a claim, he founds a sect, we submit if his followers have a right to plead in abatement of judgment his idiosyncrasies. We owe something to truth and its slandered friends, and not all to misguided and factious heresiarchs or schismatics.

“Our faith,” says the Professor (*ib.*), “is the Bible.” The Bible as you understand it, or as we understand it ? As you, of course. Then which of you ? for no two of you agree. How are we to determine what Protestantism is ? How shall we be able to seize and delineate its features, so that every individual Protestant will admit that he sat for the picture ? From your doctors ? — which of them ? None, you say. From your Confessions ? — which of them, and which edition ? None of them, you say ; for these must not be assumed as authority. Where then ? Is your Protestantism a definable thing ? If not, why do you complain, if our statement of it, according to the highest authority you acknowledge, does not present it in the precise shape in which it presents itself to each individual Protestant, since in a precise shape or a definite shape it presents itself to no one ?

We will take this occasion to inform the Professor, that Paul Sarpi's account of the Council of Trent cannot be appealed to as authority. His history is denied to be authentic, and the Professor might as well quote against us the recent publications of Hogan and Dowling. If he wishes to know the true history of the Council of Trent, he must consult Pallavicina. We reply to no argument based on the authority of Paul Sarpi, whose statements the Professor knows, if he is at all acquainted with the controversy on the subject, are not to be relied on. This is all the answer we give to his charges against the Tridentine Fathers.

forth their doctrines in their true light, as they are and always have been held ; and forthwith they are charged with a want of fairness, of being ingenious, but uncandid ! This is adding insult to injury.

2. Want of truth means, with the Professor, in this charge, very much the same as want of candor. The charge comes with an ill grace from a Protestant. We have never met with a Protestant writer who states a single Catholic doctrine which he rejects, no matter on what point, correctly, — who in a single instance reproduces a Catholic argument in its full strength, or gives it a fair and logical reply. The unfairness, we will say the untruth, of Protestants, when engaged in controversy with Catholics, has been a constant theme of complaint with Catholic writers from Cajetan and Eck down to the present moment. It is notorious, and, if not notorious, it is really so flagitious that it would be incredible. When we first turned our attention to the controversy, and began to put Protestant statements to the usual historical tests, we were perfectly astounded. It is impossible to imagine grosser falsehood, or more outrageous injustice, than may be found in the pages of Protestant writers generally, — nay, the very best of them, — whenever they write against Catholics. It is not merely as a Catholic we say this ; we say it as a fact of which we became fully convinced before we became a Catholic, and from consulting Protestant authorities themselves. Nothing can exceed the ferocity, falsehood, and wickedness of the books against Catholicity even now recommended by respectable religious journals and grave Protestant divines, and hawked about our streets. They are so barefaced, that they would carry their own refutation with them, if Protestants ever thought of pausing a moment to inquire into the internal probability of any thing said against Catholics or Catholicity. Never were a people so deceived, so gulled, as good, honest, simple credulous Protestants are by the getters-up and circulators of anti-Catholic publications. We need but read for a few weeks the anti-Catholic press of the country, to be satisfied of this. An editor lights somewhere upon a “mare’s nest,” cooks up a “startling incident,” or a terrible tale of the “horrors of Popery,” publishes it, and forthwith it is copied by all the editors of the same brotherhood throughout the country ; pious deacons have more *vinaigre* faces than ever ; pious old ladies are sure the end of the world is near ; the politician screams out the country is in danger, and we must defend it against

the pope, the cardinals, the bishops, the priests, and the Jesuits ; and the double-distilled hypocrite, with his pockets gorged with the hard earnings wrung from the poor seamstress, the widow, and the orphan, " who puts a penny in charity's box and takes a shilling out," clasps his Bible, with eyes upturned, and a graveyard face, sets up a piteous howl, that the Bible is in danger, cries, " Down with the Pope, the *Jesuits*, and up with the Bible," and sets the whole community in commotion. A Catholic editor calmly contradicts and refutes the story ; the Protestant editor takes no notice of the contradiction and refutation, but repeats it as before, or silently drops it. An anti-Catholic writer, preparing an obscene book, lights upon it, copies it into his filthy pages as illustrative of " the horrors of Popery," and henceforth it is authentic Protestant history. This is but an unexaggerated statement of what passes before our eyes and in our own moral and enlightened country ; and in this or a similar way Protestant history is manufactured, as some recent Protestant writers themselves, not being immediately concerned in putting down Catholics, have to some extent been forced to admit.*

On the other hand, without meaning to defend every Catholic writer, — for there may have been uncandid Catholic authors, although we know no such, — Catholic authors are singularly fair and candid towards Protestants. This is no merit in them, for they are required to be so. No Catholic would escape the rebuke of his director, if he should win a victory over an opponent by craft, cunning, evasion, misstatement, or sophistical reply. As Catholics, we are required to write in the presence of God, under a deep sense of responsibility, — not for our own glory, our own puny triumphs, but for the greater glory of God, which permits none but holy ends and holy means ; and we are false to our religion, when we do not. In all the Catholic controversial works we have seen, we have found candid statements, and fair and logical arguments. In any " Course of Theology " we take up, we find the objections of opponents fairly and honestly stated, and not unfrequently with more clearness, force, and point than in the works of the opponents themselves. Take, as a specimen, Bellarmine, Sardagne, Billuart, Perrone, Bouvier. The man who could accuse such men as

* Consult Ranke's *History*, not of the *Reformation*, but of the *Popes*, Voigt's *St. Gregory the Seventh*, Hurter's *Pope Innocent the Third*, and especially Maitland's *Dark Ages*. Hurter wrote his work as a Protestant, but we rejoice to learn that he is now a Catholic.

these of a want of candor or of love of truth, — of unfair dealing, — would only write his own condemnation.

The Professor's own Lecture is a fair specimen of the Protestant mode of discussing the Catholic question. It is not without some cleverness, but, saving a half-candid remark on the Catholic doctrine of indulgences, it has not a single fair, candid, or truthful statement from beginning to end. With the exception named, and which is only half an exception, there is not a point of Catholic doctrine, or Catholic worship, or Catholic history, touched upon, on which the reader, relying on this Lecture alone, would not receive an impression directly the reverse of the truth. The ignorance of the Professor in regard to Catholicity is indeed great, but his Lecture contains evidence enough that his perversions of truth, misstatements, and absolute untruths are not in all cases the result of misinformation or of defective information. Yet he does not appear to blush to come forward in open day and accuse the Catholic Church of being hostile to candor and love of truth. They were the blasphemous Jews, we believe, who accused our blessed Lord of blasphemy.

3. To the charge, that the Catholic Church is deficient in great philosophers and eminent preachers, we have not much to say. But, unless we have been wholly misinformed, the Gospel was not given expressly to make great philosophers or eminent preachers; but simple, docile, meek, humble, self-denying Christians, who, relying on God's goodness and promises, through the merits of Jesus Christ, hope and labor, by patient endurance and perseverance in well-doing, to attain, at last, forgiveness of their sins and life everlasting. It is better to be a good Christian than a great philosopher, and a true saint than an eminent preacher. The patient watchings, fervent prayers, and daily mortifications of the humble and devoted servant of God, whose name is never heard beyond the solitude in which he lives, avail more, both for himself and for others, than the profoundest treatises of your profoundest philosopher, or the most eloquent sermons of your most gifted divine.

The Gospel is not of man's device and does not stand in human wisdom. "*Quid prodest tibi alta de Trinitate disputare, si careas humilitate, unde displiceas Trinitati? Vere alta verba non faciunt sanctum et justum; sed virtuosa vita efficit Deo charum. Opto magis sentire compunctionem, quàm scire ejus definitionem. Si scires totam Bibliam exterius, et omnium phi-*

losophorum dicta, quid totum prodesset sine charitate et Dei gratia? *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas*, præter amare Deum, et illi soli servire. Ista est summa sapientia, per contemptum mundi tendere ad regna cœlestia."* The poor nun of Our Lady of Mount Carmel, whom the world knows not and dreams not of, may be doing more, as she recites her rosary, to build up the kingdom of God on earth, and to advance the glory of God among men, than whole armies of your profound philosophers and eloquent divines. God loves the simple, the meek, the humble, who forget themselves and remember only him, and will grant almost any thing to their prayers. He does not need the great, the learned, the profound, the eloquent, and rarely makes use of them as his instruments; for they are rarely so humble as not to claim for themselves some share of the glory of what he does by them, and he will suffer no flesh to glory in his presence, or to rob him of the glory which is his, and cannot be another's. *Videte enim vocationem vestram, fratres, quia non multi sapientes secundum carnem, non multi potentes, non multi nobiles: sed quæ stulta sunt mundi elegit Deus, ut confundat sapientes; et infirma mundi elegit Deus, ut confundat fortia; et ignobilia mundi et contemptibilia elegit Deus, et ea quæ non sunt, ut ea quæ sunt destrueret, ut non gloriatur omnis caro in conspectu ejus.*" — 1 Cor. i. 26 – 29.

Nevertheless, the Catholic Church has a few men, besides Campanella, Descartes, Malebranche, Bossuet, Fénelon, Bourdaloue, Dupin, Dölinger, Hug, and Van Ess, that are not quite contemptible, and we had rapidly collected a list of several hundred names which we thought of inserting; but upon closer examination of the Professor's assertions, we saw it would be of no use. He asserts the Church is unfavorable to the mind; and if we should refute this by showing, that, in every department of mind, Catholics always have taken, and still take, the lead, he would reply, that it is in despite of the Church. "We have no disposition to deny that many illustrious names are enrolled among the scholars of the Church. The human mind will rouse itself to action in despite of all the sedative effects applied to it." — p. 464. What can we say? If we are deficient in great men, eminent philosophers and preachers, it is the fault of the Church; if we are not deficient, but abound in them, it is in *despite* of the sedative effects

* *De Imitatione Christi*, Lib. I., cap. 1.

of the Church; — nothing is to be said to such reasoning. The argument, *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, is conclusive against the Church, but inadmissible if the Church is to be defended. “The themes with which Catholic authors are most intimate are of inferior worth,” — “themes of external interest, — seldom of inward dignity.” — p. 463. We can reply to this only by a smile, and the recommendation to the author to study the *Summam Theologicam* of St. Thomas of Aquin, the commentary on it by Billuart, the *Moral Theology* of St. Liguori, the *Theology* of the Salamanca divines, the works of Bellarmine, especially of Suarezius, or of Pope St. Leo the Great, of St. Gregory the Great, Benedict the Fourteenth, of Gerson, Thomas à Kempis, Rodriguez, Father Luis of Granada, Salazar, St. Bernard de Clairvaux, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bonaventura, the *Prælectiones Theologicæ*, by Perrone, the volumes published by M. Carrière, of St. Sulpice, Paris, or even an ordinary prayer-book in the hands of our servant-girls, or the catechism we teach our children. The themes with which Catholic authors are most intimate are of inferior worth! Pray, tell us, what is of *superior* worth? Are there loftier themes than God, the sacred mysteries of faith, the Holy Catholic Church, the Spouse of the Lamb, the soul, — its wants, weaknesses, depravities, trials, temptations, recovery, growth in Christian knowledge and virtue, its sanctification, and final beatitude? These are the themes with which Catholic authors are most intimate, and which they rarely leave, unless it be in condescension to the weakness of some pert objector, or to repel the sophistry and sneers of some scoffer, and even then only for the sake of these.

It is easy to sneer at the “niceties of the Schoolmen” (*ib.*), but not so easy to comprehend them. This sneer is on the lips and in the tone or the words of no man who has any knowledge or comprehension of the Schoolmen. That the Schoolmen are often “nice,” we admit, but it is because they aim at exactness, at truth, and are not willing to favor falsehood by a loose expression. That they want comprehensiveness, or that they ever make a distinction without a difference, or which has no foundation in *re*, we have yet to learn. We have heard enough of sneers at the Schoolmen, — sneers born of ignorance and the conceit which always accompanies it. Go and master the Schoolmen, and then you may sneer at them, if you can. Saving some few matters pertaining to physical science, in which there may have been some progress

since the fifteenth century, we stand ready to defend the Schoolmen, and to prove to you that your sneers at them are the results of your own utter ignorance of them, or rather incapacity to comprehend theological and philosophical reasoning. We deny, positively deny, that in moral and intellectual science, properly so called, Protestants have made the least progress, or that their philosophers have ascertained a single fact or a single principle not known and recognized by the Schoolmen. You know nothing of the Schoolmen, if you know not enough not to sneer at them. They may have discussed with great labor and pains some questions of little practical importance, but there is not a single important question they have not also discussed, and well and ably discussed. You talk of "the Dark Ages," — dark, forsooth, as Coleridge, one of your own number, tells you, because you have not light enough to read them.

We know something of your Protestant philosophers, and there are absolutely only four Protestant names that it is not discreditable to one's own knowledge to call a philosopher, and it is doubtful if any one of these was really a Protestant. We mean Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, and Hobbes. Bacon was an able man, a man of some knowledge and considerable imagination. He discoursed, often eloquently, about philosophy, as it was said of Cicero, but he did not discourse it. Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Reid, Stewart, Fichte, Fries, Jacobi, Schelling, &c., were in some respects clever men, but no philosophers. Hobbes is the only English philosopher, and he was a downright infidel; Hegel has done little else than revive Buddhism, and lose himself in Nihilism; Kant had a true metaphysical genius, but his system, as a system, is totally false, and is already exploded. Leibnitz was a man of a comprehensive mind, a boundless ambition, without, as one must believe, any real religious faith. The only portions of his philosophy which any one can now think of adopting were borrowed from the Schoolmen. Protestants have no philosophy. If I ask, Where is the Protestant philosopher who has produced a philosophy even widely received by Protestants? — such a confusion of tongues will immediately be heard as will make me glad to step my interrogatories. No, no, for shame's sake, say nothing about great philosophers.

In theology you are as badly off as you are in philosophy. You have no more respectable theological work than Calvin's *Institutes*, which none of you now accept, — unless with a

qualification. There is no such thing as a Protestant systematic course of theology, properly so called. We will not except from this sweeping remark a single one of your famous *Glaubenslehren* of modern Germany, which studies all things, and some others, speculates, theorizes on all, and on none does more than erect a monument to its own folly, want of faith, and blasphemy. Even the boasted erudition of Germany is valuable only as it indicates the sources to be explored. It can in no case supersede the necessity of exploring them anew. Saving some branches of physical science, in which the progress effected is far less than is imagined, Protestants have really contributed nothing of any real importance to the progress of the human mind. We know the Protestant boasts, and we know what Protestants have done. Not one of the great inventions or discoveries, which have so changed the face of the modern world, with the exception, perhaps, of the mule and jenny, and a few other inventions in labor-saving machinery, all of which we look upon as a curse, are due to them. Every thing degenerates, except material industry, in their hands; and yet they have the singular impudence to accuse the Catholic Church of injuring the mind.

But who is this Professor who brings this unfounded charge? He is a Puritan. But what have the Puritans done for the mind? In this country, including even the Presbyterians and Calvinistic Baptists, they have produced scarcely a single work in any branch of literature or science, that could receive honorable mention in a general history of literature and science for the last three hundred years. We know no Calvinistic work, or work proceeding from a Calvinistic source, produced in this country, which indicates that its author was master of the current literature of his subject, unless we must except Webster's *Dictionary*, and, perhaps, a geographical work on the Holy Land, by Dr. Robinson. The literature of our country, such as it is, and it is nothing at best to boast of, we owe to authors not of the Puritan or Calvinistic school. The profoundest works of the Puritan school in this country are Edwards *On the Will*, and *On the Affections*, Hopkins's *System of Divinity*, and Dwight's *Theology*. The school does little else than republish from England and Scotland, translate from the German, or compile from foreign scholars. And yet our Puritan Professor, with the tail of a Dutch goose in his cap for plume, steps boldly forward, and gravely accuses Catholi-

city of being hostile to the mind, and seriously charges the Catholic Church with being deficient in great philosophers and eminent preachers !

“Rome has trained a smaller number of original thinkers, for the last three hundred years, than have arisen from even half the number of Protestant churches.”—p. 464. If by original thinkers be meant mere dreamers, rash speculators, theorizers, founders of systems which die before their authors, or do not long survive them, we admit the assertion ; if it be meant men of solid learning, sound judgment, of varied and accurate knowledge, just and comprehensive views of the subjects they treat, able to treat them in a clear, intelligible, and scientific manner, and to sustain their doctrines by profound erudition, and appropriate logical and conclusive arguments, we deny it, and pledge ourselves, after making all proper allowance for the excess of Catholic population over the Protestant, to produce ten Catholics to every one Protestant the Professor will bring forward.

“Why, at the present day, are Lucerne, Friburg, and Uri so much less enlightened than Basle and Berne and Geneva ?”—*Ib.* We deny that they are. True enlightenment is religious enlightenment, that which enlightens a man in regard to the end for which Almighty God made him,—both because this is the most essential, and because it most elevates the mind. Dare the Professor deny this ? If not, we assert the Catholic cantons of Switzerland are more truly enlightend than the Protestant. Moreover, when the Catholic cantons take measures to extend education, the Protestant cantons, with armed soldiery, attempt to arrest them, or assassinate their patriotic leaders, as in the case of the late M. Leu.

“Why is Spain so much more degraded than Holland, Portugal than Denmark, Ireland than Scotland ?”—*Ib.* We deny the fact. The case of Holland is not fortunate, for half the population of the kingdom are Catholics. Spain is not more degraded than Holland, and her present afflictions are easily accounted for by her internal revolutions, fomented by anti-Catholic influences either from within or from without. The same may be said of Portugal. The influence of the so-called “Liberals,” in all cases anti-Catholic, joined with the protection and intrigues of England, will account for what we may have to deplore in either country, without accusing Catholicity. These nations have, indeed, fallen from their former grandeur ; but it must be remembered that they attained their former

grandeur under Catholicity, and were greatest, most renowned, when most truly Catholic. If Catholicity be hostile to national greatness and prosperity, how could these nations become so great and prosperous under Catholicity? And why do they decline, as they become less Catholic, and more affected by infidel and Protestant influences? If any man wishes to ascertain the true cause of the decline of some Catholic nations, he must seek for it in the causes which have made, first Holland, then England, the commercial centre of the world. Here Catholicity will have nothing to dread or to be ashamed of. This is a subject we hope to be able to treat at length soon. Ireland is not so much more degraded than Scotland as the Professor imagines. *Blackwood's Magazine* has given us some startling accounts of the rapid increase of crime in Scotland, and the Professor may himself have heard of Glasgow lanes. That Ireland is not more degraded is owing entirely to the Catholic faith. It is this alone that has buoyed up her inhabitants, and enabled them to endure the untold sufferings to which they have been subjected. Not to Catholicity, but to the policy of England and the Church by law established, must we look for Ireland's degradation. We would willingly let the question itself turn on the instance of Ireland. We want no better evidence to prove the superiority of Catholicity over Protestantism.

In our turn, we ask the Professor why the laboring classes are so much more degraded in England than they are in Austria, in Italy, or in Spain? Why crime is on the increase in all Protestant countries, but on the decrease in Catholic countries? Why Sweden is so much more immoral than Ireland or Belgium, Stockholm than Rome, London than even Paris? Why generally in Catholic countries are the provisions for the education of the people more ample than in Protestant countries, and a more advanced civilization found? Questions can be asked on our side as well as on the Professor's.

"Why are the Austrian clergy so far inferior to the Prussian, the Bavarian to the Saxon, the French to the English?" — *Ib.* We deny that they are so in what constitutes the proper qualifications and true dignity and worth of a clergy. That they are inferior in pride, in vain learning, in rash speculation, and blasphemous doctrines, we admit; but inferior in solid piety, solid learning, true science, thorough knowledge of whatever pertains to their vocation, or in the faithful and

diligent discharge of their numerous and painful duties, we deny it. The Professor, here as well as elsewhere, is liable to be deceived by concluding from Protestants to Catholics. We have no priests who introduce new doctrines, or gain notoriety by leaving old, well-beaten paths, attracting attention by their eccentricities. We have no Schleiermachers, De Wettes, or Strausses, and do not wish them. The Protestant minister lives in public, acts in public, and his qualities are displayed before the public, and noted. The Catholic priest does not act so much in public. His great duty is not to write books, nor his principal sphere the pulpit. His labors are chiefly by the side of the sick and the dying, in the hut of poverty, in succouring those who have no friend but God and the priest, and, above all, in the Confessional. No Protestant is qualified to judge of the ability, worth, or efficiency of a Catholic clergy. The Austrian clergy are not inferior to the Prussian, but they suffer, nevertheless, much in consequence of the *reformations* introduced by the half infidel, half Protestant Emperor Joseph the Second. To represent the present body of the French clergy, whether of the first or of the second order, as inferior to the English betrays an ignorance or a recklessness that we were not prepared for even in our Andover Professor. The present clergy of France, of both orders, are a pious, able, learned, and faithful body of men, and their superiors, if their equals, are nowhere to be found. We love and honor the present French bishops and clergy. They are Catholic, and nobly, zealously, and, with God's blessing, successfully, are they laboring for the regeneration of their beautiful France. To think of comparing these with the indolent English clergy, with their fat livings and famished flocks, is an outrage upon common propriety. The Professor must have been joking, or else he counted largely upon the ignorance and credulity of his countrymen.

The reason assigned by the Professor for the superiority of the Protestant is ingenious ; but, unhappily, he undertook, like a certain philosopher, to account for the phenomenon, before taking the pains to verify the fact. His sneer, that "Romanism is so contrived as to save men the trouble of thinking for themselves," does not greatly disturb us. We would prefer to have our thinking done vicariously, as the Professor suggests, than to think to no better purpose than we have found our Protestant thinkers doing. We would rather look upward and outward for light, than into the depths of our own dark-

ness ; and we prefer to rely on the teachings of God's word, than on our own excogitations. If the Professor thinks differently, perhaps it is not our fault, nor his merit.

VI. We come now to the portion of this Lecture which is specially devoted to the discussion of the *moral* influence of Catholicity, and, notwithstanding the interest of the subject, we are compelled to treat it with the greatest possible brevity ; for we have but a few more pages at our command. But we have already refuted, in principle, so far as they depend on any principle, the main charges which are urged. We must restrict ourselves to some brief observations on a few only of the Professor's assumptions, misrepresentations, and false assertions.

The charge now before us is, that the Catholic Church injures the heart of man by holding doctrines which have "a peculiar tendency to be perverted." — pp. 465–467. It is not pretended that the doctrines are untrue or unimportant, but they are objected to simply on the ground of the ease with which they may be perverted. But is the injury done by the doctrines themselves, or by their perversion ? If by their perversion, who is in fault, — the Church who teaches the truth, or they who pervert it ? The blessed Apostle says, — "We are unto God the good odor of Christ in them who are saved, and in them who perish. To some, indeed, the odor of death unto death, but in others the odor of life unto life." — 2 Cor. ii. 15, 16. Were the Apostles guilty of injuring the heart of man, because they preached a doctrine which became to some, through their perversion of it, the odor of death unto death ? And, in order to avoid such a result, was it their duty to withhold their doctrine, to modify it, or conceal some portions of it ? The holy Apostle Paul did not think so ; for he adds, in the following verse, — "We are not as many, adulterating the word of God ; but with sincerity, but as from God we speak in Christ." St. Peter (2 St. Pet. iii. 16) tells us, that St. Paul, in his epistles, has said some things hard to be understood, which the unstable and the unlearned wrest to their own destruction. Will the Professor, therefore, charge St. Paul with injuring the heart of man ? The wicked pervert, undoubtedly, the truth of the Gospel, the best gifts of God, for they pervert every thing ; but the Church cannot confine herself to the merely expedient. The true question for the Christian is never merely, What is expedient ? but, What is the

truth? and the truth he must speak, whether men hear or whether they forbear. To object to the Church because she proclaims doctrines which may be perverted, and which may, therefore, be thought to be inexpedient, is objecting to her for adopting too high a moral standard, and not conceding enough to human weakness and perversity.

Moreover, the Professor reasons on a false hypothesis. He assumes that the Church, like Protestant sects, has full control over her doctrines, and may herself determine arbitrarily what she shall hold and teach, and what not. But this is not the fact. She does not make her own creed; she receives it, and can hold and teach only what she has received and been commanded to hold and teach. It is her duty to teach the whole word of God, and she must do so. While she is faithful to her trust, the responsibility of effects belongs to Him by whose authority she acts, and the guilt of the perversion of what she teaches belongs to those who pervert it. She cannot withhold the truth, because men may abuse it; nor deny her children the food they need, because perverse minds and hearts may despise it, or derive strength from it for their wickedness. Should she do so, there would be no end to the cry of Protestants against her for her timidity, temporizing, and unfaithfulness.

The Professor falls again into the predicament of the philosopher to whom we have just referred him, of assigning ingenious reasons for facts not verified, and which do not exist. His statement of the errors into which Catholics are liable to fall is rather amusing; though after all lamentable, for the degree of ignorance of Catholic doctrine it betrays. "When a man," he says, "is bowed down under a thought of his sinfulness, and is therefore simply commanded to eat no meat for a month, he will not understand the nature of faith, and will misunderstand the nature of Christian works."—p. 466. We remember to have read somewhere of a young girl standing by a beautiful spring of water, bitterly crying and wringing her hands. Her mother came, and asked her why she cried. "I was thinking," said the poor girl, "if I should grow up and get married, and have a child, and the child should come to be able to run alone, and should be playing by this spring, and should fall in, and should be drowned, how very bad I should feel." Whereupon the mother burst out also a crying, and the father came, and heard the story, and he broke out a crying, and the grandmother came, and the grandfather, and

the whole family came, and heard the story, and they all set to a crying, and it was truly a crying family. Now, there is this difference between the Professor and the poor girl, — her apprehensions were of an evil which *might* possibly happen, but the Professor's are of what *cannot* happen. The case he imagines is not even supposable. Such a command could never be given, and no Catholic could ever be simpleton enough to believe that simply refraining from eating meat can atone for sin. Mortification of the body, as a cure for its disorders, is enjoined by the Scriptures; and he who does not, in some way, mortify the flesh, will make little progress in Christian perfection. But for works of mortification to be worth any thing, they must be preceded by faith and repentance, be done in a state of grace, in a spirit of contrition and humility, and accompanied by charity. A few visits to the Confessional would teach the Professor many things of which he appears to be now ignorant, and correct many of his false notions, as well as relieve him of certain imaginary fears which now affect his repose. It would do him no harm even to consult the instructions for penitents, which he may find in any of our ordinary manuals of piety.

The Professor admits that "there is some truth in the Catholic doctrine of Indulgences," but blames the Church for holding it, because "there is reason to fear that men who have made satisfaction for the temporal penalties of the law will consider themselves as having satisfied its eternal demands." — p. 466. The Professor little imagines the ignorance of Catholic doctrine this statement betrays to a Catholic. Every Catholic knows that the eternal demands of the law are satisfied only by the death and sufferings of our Lord upon the cross, and that he must be *in a state of grace*, have repented of his sins, and received pardon of them from Almighty God, before his works of satisfaction can be acceptable, or he receive an indulgence.

"If their sins are cancelled for this life, they will presume on the life to come." — *Ib.* Nonsense! for there is no cancelling of sins, either for this life or for that which is to come, but through the infinite satisfaction made by our blessed Redeemer; and no way of escaping the penalty *temporal* or eternal, but by faith, which is always presupposed, sincere repentance, and the free pardon of Almighty God. It is only he who believes, repents, humbles himself before God, and performs acts of contrition and charity, to whom indulgences

or works of satisfaction are available. Every Catholic knows this, and therefore the last blunder he could possibly commit would be the one the Professor so gratuitously imagines. The Professor is quite mistaken in his assertion of a difference between Catholicity "as cautiously and guardedly stated in the standards, and Catholicity as commonly taught and believed." He is equally at fault in his assertions as to what is Catholicity, as commonly taught and believed. He should be ashamed of his misrepresentations. No Catholic teaches, no Catholic believes, that the Blessed Virgin has divine attributes. In her own nature, by virtue of her own essential attributes, she is simply a human being, neither more nor less ; and whatever the exalted rank above all creatures she is believed to hold, she holds it not in her own right, but by the appointment and free gift of God. Does it require rare sagacity, extraordinary powers, such as the Professor seldom finds among his own people, to distinguish between a being holding, by its own nature, an exalted rank, and one holding an exalted rank solely by virtue of the supernatural gifts and graces of Almighty God ? If so, intellectual culture must be sadly neglected among Protestants.

That "indulgences are a legitimate article of traffic," or in any sense an article of traffic at all, is not taught, never was taught, is not believed, never was believed, and never can be believed, by any Catholic. No money can purchase an indulgence ; for an indulgence can be obtained only by faith, repentance, confession, absolution, prayers, and alms-deeds. Why did not the Professor go a step further, and tell us indulgences are permits to commit sin ? This is the general belief of Protestants, who know so little of what they speak as not to know that an indulgence cannot be granted till after the sin has been repented of, confessed, and its eternal guilt pardoned by Almighty God !

VII. "Romanism becomes injurious to the feelings by the *mystical* working of its machinery." — pp. 467 – 475. We have already answered this charge, in our remarks on the intellectual influence of Catholic worship. The *mystical* working here alluded to is the Professor's way of stating the fact, that Catholicity teaches that the sacraments are efficacious through the power of God who instituted them, and the Holy Ghost, who operates in and through them. His first objection, under this head, is, that the Church is held to be necessa-

ry as the medium of our relation to Christ. He himself would contend that communion with Christ should be proposed as the condition of communion with the Church, not communion with the Church as the condition of communion with Christ. He therefore regards communion with Christ as the means, and communion with the Church as the end, — placing thus the Church above Christ, and making Christ necessary only as the way into it. In this, he and the Catholic Church unquestionably differ in opinion. She proposes communion with Christ as the end, communion with her simply as the means of coming into relation with Christ, — thus subordinating herself to Christ, and not Christ to herself. We shall not undertake to say which is the sounder view, for we think St. Paul has done that effectually for all who are not without understanding (Eph. v. 22 – 32). Yet, if we can have full communion with Christ without the ministry of the Church, we confess we see no reason for the Church. Does the Professor object to Catholicity because it is not No-Churchism?

The second objection, under this same head, appears to be, that the Church proposes Holy Communion as a condition of the Christian life, and not the Christian life as the condition of Communion. “It calls on us not first to live and then eat,” but the reverse. The Professor’s doctrine, then, is, that we should live in order to eat, and not eat in order to live, — a very general Protestant doctrine. Yet the Professor is mistaken, if he supposes the Church does not demand life before eating; for a dead man cannot eat, any more than he can perform any other function. The communicant must have been born again, made alive in Christ by the sacrament of baptism, or, if he have sinned mortally after baptism, by the sacrament of Penance, before he can worthily commune. He does not eat, then, as a dead man, that he may become a living man, but that he may have life more abundantly, that he may nourish, sustain, invigorate, and augment his divine life.

The Professor is inexcusable for asserting that Catholicity “represents a sacrament as communicating rather than presupposing the fitness for receiving it,” for he knows better; as also for saying, the only obstacle forbidden to be interposed to its operation “is not sin in general, but only a particular species of it, — sin against the Church, and this is the sin unto death.” We will not trust ourselves to characterize this statement as it deserves. The references the Professor himself makes prove that he knew he was stating an absolute falsehood.

No sacrament imparts the fitness to receive it, for no sacrament can be received with improper dispositions without sacrilege, and especially is this true of so great a sacrament as Holy Communion. We are everywhere admonished of the danger of eating or drinking unworthily ; for he who does so eateth and drinketh condemnation to himself. In order to receive Holy Communion without eating or drinking our own condemnation, and being guilty of the Lord's body, we must be free, not from one species of mortal sin only, but from every species of it (Conc. Trid. Sess. XIII., can. 11); and in order to receive the plenitude of its fruits, we must be free from even the affection to venial sins, and have a lively faith, a firm hope, and an ardent charity. The effect of the sacrament, indeed, does not depend on these dispositions as the *causa efficiens*, but it is not produced where these dispositions are wanting. They are not the efficacy of the sacrament, but the conditions without which it is not effectual in the recipient.

The objection, which the Professor urges against Catholicity for teaching that the sacraments produce their effects *ex opere operato*, is one on which he will hardly dare insist. He himself, in the Andover creed, admits sacraments. The sacrament is intended to effect something, or it is not. If not, let it be dismissed, for it is an idle ceremony. If it is, then it must produce its effect in one of three ways : — 1. *ex opere operantis* ; 2. *ex opere suscipientis* ; or, 3. *ex opere operato* ; for these are the only conceivable alternatives. The first assumes the efficacy of the sacrament to be in the administrator. If you say this, you make the virtue of the sacrament depend on the priest ; that is, you make the priest the efficient cause of the grace received in the sacrament. But this would be to put the priest in the place of the Holy Ghost, and to assert another source of grace than the merits of Jesus Christ, which is inadmissible. Moreover, the priest may be a sinful man, and to suppose a sinful man can be the efficient cause of grace is absurd. If, to obviate this, you assert that none but holy men can be legitimate priests, you fall into the old Donatist heresy of making the validity and efficacy of sacraments depend on the sanctity of the priest, — a fact which God alone can know.

If you adopt the second view, which supposes the virtue to be in the recipient, you deny that the sacrament, as a sacrament, has any virtue at all. If the efficacy of the sacrament depends on him who receives it, as the efficient cause, he, in receiving it, receives only what he gives it, and therefore noth-

ing which he had not before receiving it ; which is to say, he receives nothing at all. Cause, so far forth as cause, receives nothing from its effects. The creation does not react on the Creator, and augment his power. That which leaves us as it found us, or returns to us only what it receives from us, produces no effect in us. One needs to be no very profound metaphysician to know all this. The Professor, we apprehend, is not aware of the consequences of making the virtue of the sacrament depend on the recipient. He contends, that the efficacy of the sacrament is in the faith of the recipient, and that it consists in strengthening faith, and thereby the life which is by faith. But this involves a principle which may lead where the Professor is not prepared to follow. If our faith be the efficient cause of the sacramental effect, to assert that by it there is an increase of faith, or an augmentation of the grace of faith, or of the effects of faith, implies that faith can be augmented from itself and by itself, or that of itself and by itself it can increase its power and fruitfulness ; which implies the principle of self-growth, — an evident absurdity ; for it implies that a given existence can, in and of itself and by itself, make itself more than it is, — that the possible is able to actualize itself, — *vacuum* to fill up itself and become *plenum*, — the precise absurdity of the modern Progressists and of the old Buddhists. Is our Professor prepared to accept this absurdity ? If not, he must not say a thing can augment itself, or be augmented, save as it receives and assimilates somewhat *ab extra*, from a source foreign to itself. Then he must either admit in the sacrament a virtue not derivable from the recipient, or deny that it has any virtue at all.

Nothing remains, then, but the third supposition, namely, the virtue of the sacrament is *ex opere operato, non merito operantis vel suscipientis* ; that is, that the virtue or efficacy of the sacrament is of God, who instituted it, and operates in and through it. The Professor must admit this conclusion, or either assert another source of grace than the merits of Jesus Christ, or deny the sacraments altogether. The last is, in fact, what Protestants generally do.

These remarks on the sacraments contain a sufficient answer to all that the Professor says of the influence of Catholicity on the clergy. The Professor has become so enamoured of the modern German method of finding in human nature or in a philosophic theory the measure of all institutions, that he forgets that the Church is to be judged not as a human, but as a

divine, supernatural institution. He forgets, that, as a simple human institution, having its origin and cause in human nature, and operating only by human agencies and means, according to the simple laws of human nature, nobody proposes it, nobody pretends to defend it. His speculations, however ingenious, nay, however true they might be, were it a human institution, and to be judged as we would judge a temporal government, are valueless, and must count for nothing ; because, as speculations, they proceed from a false assumption, and are not in return borne out by facts. To apply *a priori* reasoning, which might be legitimate to a natural, human institution, to a supernatural, divine institution, is an error which no man of any tolerable scientific attainments would willingly be guilty of.

The Professor's objections all proceed from his overlooking one rather important fact, namely, the gracious presence of God. He reasons as if there was no grace of God. Here is his primal sin. If he chooses to deny that the Church is a supernatural, divine institution, and that the grace of God operates in and through her sacraments, well and good ; but then comes up the Church question we began by stating. But till he does that, and ousts the Church from her possession, by invalidating her claims, his present line of argument is illegitimate ; and when he shall have done that, it will be unnecessary.

VIII. The eighth charge, that Catholicity has a tendency to separate religion from good morals, and to undervalue morality as distinct from religion (pp. 475, 476), is altogether unfounded. The basis of ethics, according to Catholicity, is theology ; and ethics are uniformly treated by Catholic writers under the head of *Theologia Moralis*, or practical theology. Religion is always presented to us as the basis of good morals. The foundation and motive to the love of our neighbour is in the love of God. We are taught to love our neighbour for the sake of God, and throughout the whole range of morals the *propter quem* is God, who is our beginning and end ; and every action not referred to him as the end or final cause, for the sake of which it is done, is always sinful, or at least morally imperfect. Here is the closest union between religion and morals conceivable. It is impossible to say more.

The assertion, that Catholicity places the fulfilling of the law in the external observances of the Church, is false and inexcusable. The Church can dispense from any of her own observances or laws, but she denies that she can dispense from a

precept of the moral law. The Professor knows this, if he knows any thing of the subject he pretends to treat. Where did he learn that it is, in the estimation of the Church or of her doctors, "a comparatively humble virtue to speak the truth"? Do Protestants hold, that to speak the truth is a *virtue* at all? Judging from the Professor's assertions against Catholicity, we should presume not. Catholic morality denies me the right, in any case, to speak what is not true, or what, in the plain, legitimate sense of my words, is false, though, in some restricted sense of my own, what I say may be true. No intentional falsehood, no intentional deception of any kind, in any case, or for any cause whatever, is allowed. This is Catholic morality. The author's assertions respecting Bossuet, Massillon, &c., and especially the general councils, that they divorce morality from piety, authorize pious frauds, teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics, &c., are barefaced falsehoods, and convict him of the very vice he is trying to fasten on others. He knows these charges have been denied and refuted over and over again, — unless his ignorance is more profound than even we believe it. Wherefore, then, does he not blush to reiterate them, and to reiterate them in the same breath in which he is trying to monopolize candor, fairness, and love of truth as Protestant virtues, — born, as it were, with Luther and Calvin?

"The spirit of mediæval piety was in too fearful a degree the spirit of robbery, and burnt-offering; of falsehood, and devotedness to the Church; of an Ave Maria on the lips, and carnage in the heart." — p. 476. This from a man who is accusing the Church of a want of candor, fairness, love of truth! The man is mad, and not "with much learning." The Middle Ages are not without their faults, but who knows any thing of them knows this — when intended to describe their predominating spirit — is false, totally false, as prove all the records of that glorious period of human history, on which he who loves God and man lingers, as the traveller on some green oasis in the sandy waste. But, even if true, a descendant of the Puritans, who robbed the Indians of their lands, then massacred the poor savages or sold them into slavery, while saying their long graces or interminable prayers, should, for shame's sake, hold his peace. A descendant of a class of men whose spirit was condensed in Cromwell's famous exhortation, — "Pray to God, my brethren, and mind and keep your powder dry," — should not talk about Ave Maria on the lips and carnage in the heart. It is

not for one who builds the tombs and garnishes the sepulchres of the canting, hypocritical, sour-visaged, greedy, arrogant, and cruel old Puritans, to accuse others of paying "tithes of anise, cummin, and mint, and of passing over justice and judgment, and the weightier matters of the law." The Professor should know that there are some who have even Puritan blood running in their veins who do not remember to forget what the Puritans were. We know their history, and would be silent; but we may yet be driven to write it. These men of yesterday, these theologians not yet in shorts, who want ancestors, and whom their own children disown, may yet be summoned to answer for their presumption and pride, their cant and hypocrisy, their falsehoods and calumnies, before the bar of a public that will not consent to be for ever duped. They have a terrible account to settle, and it will be no disadvantage to them to settle it now, before the books are opened for the last time.

"No faith to be kept with heretics." Where did the Professor learn that this is a maxim of Catholicity? It is false. Catholicity knows no such maxim, and Catholic history authorizes no inference that she practically adopts or in the least conceivable manner countenances it. Individuals of bad faith may be found, no doubt, even among Catholics; but that Catholicity or Catholic doctors anywhere countenance any thing of the sort is a malignant falsehood. We are taught and required to keep our faith with all men, and faith plighted to a heretic can no more be broken without sin than faith plighted to a true believer. We would that Protestants would observe a tithe of the good faith towards Catholics that Catholics do towards Protestants; and when they shall do so, we give them free leave to abuse our morals to their full satisfaction.

"The end sanctifies the means." So the Apostles were slanderously reported to teach, — "Let us do evil that good may come." "If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household!" No such doctrine is known among Catholics; we are not permitted to do evil that good may come. Both the means and the ends must be holy. But on what principle do Protestants themselves act, when they lie about and calumniate Catholics? On what principle would Professor Park attempt to justify the misrepresentations, distortions of the truth, and downright falsehoods of his own Lecture, if not on the principle, that "the end sanctifies the means"? On what principle can your Brownlows, Spar-

rys, Breckenridges, Bemans, Kirks, Beechers, Dowlings, your famous anti-Catholic lecturers, pamphleteers, editors, and col-porteurs, pretend to justify their flagitious falsehoods and calumnies, but on the principle that Catholicity is so great an evil, that any means are lawful which will tend to destroy it, — that is, “the end sanctifies the means” ? When have Catholics lied about or calumniated Protestants ? When or where have they even exaggerated their errors, vices, or crimes ? When or where have they combined by systematic misrepresentation and slander to overthrow Protestantism or to build up their own Church ? Facts, names, dates, Gentlemeh, if you please, — which we hold ourselves ready to give in return, if those already given do not satisfy you, or if you presume to contradict us. No, no, dear Protestant friends, remember that he that is without sin is the one who has permission to cast the first stone. Your own morals are quite too questionable to allow you to rail at Catholics. Be so good as to practise a morality half as pure as we teach, before you think of reading us moral lectures.

IX. The ninth charge, touching the austerity of Catholicity and its influence on the emotions, we must pass over. The author converses on these matters as a Rationalist who forgets the grace of God may count for something might be expected to converse on a subject of which he knows nothing, and which, in his present state of mind, he is as ill able to appreciate as a blind man is colors, or a deaf man harmony. The Professor evidently has made no study of ascetic theology, or ever devoted much time to prayer, meditation, and mortification ; and this may account, in no small degree, for his hostility to Catholicity.

He might as well charge our blessed Lord with exerting a bad moral influence on the emotions and passions, in choosing his Apostles from fishermen, publicans, and tent-makers, as to charge the Church with a bad moral influence, because no small portion of her clergy are taken from the humbler classes of society. He thinks priests taken from the humbler classes, elevated suddenly to a higher condition of life, and invested with great power, must inevitably become proud, vain, servile towards those above them, and haughty and overbearing towards those below them. If they were to be Protestant ministers, this might perhaps be the case ; for Protestants have not the grace of God to keep them humble. But we do not observe that the Apostles became proud in consequence of their eleva-

tion and authority, nor as a fact is it often so with our Catholic clergy. The effects feared are guarded against by the religious training they receive, the influence of their religion on their consciences, and the grace of God imparted to aid them not only as Christians, but as Christian teachers and pastors. May we request the Professor to remember that the grace of God is not regarded by Catholics as a fiction, and that Catholicity teaches us in all things to seek the glory of God, and to ascribe in all the glory to God?

X. The tenth charge, that Catholicity engenders an exclusive and persecuting spirit, we throw back on the Professor. The Catholic Church is exclusive in the sense that truth is exclusive, but in no other. She never persecutes, never has persecuted, never authorizes or approves persecution. Legitimate authority may punish, but it cannot persecute. But the Church herself inflicts only ecclesiastical punishments; and she has never authorized, or even tacitly approved, any *civil* punishment of heretics, when the heretic did not add to the sin of heresy, which St. Paul classes with murder and other deadly sins, the further sin of offences against the state, or of attacks on the very foundations of moral and social order, as in the case of the Albigenses, Wickliffites, Hussites, &c. The Catholic Church here, as well as elsewhere, is impervious to the shafts of her enemies.

But if you want to find persecution, genuine, unmitigated persecution, you must go out of the Catholic Church, among the Reformers and their numerous bands of hostile sectaries; and especially among the Calvinists at Geneva, under Calvin's own reign of terror, where it was virtually a capital offence "to speak evil of M. Calvin," and where Calvin kept his grand inquisitor, Colladen, who applied the torture to the very point of death to whomsoever Calvin was pleased to designate; and where Calvin himself, in the coolest and most malignant manner conceivable, procured the judicial murder of the poor poet, Gruet, Michael Servetus, and others. Whoever would become familiar with *bonâ fide* persecutions must read the history of the Reformers and their children.

XI. That Catholicity accepts the sneer of Hume, that "Religion rests on faith, not on reason," we admit, if regard be had to the intrinsic reasonableness of the mysteries; yet we deny that faith is unreasonable, for nothing is more rea-

sonable than to believe God on his word. The rule the Professor would introduce would be fatal to supernatural revelation. He contends for the principle, that we must judge the speaker by the word, and not the word by the speaker. This is a sound principle within the sphere of natural reason, in matters of which we have in ourselves a full knowledge, and therefore all the conditions of forming a correct judgment. But whoso adopts it in the sphere of religion is already an infidel or on the declivity to infidelity ; for it cannot be adopted in the sphere of religion without first denying that in religion there is any thing to be believed which transcends natural reason ; therefore it cannot be adopted without denying supernatural revelation ; and to deny supernatural revelation is what is meant by infidelity.

We do not like to call a man an infidel, or to be continually telling him that his objections involve a denial of Christianity. We know how easy it is to say such things, and how very suspicious such charges usually are ; but we confess, that, so far as we are competent to judge of the matter, the Professor has not urged a single objection against us, not false in fact, which, if analyzed, reduced to its ultimate principle, does not imply a total denial of all revelation of the supernatural order. We have found in no professedly religious writer in this country, unless it be in Mr. Parker, so complete a rejection, in principle, at least, of all supernatural revelation. The whole Lecture is written from the Humanitarian point of view, and proves that the author is far, very far, gone in German Rationalism ; and unless the Puritans of New England are much changed from what they were when we knew them better than we now do, he will yet be called to an account for his doctrines.

In this Lecture, his tendencies are not fully developed, and they show themselves to the Puritan reader only in their opposition to Catholicity, and therefore are not likely to be at once suspected of their real character. He will be allowed, without rebuke, to pursue a line of argument towards us, which, if he should adopt it in regard to his own creed, would not be tolerated for a moment. But whoso sows error sows dragon's teeth, and they will one day spring up armed men. They who countenance arguments false in principle, when directed against their opponents, will one day find them rebound, and with as much force as they were urged. We do not like Puritanism ; we regard it as a deadly enemy to truth and religion ; but we should be sorry to see it overthrown by the introduction

of another error still greater, still more destructive. Bad as it is, it is not so bad as German Rationalism, or even German Supernaturalism, as represented by Schleiermacher, Neander, and De Wette, which is only Rationalism sentimentalized.

We make these remarks with no ill-will towards Professor Park. We see his tendency, for it is a tendency we followed long before he was affected by it ; we have followed it to its termination, and we know where it conducts. Would to God, that on this point the Professor would place some little confidence in our words. We were bred in the same school he was, and we embraced the faith in which he was educated, and made what we thought was our first communion in a Calvinistic church. We sought, like him, to rationalize our faith, with less learning, less knowledge, and less advantages to begin with, we own ; for we were a poor boy cast upon the world alone, to struggle our way as best we could. We wished to have a faith the intrinsic reasonableness of which we could demonstrate. Of the twenty years which followed we need not speak. They are not such as we are proud of, nor such as we can recur to, except for a lesson of humility ; yet this have we learned, — had burnt and scarred into our very soul, — that there is no medium between a simple, meek, unquestioning faith in the sacred mysteries, as perfectly incomprehensible mysteries, on the sole authority of God revealing them, and absolute, downright infidelity ; and that the first step taken for the purpose of rationalizing the Christian faith is a step downwards to the bottomless hell of unbelief.

The Professor charges us with being unwilling to accept, or unable to delight in, goodness not in our own Church. “ The treasures of excellence that are spread out before us in Fénelon and Bossuet we, as Protestants, rejoice in ; but when the amiable sentiments of a Zinzendorf or of a Spangenberg are presented to a Romanist, are they welcomed by him ? ” — p. 484. Yes, so far as truly amiable and good ; and the Catholic is ready to acknowledge and does acknowledge and delight in excellence, let him find it where he may.

1. But — and here is a point we beg the Professor to remember — there is a difference between the amiable sentiments which are without grace, and the really amiable sentiments which are by grace. We admit amiable sentiments in men who are out of the Church ; but not that men, who are not, to say the least, *virtually* in the Church, have or can have any

truly meritorious sentiments ; for no sentiments not proceeding from grace are or can be meritorious ; and we know no ordinary means of grace but the sacraments of the Church.

2. The Catholic Church is older than any of the sectaries, and had examples of all the virtues long before Zinzendorf or Spangenberg was born, and purer examples than either of these gives us of any virtue. We find nothing in these men but feeble imitations of originals in possession of the Church, and therefore we neither need them nor can profit by them.

3. These men were heretics and schismatics ; and St. Paul classes heresy and schism with deadly sins. Moreover, we do not think it favorable to good morals to dwell with too much admiration on the few virtues individuals may have in despite of their mortal sins. The tendency to compel us to do this is the crying sin of modern literature, as witness *The Corsair*, *Lucrece Borgia*, *The Adventures of a Younger Son*, &c.

4. The blessed Apostle John says, " We are of God. He that knoweth God heareth us, and he that is not of God heareth not us. By this we know the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error." — 1 St. John, iv. 6. Moreover, he says, again, *Si quis venit ad vos, et hanc doctrinam non affert, nolite recipere eum in domum, nec AVE dixeritis.* — 2 St. John, 10. If the Professor wants any further reply, we will give it, after he has settled his quarrel with the beloved Apostle of our Lord.

If the Protestants rejoice in the treasures of excellence spread out in Fénelon and Bossuet, it is well, as far as it goes. They should do so ; it is their duty ; and it is also their duty to go farther, and submit to the Church of Fénelon and Bossuet, love and obey her as their spiritual mother ; and even then they would have no right to put on airs ; for when we have done our whole duty, our blessed Lord tells us to account ourselves unprofitable servants. We do not, we own, feel bound to be remarkably grateful to the would-be liberal Protestant, who thinks to say a kind thing to us, by saying, " O, yes, the Catholic Church has had some eminent men ; there's Fénelon ; I am a great admirer of Fénelon." We only do not take this as an insult, because no insult is intended. As well think to compliment a Christian by saying some of the Apostles were very eminent men, that you are a great admirer of the virtues of the Founder of Christianity. Do you receive Jesus Christ as your master ? Do you own the Church as your mother ? No ? Then you fall infinitely short of your duty. We are not Catholics be-

cause we admire Fénelon, or Bossuet, and we do not regard it as a compliment even to the Catholics you pretend to admire that you admire them, for you deride that to which they owed their virtues, and show your admiration is worth nothing by admiring also Luther, Calvin, Beza, John Knox, and perhaps Cotton Mather. We do not thank you for praising our brethren, while you insult and calumniate our Mother. Speak evil of me, or of them, and I can forgive you. But call my Mother hard names, as you do, and nothing you can say in my favor or in theirs will enable me to forgive you. In the one case, you at worst only blaspheme men ; in the other, you blaspheme the Holy Ghost, the eternal God, whose Spouse she is ; and even were I and my brethren to forgive you, it would avail you nothing.

XII. To the twelfth charge, that Catholicity “is fascinating to all classes,” we will say not much. It is a charge we cannot retort upon Puritanism. That the Catholic Church is attractive to all men of all classes who would have faith, who feel they are poor, helpless sinners, and would have the sure means of salvation ; to the weary and heavy laden, who seek rest, and find it nowhere in the world ; to those who would have confidence in their principles, and free scope and full employment for their intellectual powers ; to those who are tired of endless jarring, and disgusted with shallow innovators, pert philosophers, unfledged divines, cobweb theories spun from the brain of vanity and conceit, vanishing as the sun exhales the morning dew which alone rendered them visible, and who would have something older than yesterday, solid, durable, carrying them back and connecting them with all that has been, and forward and connecting them with all that is to be, admitting them into the goodly fellowship of the saints of all ages, making them feel that they have part and lot in all that over which has coursed the stream of divine providence, been consecrated by the blood of martyrs, and hallowed by the ebb and flow of sanctified affection, and permitting them to love, venerate, and adore to their heart’s content, or their heart’s capacity ; — to all these, of whatever age or nation, sex, rank, or condition, the glorious, sublime, God-inspired, guided, and defended Catholic Church is full of attractions, we admit, even fascinating, if you will. But in any other sense than this, or to any other than such as these, we deny it, and find the justification of our denial in the fact that the Professor and his brethren are

yet without her pale. — The thirteenth charge we shall consider in a separate article, designed to show the necessity of Catholicity to sustain popular liberty.

We here close our protracted review of this Lecture. The unchristian style of writing adopted by the author has prevented us from being briefer. But we have been as brief as we well could be. We have doubtless omitted some points which the author judges important, but we have touched upon all the main charges. For the most part, we have had nothing but assertions, unsupported by fact or argument, to combat. Where these were such as could, from the nature of the case, be met by argument, we have so met them; where they admitted no argument, we have met them by counter assertions, and put the author upon his proofs. If he shall attempt to bring forward facts to sustain any of his assertions which we have contradicted, or left uncontradicted, he will find us ready to meet him.

In some passages we have spoken plainly, perhaps severely. We are not in the habit of seeking for soft words, nor has the present case seemed to us to demand them. No Protestant can feel or understand the outrageous character of the Lecture we have had to combat. Its real flagitiousness is apparent only to a Catholic; and it were to be false to our brethren, false to the truth, false to our God, not to rebuke its author in the tones of a just severity. We have spoken calmly, sincerely, conscientiously, but strongly, and we hope to the point, and to the purpose.

ART. III. — *Catholicity necessary to sustain Popular Liberty.*

By popular liberty, we mean democracy; by democracy, we mean the democratic form of government; by the democratic form of government, we mean that form of government which vests the sovereignty in the people as population, and which is administered by the people, either in person or by their representatives. By sustaining popular liberty, we mean, not the introduction or institution of democracy, but preserving it when and where it is already introduced, and securing its free,

orderly, and wholesome action. By Catholicity, we mean the Roman Catholic Church, faith, morals, and worship. The thesis we propose to maintain is, therefore, that without the Roman Catholic religion it is impossible to preserve a democratic government, and secure its free, orderly, and wholesome action. Infidelity, Protestantism, heathenism may institute a democracy, but only Catholicity can sustain it.

Our own government, in its origin and constitutional form, is not a democracy, but, if we may use the expression, a limited *elective* aristocracy. In its theory, the representative, within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, when once elected, and during the time for which he is elected, is, in his official action, independent of his constituents, and not responsible to them for his acts. For this reason, we call the government an elective aristocracy. But, practically, the government framed by our fathers no longer exists, save in name. Its original character has disappeared, or is rapidly disappearing. The Constitution is a dead letter, except so far as it serves to prescribe the modes of election, the rule of the majority, the distribution and tenure of offices, and the union and separation of the functions of government. Since 1828, it has been becoming in practice, and is now, substantially, a pure democracy, with no effective constitution but the will of the majority for the time being. Whether the change has been for the better or the worse, we need not stop to inquire. The change was inevitable, because men are more willing to advance themselves by flattering the people and perverting the Constitution, than they are by self-denial to serve their country. The change has been effected, and there is no return to the original theory of the government. Any man who should plant himself on the Constitution, and attempt to arrest the democratic tendency, — no matter what his character, ability, virtues, services, — would be crushed and ground to powder. Your Calhouns must give way for your Polks and Van Burens, your Websters for your Harrisons and Clays. No man, who is not prepared to play the demagogue, to stoop to flatter the people, and, in one direction or another, to exaggerate the democratic tendency, can receive the nomination for an important office, or have influence in public affairs. The reign of great men, of distinguished statesmen and firm patriots, is over, and that of the demagogues has begun. Your most important offices are hereafter to be filled by third and fourth-rate men, — men too insignificant to excite strong opposition, and too flexible in

their principles not to be willing to take any direction the caprices of the mob — or the interests of the wire-pullers of the mob — may demand. Evil or no evil, such is the fact, and we must conform to it.

Such being the fact, the question comes up, How are we to sustain popular liberty, to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome action of our practical democracy? The question is an important one, and cannot be blinked with impunity.

The theory of democracy is, construct your government and commit it to the people to be taken care of. Democracy is not properly a government; but what is called the government is a huge machine contrived to be wielded by the people as they shall think proper. In relation to it the people are assumed to be what Almighty God is to the universe, the first cause, the medial cause, the final cause. It emanates from them; it is administered by them, and for them; and, moreover, they are to keep watch and provide for its right administration.

It is a beautiful theory, and would work admirably, if it were not for one little difficulty, namely, — *the people are fallible, both individually and collectively, and governed by their passions and interests, which not unfrequently lead them far astray, and produce much mischief.* The government must necessarily follow their will; and whenever that will happens to be blinded by passion, or misled by ignorance or interest, the government must inevitably go wrong; and government can never go wrong without doing injustice. The government may be provided for; the people may take care of that; but who or what is to take care of the people, and assure us that they will always wield the government so as to promote justice and equality, or maintain order, and the equal rights of all, of all classes and interests?

Do not answer by referring us to the virtue and intelligence of the people. We are writing seriously, and have no leisure to enjoy a joke, even if it be a good one. We have too much principle, we hope, to seek to humbug, and have had too much experience to be humbugged. We are Americans, American born, American bred, and we love our country, and will, when called upon, defend it, against any and every enemy, to the best of our feeble ability; but, though we by no means rate American virtue and intelligence so low as do those who will abuse us for not rating it higher, we cannot consent to hoodwink ourselves, or to claim for our countrymen a degree

of virtue and intelligence they do not possess. We are acquainted with no salutary errors, and are forbidden to seek even a good end by any but honest means. The virtue and intelligence of the American people are not sufficient to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome action of the government ; for they do not secure it. The government commits, every now and then, a sad blunder, and the general policy it adopts must prove, in the long run, suicidal. It has adopted a most iniquitous policy, and its most unjust measures are its most popular measures, such as it would be fatal to any man's political success directly and openly to oppose ; and we think we hazard nothing in saying, our free institutions cannot be sustained without an augmentation of popular virtue and intelligence. We do not say, nor do we pretend, that the people are not capable of a sufficient degree of virtue and intelligence to sustain a democracy ; all we say is, they cannot do it without virtue and intelligence, nor without a higher degree of virtue and intelligence than they have as yet attained to. We do not apprehend that many of our countrymen, and we are sure no one whose own virtue and intelligence entitle his opinion to any weight, will dispute this. Then the question of the means of sustaining our democracy resolves itself into the question of augmenting the virtue and intelligence of the people.

The press makes readers, but does little to make virtuous and intelligent readers. The newspaper press is, for the most part, under the control of men of very ordinary abilities, lax principles, and limited acquirements. It echoes and exaggerates popular errors, and does little or nothing to create a sound public opinion. Your popular literature caters to popular taste, passions, prejudices, ignorance, and errors ; it is by no means above the average degree of virtue and intelligence which already obtains, and can do nothing to create a higher standard of virtue or tone of thought. On what, then, are we to rely ?

“On Education,” answer Frances Wright, Abner Kneeland, the Hon. Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, and the Educationists generally. But we must remember that we must have virtue *and* intelligence. Virtue without intelligence will only fit the mass to be duped by the artful and designing ; and intelligence without virtue only makes one the abler and more successful villain. Education must be of the right sort, if it is to answer our purpose ; for a bad education is worse than none. The Mahometans are great

sticklers for education, and, if we recollect aright, it is laid down in the Koran, that every believer must at least be taught to read ; but we do not find their education does much to advance them in virtue and intelligence. Education, moreover, demands educators, and educators of the right sort. Where are these to be obtained ? Who is to select them, judge of their qualifications, sustain or dismiss them ? The people ? Then you place education in the same category with democracy. You make the people through their representatives the educators. The people will select and sustain only such educators as represent their own virtues, vices, intelligence, prejudices, and errors. Whether they educate mediately or immediately, they can impart only what they have and are. Consequently, with them for educators, we can, by means even of universal education, get no increase of virtue and intelligence to bear on the government. The people may educate, but where is that which takes care that they educate in a proper manner ? Here is the very difficulty we began by pointing out. The people take care of the government and education ; but who or what is to take care of the people, who need taking care of quite as much as either education or government ?—for, rightly considered, neither government nor education has any other legitimate end than to take care of the people.

We know of but one solution of the difficulty, and that is in RELIGION. There is no foundation for virtue but in religion, and it is only religion that can command that degree of popular virtue and intelligence requisite to insure to popular government the right direction and a wise and just administration. A people without religion, however successful they may be in throwing off old institutions, or in introducing new ones, have no power to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome working of any institutions. For the people can bring to the support of institutions only the degree of virtue and intelligence they have ; and we need not stop to prove that an infidel people can have very little either of virtue or intelligence, since, in this professedly Christian country, this will and must be conceded us. We shall, therefore, assume, without stopping to defend our assumption, that religion is the power or influence we need to take care of the people, and secure the degree of virtue and intelligence necessary to sustain popular liberty. We say, then, if democracy commits the government to the people to be taken care of, religion is

to take care that they take proper care of the government, rightly direct and wisely administer it.

But what religion? It must be a religion which is above the people and controls them, or it will not answer the purpose. If it depends on the people, if the people are to take care of it, to say what it shall be, what it shall teach, what it shall command, what worship or discipline it shall insist on being observed, we are back in our old difficulty. The people take care of religion; but who or what is to take care of the people? We repeat, then, what religion? It cannot be Protestantism, in all or any of its forms; for Protestantism assumes as its point of departure that Almighty God has indeed given us a religion, but *has given it to us not to take care of us, but to be taken care of by us*. It makes religion the ward of the people; assumes it to be sent on earth a lone and helpless orphan, to be taken in by the people, who are to serve as its dry nurse.

We do not pretend that Protestants say this in just so many words; but this, under the present point of view, is their distinguishing characteristic. What was the assumption of the Reformers? Was it not that Almighty God had failed to take care of his Church, that he had suffered it to become exceedingly corrupt and corrupting, so much so as to have become a very Babylon, and to have ceased to be his Church? Was it not for this reason that they turned reformers, separated themselves from what had been the Church, and attempted, with such materials as they could command, to reconstruct the Church on its primitive foundation, and after the primitive model? Is not this what they tell us? But if they had believed the Son of Man came to minister and not to be ministered unto, that Almighty God had instituted his religion for the spiritual government of men, and charged himself with the care and maintenance of it, would they ever have dared to take upon themselves the work of reforming it? Would they ever have fancied that either religion or the Church could ever need reforming, or, if so, that it could ever be done by human agency? Of course not. They would have taken religion as presented by the Church as the standard, submitted to it as the law, and confined themselves to the duty of obedience. It is evident, therefore, from the fact of their assuming to be reformers, that they, consciously or unconsciously, regarded religion as committed to their care, or abandoned to their protection. They were, at least, its guardians, and were to govern it, instead of being governed by it.

The first stage of Protestantism was to place religion under charge of the civil government. The Church was condemned, among other reasons, for the control it exercised over princes and nobles, that is, over the temporal power ; and the first effect of Protestantism was to emancipate the government from this control, or, in other words, to free the government from the restraints of religion, and to bring religion in subjection to the temporal authority. The prince, by rejecting the authority of the Church, won for himself the power to determine the faith of his subjects, to appoint its teachers, and to remove them whenever they should teach what he disapproved, or whenever they should cross his ambition, defeat his oppressive policy, or interfere with his pleasures. Thus was it and still is it with the Protestant princes in Germany, with the temporal authority in Denmark, Sweden, England, Russia, — in this respect also Protestant, — and originally was it the same in this country. The supreme civil magistrate makes himself sovereign pontiff, and religion and the Church, if disobedient to his will, are to be turned out of house and home, or dragooned into submission. Now, if we adopt this view, and subject religion to the civil government, it will not answer our purpose. We want religion, as we have seen, to control the people, and through its spiritual governance to cause them to give the temporal government always a wise and just direction. But, if the government control the religion, it can exercise no control over the sovereign people, for they control the government. Through the government the people take care of religion, but who or what takes care of the people ? This would leave the people ultimate, and we have no security unless we have something more ultimate than they, something which they cannot control, but which they must obey.

The second stage in Protestantism is to reject, in matters of religion, the authority of the temporal government, and to subject religion to the control of the faithful. This is the full recognition in matters of religion of the democratic principle. The people determine their faith and worship, select, sustain, or dismiss their own religious teachers. They who are to be taught judge him who is to teach, and say whether he teaches them truth or falsehood, wholesome doctrine or unwholesome. The patient directs the physician what to prescribe. This is the theory adopted by Protestants generally in this country. The congregation select their own teacher, unless it be among the Methodists, and to them the pastor is responsible. If he

teaches to suit them, well and good ; if he crosses none of their wishes, enlarges their numbers, and thus lightens their taxes and gratifies their pride of sect, also well and good ; if not, he must seek a flock to feed somewhere else.

But this view will no more answer our purpose than the former ; for it places religion under the control of the people, and therefore in the same category with the government itself. The people take care of religion, but who takes care of the people ?

The third and last stage of Protestantism is Individualism. This leaves religion entirely to the control of the individual, who selects his own creed, or makes a creed to suit himself, devises his own worship and discipline, and submits to no restraints but such as are self-imposed. This makes a man's religion the effect of his virtue and intelligence, and denies it all power to augment or to direct them. So this will not answer. The individual takes care of his religion, but who or what takes care of the individual ? The state ? But who takes care of the state ? The people ? But who takes care of the people ? Our old difficulty again.

It is evident, from these considerations, that Protestantism is not and cannot be the religion to sustain democracy ; because, take it in which stage you will, it, like democracy itself, is subject to the control of the people, and must command and teach what they say, and of course must follow, instead of controlling, their passions, interests, and caprices.

Nor do we obtain this conclusion merely by reasoning. It is sustained by facts. The Protestant religion is everywhere either an expression of the government or of the people, and must obey either the government or public opinion. The grand reform, if reform it was, effected by the Protestant chiefs, consisted in bringing religious questions before the public, and subjecting faith and worship to the decision of public opinion, — public op a larger or smaller scale, that is, of the nation, the province, or the sect. Protestant faith and worship tremble as readily before the slightest breath of public sentiment, as the aspen leaf before the gentle zephyr. The faith and discipline of a sect take any and every direction the public opinion of that sect demands. All is loose, floating, — is here to-day, is there to-morrow, and, next day, may be nowhere. The holding of slaves is compatible with Christian character south of a geographical line, and incompatible north ; and Christian morals change according to the prejudices, interests,

or habits of the people, — as evinced by the recent divisions in our own country among the Baptists and Methodists. The Unitarians of Savannah refuse to hear a preacher accredited by Unitarians of Boston.

The great danger in our country is from the predominance of material interests. Democracy has a direct tendency to favor inequality and injustice. The government must obey the people ; that is, it must follow the passions and interests of the people, and of course the stronger passions and interests. These with us are material, such as pertain solely to this life and this world. What our people demand of government is, that it adopt and sustain such measures as tend most directly to facilitate the acquisition of wealth. It must, then, follow the passion for wealth, and labor especially to promote worldly interests.

But among these worldly interests, some are stronger than others, and can command the government. These will take possession of the government, and wield it for their own especial advantage. They will make it the instrument of taxing all the other interests of the country for the special advancement of themselves. This leads to inequality and injustice, which are incompatible with the free, orderly, and wholesome working of the government.

Now, what is wanted is some power to prevent this, to moderate the passion for wealth, and to inspire the people with such a true and firm sense of justice, as will prevent any one interest from struggling to advance itself at the expense of another. Without this, the stronger material interests predominate, make the government the means of securing their predominance, and of extending it by the burdens which, through the government, they are able to impose on the weaker interests of the country.

The framers of our government foresaw this evil, and thought to guard against it by a written Constitution. But they intrusted the preservation of the Constitution to the care of the people, which was as wise as to lock up your culprit in prison and intrust him with the key. The Constitution, as a restraint on the will of the people, or the governing majority, is already a dead letter. It answers to talk about, to declaim about, in electioneering speeches, and even as a theme of newspaper leaders, and political essays in reviews ; but its effective power is a morning vapor after the sun is well up.

Even Mr. Calhoun's theory of the Constitution, which

regards it not simply as the written instrument, but as the disposition or the constitution of the people into sovereign states united in a federal league or compact, for certain purposes which concern all the states alike, and from which it follows that any measure unequal in its bearing, or oppressive upon any portion of the confederacy, is *ipso facto* null and void, and may be vetoed by the aggrieved state, — this theory, though unquestionably the true theory of the Federal Constitution, is yet insufficient; because, 1. It has no application within the State governments themselves; and because, 2. It does not, as a matter of fact, arrest the unequal, unjust, and oppressive measures of the Federal government. South Carolina, in 1833, forced a compromise, but in 1842, the obnoxious policy was revived, is pursued now successfully, and there is no State to attempt again the virtue of State interposition. Not even South Carolina can be brought to do so again. The meshes of trade and commerce are so spread over the whole land, the controlling influences of all sections have become so united and interwoven, by means of banks, other moneyed corporations, and the credit system, that henceforth State interposition becomes practically impossible. The Constitution is practically abolished, and our government is virtually, to all intents and purposes, as we have said, a pure democracy, with nothing to prevent it from obeying the interest or interests which for the time being can succeed in commanding it. This, as the Hon. Caleb Cushing would say, is a “fixed fact.” There is no restraint on predominating passions and interests but in religion. This is another “fixed fact.”

Protestantism is insufficient to restrain these, for it does not, and because it itself is carried away by them. The Protestant sect governs its religion, instead of being governed by it. If one sect pursues, by the influence of its chiefs, a policy in opposition to the passions and interests of its members, or any portion of them, the disaffected, if a majority, change its policy; if too few or too weak to do that, they leave it and join some other sect, or form a new sect. If the minister attempts to do his duty, reprovcs a practice by which his parishioners “get gain,” or insists on their practising some real self-denial not compensated by some self-indulgence, a few leading members will tell him very gravely, that they hired him to preach and pray for them, not to interfere with their business concerns and relations; and if he does not mind his own business, they

will no longer need his services. The minister feels, perhaps, the insult ; he would be faithful ; but he looks at his lovely wife, at his little ones. These to be reduced to poverty, perhaps to beggary, — no, it must not be ; one struggle, one pang, and it is over. He will do the bidding of his masters. A zealous minister in this city ventured, one Sunday, to denounce the modern spirit of trade. The next day, he was waited on by a committee of wealthy merchants belonging to his parish, who told him he was wrong. The Sunday following, the meek and humble minister publicly retracted, and made the *amende honorable*.

Here, then, is the reason why Protestantism, though it may institute, cannot sustain popular liberty. It is itself subject to popular control, and must follow in all things the popular will, passion, interest, ignorance, prejudice, or caprice. This, in reality, is its boasted virtue, and we find it commended because under it the people have a voice in its management. Nay, we ourselves shall be denounced, not for saying Protestantism subjects religion to popular control, but for intimating that religion ought not to be so subjected. A terrible cry will be raised against us. "See, here is Mr. Brownson," it will be said, "he would bring the people under the control of the Pope of Rome. Just as we told you. These Papists have no respect for the people. They sneer at the people, mock at their wisdom and virtue. Here is this unfledged Papistling, not yet a year old, boldly contending that the control of their religious faith and worship should be taken from the people, and that they must believe and do just what the emissaries of Rome are pleased to command ; and all in the name of liberty too." If we only had room, we would write out and publish what the anti-Catholic press will say against us, and save the candid, the learned, intellectual, and patriotic editors the trouble of doing it themselves ; and we would do it with the proper quantity of Italics, small capitals, capitals, and exclamation points. Verily, we think we could do the thing up nearly as well as the best of them. But we have no room. Yet it is easy to foresee what they will say. The burden of their accusation will be, that we labor to withdraw religion from the control of the people, and to free it from the necessity of following their will ; that we seek to make it the master, and not the slave, of the people. And this is good proof of our position, that Protestantism cannot govern the people, — for they govern it, — and therefore that Protestantism is not the religion wanted ;

for it is precisely a religion that can and will govern the people, be their master, that we need.

If Protestantism will not answer the purpose, what religion will ? The Roman Catholic, or none. The Roman Catholic religion assumes, as its point of departure, that it is instituted not to be taken care of by the people, but to take care of the people ; not to be governed by them, but to govern them. The word is harsh in democratic ears, we admit ; but it is not the office of religion to say soft or pleasing words. It must speak the truth even in unwilling ears, and it has few truths that are not harsh and grating to the worldly mind or the depraved heart. The people need governing, and must be governed, or nothing but anarchy and destruction await them. They must have a master. The word must be spoken. But it is not our word. We have demonstrated its necessity in showing that we have no security for popular government, unless we have some security that the people will administer it wisely and justly ; and we have no security that they will do this, unless we have some security that their passions will be restrained, and their attachments to worldly interests so moderated that they will never seek, through the government, to support them at the expense of justice ; and this security we can have only in a religion that is above the people, exempt from their control, which they cannot command, but must, on peril of condemnation, OBEY. Declaim as you will ; quote our expression, — THE PEOPLE MUST HAVE A MASTER, — as you doubtless will ; hold it up in glaring capitals, to excite the unthinking and unreasoning multitude, and to doubly fortify their prejudices against Catholicity ; be mortally scandalized at the idea that religion ought to govern the people, and then go to work and seek to bring the people into subjection to your banks or moneyed corporations through their passions, ignorance, and worldly interests, and in doing so, prove what candid men, what lovers of truth, what noble defenders of liberty, and what ardent patriots you are. We care not. You see we understand you, and, understanding you, we repeat, the religion which is to answer our purpose must be *above* the people, and able to COMMAND them. We know the force of the word, and we mean it. The first lesson to the child is, *obey* ; the first and last lesson to the people, individually or collectively, is, OBEY ; — and there is no obedience where there is no authority to enjoin it.

The Roman Catholic religion, then, is necessary to sustain

popular liberty, because popular liberty can be sustained only by a religion free from popular control, above the people, speaking from above and able to command them, — and such a religion is the Roman Catholic. It acknowledges no master but God, and depends only on the divine will in respect to what it shall teach, what it shall ordain, what it shall insist upon as truth, piety, moral and social virtue. It was made not by the people, but for them ; is administered not by the people, but for them ; is accountable not to the people, but to God. Not dependent on the people, it will not follow their passions ; not subject to their control, it will not be their accomplice in iniquity ; and speaking from God, it will teach them the truth, and command them to practise justice. To this end the very constitution of the Church contributes. It is Catholic, universal ; it teaches all nations, and has its centre in no one. If it was a mere national church, like the Anglican, the Russian, the Greek, or as Louis the Fourteenth in his pride sought to make the Gallican, it would follow the caprice or interest of that nation, and become but a tool of its government or of its predominating passion. The government, if anti-popular, would use it to oppress the people, to favor its ambitious projects, or its unjust and ruinous policy. Under a popular government, it would become the slave of the people, and could place no restraint on the ruling interest or on the majority ; but would be made to sanction and consolidate its power. But having its centre in no one nation, extending over all, it becomes independent of all, and in all can speak with the same voice and in the same tone of authority. This the Church has always understood, and hence the noble struggles of the many calumniated popes to sustain the unity, Catholicity, and independence of the ecclesiastical power. This, too, the temporal powers have always seen and felt, and hence their readiness, even while professing the Catholic faith, to break the unity of Catholic authority ; for, in so doing, they could subject the Church in their own dominions, as did Henry the Eighth, and as does the emperor of Russia, to themselves.

But we pray our readers to understand us well ; and we hope to find some candor even among Protestant readers. We unquestionably assert the *adequacy* of Catholicity to sustain popular liberty, on the ground of its being exempted from popular control and able to govern the people ; and its *necessity*, on the ground that it is the only religion, which, in a popular government, is or can be exempted from popular control, and

able to govern the people. We say distinctly, that this is the ground on which, reasoning as the statesman, not as the theologian, we assert the adequacy and necessity of Catholicity ; and we object to Protestantism, *in our present argument*, solely on the ground that it has no authority over the people, is subject to them, must follow the direction they give it, and therefore cannot restrain their passions, or so control them as to prevent them from abusing their government. This we assert, distinctly and intentionally, and so plainly, that what we say cannot be mistaken.

But in what sense do we assert Catholicity to be the master of the people ? Here we demand justice ; for on this point some of our former assertions have, by a profligate press, been wilfully perverted. The authority of Catholicity is spiritual, not temporal ; and the only sense in which we have urged or do urge its necessity is as the means of augmenting the virtue and intelligence of the people. We demand it as a religious, not as a political power. We began by defining democracy to be that form of government which vests the sovereignty in the people. We weighed our words and knew what we said when we gave that definition. If, then, we recognize the sovereignty of the people in matters of government, we must be more inconsistent than even our traducers will believe us, if we do not recognize their political right to do what they will. The only restriction on their will we contend for is a *moral* restriction ; and the master we contend for is not a master that prevents them from doing politically what they will, but who, by his moral and spiritual influence, prevents them from willing what they ought not to will. The only influence on the political or governmental action of the people which we ask, which we wish, or expect, or believe in, from Catholicity, is that which it exerts on the mind, the heart, and the conscience ; — an influence which it exerts by enlightening the mind to see the true end of man, the relative value of all worldly pursuits, by moderating the passions, by weaning the affections from the world, inflaming the heart with true charity, and by making each act in all seriously, honestly, conscientiously. The people will thus come to see and to will what is equitable and right, and will give to the government a wise and just direction, and never use it to effect any unwise or unjust measures. This is the kind of master we demand for the people, and this is the bugbear of “ Romanism ” with which miserable panders to prejudice seek to frighten old women and children. Is there

any thing alarming in this ? In this sense, we wish this country to come under the Pope of Rome. As the visible head of the Church, as the representative on earth of the spiritual authority which Almighty God has instituted to enlighten and govern the nations, we assert his supremacy, and tell our countrymen that we would have them submit to him. They may flare up at this as much as they please, and write as many alarming and abusive editorials as they choose or can find time or space to do, — they will not move us, or relieve themselves of the obligation Almighty God has placed them under of obeying the spiritual authority of the Catholic Church, Pope and all.

If we were discussing the question before us as a theologian, we should assign many other reasons why Catholicity is necessary to sustain popular liberty. Where the passions are unrestrained, there is license, but not liberty ; the passions are not restrained without divine grace ; and divine grace comes ordinarily only through the sacraments of the Church. But from the point of view we are discussing the question, we are not at liberty to press this argument, which, in itself, would be conclusive. The Protestants have foolishly raised the question of the influence of Catholicity on democracy, and have sought to frighten our countrymen from embracing it by appealing to their democratic prejudices, or, if you will, convictions. We have chosen to meet them on this question, and to prove that democracy without Catholicity cannot be sustained. Yet in our own minds the question is really unimportant. We have proved the insufficiency of Protestantism to sustain democracy. What then ? Have we in so doing proved that Protestantism is not the true religion ? Not at all ; for we have no infallible evidence that democracy is the true or even the best form of government. It may be so, and the great majority of the American people believe it is so ; but they may be mistaken, and Protestantism be true, notwithstanding its incompatibility with republican institutions. So we have proved that Catholicity is necessary to sustain such institutions. But what then ? Have we proved it to be the true religion ? Not at all. For such institutions may themselves be false and mischievous. Nothing in this way is settled in favor of one religion or another, because no system of politics can ever constitute a standard by which to try a religious system. Religion is more ultimate than politics, and you must conform your politics to your religion, and not your religion to your politics. You must be the veriest infidels to deny this.

This conceded, the question the Protestants raise is exceedingly insignificant. The real question is, Which religion is from God? If it be Protestantism, they should refuse to subject it to any human test, and should blush to think of compelling it to conform to any thing human; for when God speaks, man has nothing to do but to listen and obey. So, having decided that Catholicity is from God, save in condescension to the weakness of our Protestant brethren, we must refuse to consider it in its political bearings. It speaks from God, and its speech overrides every other speech, its authority every other authority. It is the sovereign of sovereigns. He who could question this, admitting it to be from God, has yet to obtain his first religious conception, and to take his first lesson in religious liberty; for we are to hear God, rather than hearken unto men. But we have met the Protestants on their own ground, because, though in doing so we surrendered the vantage-ground we might occupy, we know the strength of Catholicity and the weakness of Protestantism. We know what Protestantism has done for liberty, and what it can do. It can take off restraints, and introduce license, but it can do nothing to sustain true liberty. Catholicity depends on no form of government; it leaves the people to adopt such forms of government as they please, because under any or all forms of government it can fulfil its mission of training up souls for heaven; and the eternal salvation of one single soul is worth more than, is a good far outweighing, the most perfect civil liberty, nay, all the worldly prosperity and enjoyment ever obtained or to be obtained by the whole human race.

It is, after all, in this fact, which Catholicity constantly brings to our minds and impresses upon our hearts, that consists its chief power, aside from divine grace, to sustain popular liberty. The danger to that liberty comes from love of the world,—the ambition for power or place, the greediness of gain or distinction. It comes from lawless passions, from inordinate love of the goods of time and sense. Catholicity, by showing us the vanity of all these, by pointing us to the eternal reward that awaits the just, moderates this inordinate love, these lawless passions, and checks the rivalries and struggles in which popular liberty receives her death-blow. Once learn that all these things are vanity, that even civil liberty itself is no great good, that even bodily slavery is no great evil, that the one thing needful is a mind and heart conformed to the will of God, and you have a disposition which will

sustain a democracy wherever introduced, though doubtless a disposition that would not lead you to introduce it where it is not.

But this last is no objection, for the revolutionary spirit is as fatal to democracy as to any other form of government. It is the spirit of insubordination and of disorder. It is opposed to all fixed rule, to all permanent order. It loosens every thing, and sets all afloat. Where all is floating, where nothing is fixed, where nothing can be counted on to be to-morrow what it is to-day, there is no liberty, no solid good. The universal restlessness of Protestant nations, the universal disposition to change, the constant movements of the populations, so much admired by shortsighted philosophers, are a sad spectacle to the sober-minded Christian, who would, as far as possible, find in all things a type of that eternal fixedness and repose he looks forward to as the blessed reward of his trials and labors here. Catholicity comes here to our relief. All else may change, but it changes not. All else may pass away, but it remains where and what it was, a type of the immobility and immutability of the eternal God.

ART. IV.—*Native American Civility, — Religious Liberty, &c.*

THE following, received by our publisher a short time since, is too characteristic of a spirit somewhat prevalent in our community to be lost.

“*Milbury, September 6th, 1845.*

“MR. BENJAMIN H. GREENE.

“Dear Sir:—I received this letter, purporting to be an account against one Samuel Harrington, for *Brownson's Review* for 1844, but, owing to carelessness in superscribing, was directed to S. Harrington of Milbury, and there being no other Harrington in town whose name began with S, the postmaster thought it must mean me. I know nothing of the work, except what is expressed in the within prospectus; but, judging of the character of the work by the author whose name it bears, I should think him well qualified to write upon politics, religion, and infidelity, having himself belonged to almost every party and sect, and, last of all, turned Roman Catholic. I should think you would be troubled to find any *American Republican* who would have any thing to do with a work bearing the name of one who has proved himself a traitor to republicanism, and every principle for which our forefathers spent their treasures and blood, by acknowledging his allegiance to the most abject of foreign despots the world has ever known, ‘the Pope of Rome,’—who claims that his will is

law ; that the Bible, the most perfect book ever given to man, his chart and compass to guide him to the 'haven of eternal rest,' is not fit for the common people ; and has sent forth his anathemas against all Bible societies, everywhere seeking its suppression ; keeping his subjects in ignorance, while he is expending hundreds of thousands to educate the children of Protestants, showing a lack of that charity which begins at home, disclosing conclusively that he has some ulterior object in view in educating Protestants, while the thousands of Papists who visit our country, or remain in their own native land, are permitted to grow up in the greatest ignorance without exciting in the least his sympathy or regard. And this O. A. Brownson, the eloquent orator, is selected to become his tool to carry out his plans, for what reward I am unable to say, but hope his perfidy will meet a just recompense at the hands of the American people. You will probably infer from this, that I am not, never was, nor ever shall be indebted to you for any volume of the Review bearing the name of the traitor Brownson.

"Most respectfully yours,

"STEPHEN HARRINGTON."

It will be seen from this, that our publisher addressed no letter to Mr. Stephen Harrington, but that Mr. Harrington, through a very pardonable mistake, took from the postoffice and opened a letter intended, not for him, but for another person. This he must have perceived, the moment he opened the letter. His simple duty was to return it to the postoffice with an explanation of the cause of his mistake, as his apology for having taken out and opened another man's letter. If, through excessive delicacy, he had felt it necessary to do more, even to write to our publisher, he should have simply written a note of apology. But his horror of Catholicity made him forget both the Christian and the gentleman. His letter is a gratuitous insult to Mr. Greene, and any thing but complimentary to ourselves, who know not Mr. Stephen Harrington from Adam, and have, and have had, nothing to do with him in one way or another.

In ordinary cases, we should take no notice of such a letter as the one before us, or, if we chose to make it the subject of some comments, we should, out of delicacy to the writer, suppress his name and residence ; but in the present case we think it due to Mr. Harrington to publish his letter with his name ; and we do so for his especial benefit, and that of a large class, who, like him, are ready in their zeal and bigotry to set aside the ordinary courtesies of civilized life. Such men deserve to be known.

So far as Mr. Harrington's letter relates merely to ourselves personally, we pass it over. We could easily show that he is far from being qualified to write our biography, but it is not worth our while. If we have changed our party or sectarian relations oftener than some others, it may not be to their credit or to our discredit. The public know, at least, where we are *now*. And we are too insignificant to make it a matter of importance to set them right as to where or what we may have been heretofore.

The assertion, that in becoming a Catholic we have become a traitor to the institutions of our country, we notice, because it is a common charge made against all Americans who become Catholics, and because it involves a principle of some gravity. The ground of the assertion is the pretence that Catholics owe allegiance to a foreign power, and that this allegiance is incompatible with that which they owe to the State.

But, even admitting that we as Catholics owe allegiance, as it is pretended, to the Pope, it does not follow that we owe allegiance to a *foreign* power. We can owe this allegiance to the Pope only in his capacity of visible head or chief pastor of the Church. But in this capacity the Pope is no foreigner,—is no more an Italian than he is an American; for in this capacity he has no national character,—no country; or rather, his country is the Church. Where the Church is, there is his country, his native land, his home; and the Church is catholic. It is absurd, then, to call him a foreign power. He is a foreign power only in his capacity of temporal chief of the patrimony of St. Peter, in which capacity no Catholic not a subject of the Ecclesiastical States owes him the least allegiance or obedience. Let our allegiance as Catholics to the Pope, then, be what it may, it is not allegiance to a foreign power.

But the allegiance which we as Catholics owe to the Church, and to the Pope as chief pastor of the Church, is simply *spiritual*, and pertains solely to *matters of conscience*. In all matters of conscience, we as Catholics unquestionably acknowledge allegiance to the Church,—to the Pope, if you will; in all else we acknowledge allegiance to the State, and are commanded by the Church to obey the State. The question to be settled is, simply, Is allegiance to the Church, in all matters of conscience, incompatible with our allegiance to the State? In answer, we ask, Does our allegiance to the Church cover any matter in relation to which we owe allegiance to the State? I owe the State allegiance in all matters over which it is sovereign, and in no others. What, then, are the extent and the limits of the sovereignty of the State? Does its sovereignty extend to matters of conscience? Has the State the right to legislate for conscience,—to subject conscience to its laws? Certainly not. The principle of our American government is, confessedly, that conscience is free, that where conscience begins, there the authority of the State ends. And it must be so, if we enjoy religious *liberty* as distinguished from religious *toleration*. Toleration presupposes the right on the part of government to force conscience, but that for certain prudential reasons it forbears to do so; but religious liberty asserts the absolute freedom of conscience before the State, and denies the right of the State, or of any human power whatever, to force it, or in any sense to intermeddle with what concerns it. In this

country, the government, according to its profession, does not merely *tolerate*; it acknowledges religious *liberty*. Then it confesses that its sovereignty ends where conscience begins. Then I owe no allegiance to the State in matters of conscience; and then it has no right to command me to do what my conscience forbids; and I have the right, in all cases in which it so commands me, to refuse to obey it. If you deny this, you deny religious liberty, and assert for the temporal power the right to force conscience.

Now, if this be so, if the sovereignty of the State ends where the empire of conscience begins, since allegiance to the Church embraces only matters of conscience, it follows that my allegiance as a Catholic to the Church can never be incompatible with my allegiance to the State, nor my allegiance to the State ever incompatible with my allegiance to the Church. I am simply to "render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." My obedience to the one is perfectly compatible with my duty to the other. So this bugbear about allegiance to a "foreign despot," so frightful to our Protestant brethren, vanishes the moment it is examined by a little daylight.

The Catholic Church, we admit, asserts RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, and denies to the State the right to force conscience, or to intermeddle in the affairs of conscience. In the face of any and every government, prince, or potentate, she asserts the freedom of religious worship, and proclaims that conscience is accountable to God alone. We, as Catholics, do and are bound to assert the same, and, strange as it may seem, we do assert even the freedom of CATHOLIC WORSHIP; we demand this freedom as our right; as our right we dare defend it, even against the State itself; for we hold it not from the State, but from Almighty God, and in defending it we plant ourselves on a higher than human authority, an authority which the State itself is bound to respect. We say to the civil government, that in its legitimate province we owe it unqualified obedience, and what it commands we do; but if it invade the empire of conscience, and command us to do violence to our conscience, we regard its command as a nullity. We tell it to its very face, that, in such a case, we will not obey it. It may punish us, for it has the physical power; it may send us into exile, to the dungeon, the scaffold, or the stake; we can die; but we cannot do what conscience forbids. This, we confess, is Catholic doctrine, and thus far allegiance to the Church, to the Pope, if you please, will carry every Catholic who is not a discredit to the name.

Do you complain of this? Then tell us what you mean by religious liberty, about which you have so much to say, and of which you apparently understand so little. Do you deny that religious liberty is freedom for the Catholic conscience as well as

for the Puritan conscience, — that freedom of conscience has significance for us as well as for you, and is as much violated when a Catholic is denied the freedom of Catholic worship, as when a Puritan is denied the freedom of Puritan worship? If you deny us the full freedom of our conscience, you deny religious liberty itself; if you contend that it is incompatible with the legitimate authority of the State that we should enjoy the full freedom of our conscience, you claim for the State authority in matters of conscience, the right to force conscience, which it has not, which it ought not to have, and which, in this country, the government itself expressly disclaims.

Our Church is our conscience; our allegiance to the Church, to the Pope as its chief pastor, is with us a matter of conscience, a part of our religion. Deny us the liberty to yield the obedience we owe, you deny us the free exercise of our religion, — the freedom of our conscience. Have we a right to the freedom of our religion, or have we not? You cannot deny it, without claiming for the State right in matters of conscience. If you do this, if you attempt by the State to invade the empire of conscience, to abridge freedom of religion, and to subject our worship to your laws, then, but only then, the spiritual authority we acknowledge and the temporal authority whose prerogative you assert may come in conflict; then, but only then, may our allegiance to the Church affect our obedience to the State. Leave religious worship free, and the spiritual power will never interfere with the temporal; attempt to chain up religious worship, the Church will resist you and do all in her power to repel your attacks upon freedom of conscience. There will then unquestionably be a struggle, and in that struggle every Catholic, if a true Catholic, will be found on the side of the Church, and ready to die in her defence; for the freedom of religious worship, the accountability of conscience to God alone, is a cardinal principle of Catholicity, and can in no instance be surrendered.

The question is purely a question of religious liberty. Do you acknowledge religious liberty, or do you not? Yes or no? If you say Yes, we can be no traitors to our country in becoming Catholics, for we do but exercise our acknowledged rights; if you say No, we brand you as false both to God and your country. For your country, through her institutions, declares that religious worship is free, and that the State cannot force conscience; and Almighty God commands you to hearken unto him rather than unto men.

They, then, who contend that the Catholic religion is incompatible with the authority of the State, who call us traitors because we become Catholics, and seek, in the obligation we are under to obey the Church, a pretence for denying us the freedom of our worship, are fighting not against Catholicity merely, but against

religious liberty itself. They prove themselves to be the bitter enemies of freedom of conscience, and the advocates of the right of the State to determine the religion of its subjects. They may deny this, or seek to disguise it as they will, — but it is the simple, naked truth. Prating of religious liberty, they have no understanding of what it is, or no love or respect for it in their hearts. The contemptible so-called “Native American” party, hoping to conceal its hostility to religious liberty under the mask of an exalted patriotism, is nothing but a party expressly organized against the freedom of Catholic worship; and the shortsighted bigots at its head do not seem to imagine that their countrymen can see that freedom of conscience may be struck in the conscience of a Catholic as well as in the conscience of a Presbyterian, of a Baptist, or of a Methodist, — that, when once the authority of the temporal power in matters of conscience is admitted, there can be henceforth, even if toleration, no religious freedom, and that no sect can observe its worship but by sufferance of the State. This whole cry against the Church is a declaration of the supremacy of the State in matters of conscience, — the most “damnable heresy” ever concocted or promulgated.

Some of the good folks, who reflect not that one cannot strike the freedom of conscience in another without striking it equally in himself, rolled up their eyes and tried to be astonished, scandalized even, when, in our last Review, we asserted that Protestants are, and always have been, the bitter enemies of religious liberty. Yet it is undeniably so. The proofs are complete. This Native American party is itself a proof of it. Its presses boldly declare, that a Catholic, in consequence of his allegiance to his Church, should not be permitted in this country the exercise of the elective franchise, that fidelity to the Catholic Church is treason to the State; and here is Mr. Stephen Harrington, a man who knows just enough to echo the wishes and designs of his class, sect, or party, and therefore a better witness than a greater or more distinguished man, calling us traitors to our country because we have, through God’s great mercy, become a Catholic. What does all this mean, but that the State is and ought to be supreme in religious, as well as in civil matters? And what is the meaning of religious liberty, where the State is supreme over conscience? Do the bigots and fanatics understand themselves? Do they know the first principle of religious liberty? If they do, they know that religious liberty exists not, and cannot exist, under the Erastian heresy of the supremacy of the temporal power. If, then, they are not mere blind leaders of the blind, if they are not consummate fools, they know that when they oppose Catholicity on political grounds, for reasons of State, they are opposing, and intentionally opposing, religious liberty itself. But, whether they know it or not, this is what they are doing. They are stirring up a war

against religious liberty. But in this war we know where the Church will be found. She will be found where she always has been, and always will be to the consummation of the world. She will be found on the side opposed to the maddened hosts who deny the freedom of conscience. From the first moment of her existence, she has opposed them in defence of the freedom of religious worship. She asserted this freedom in face of the persecuting Jew and the persecuting Gentile, and consecrated it by the blood of her millions of martyrs. She asserted it in face of pagan Rome, — has asserted it in face of the emperors of Germany, of the kings of England, and of France, — and she will assert it here, in this free republic, in face of the sects, bigots, charlatans, demagogues, heretics, and schismatics, who would immolate it to their pride, their ambition, their folly, their wrath, and their madness. She is the guardian of this glorious freedom, and let the trumpets sound the charge, if they must; here, as in France, as in Switzerland, as in Spain, as in Naples, as in Tuscany, as in England, as in Ireland, as in Poland, as in Holland, as in Germany, as in Russia, as throughout the world, she is on the side of religious liberty. Everywhere you may read inscribed on her banners, **CONSCIENCE IS ACCOUNTABLE TO GOD ALONE**, — **RELIGIOUS WORSHIP MUST BE FREE**; and everywhere her sons are the first to take, and the last to quit, the field against the maddened hosts that would enslave conscience and gain for the State the power to lord it over God's heritage.

It was for a time thought that the battle for religious liberty could never need to be fought again in this republic. It was hoped that the question was settled for ever, by the political order frankly disclaiming all right to touch the empire of conscience. But when this disclaimer was inserted in our constitutions, Catholicity was looked upon as dead; there were few Catholics, comparatively speaking, in the country, and nobody dreamed of the possibility of their becoming numerous. The Protestants, feeling themselves strong, thought they might afford to be liberal. Perhaps the recent struggle for political independence had, for the moment, humanized their feelings, and, in the sudden expansion of their hearts, they really imagined it might be a fine thing to try the experiment of religious liberty. Yet the acknowledgment of religious liberty was not obtained without strong opposition; and the history of the times shows clearly that the leading sects of the country, if they consented to it at all, consented with grave reluctance, and because they could not help themselves. The Calvinistic sects, unless we except the Baptists, have, from the first, been opposed to religious liberty, and have been constantly intriguing to overthrow it. They have retained ever the spirit of Calvin and Knox; and now, when Catholicity spreads and the sects divide and become insignificant, when the Catholic begins

to hope and the sectarian to fear, when the church threatens to supplant the meetinghouse, and the cross the weathercock that turns with every wind, serious alarm is felt, and the shout rings through the land, Down with religious liberty! A party is organized for its suppression, chiefly in the persons of Catholics. Already has this party, led on and excited by grave Calvinistic divines, burned some of our churches, seminaries, and convents, fired our dwellings, and shot down our people in the streets. Already has the wild shout of exultation broke from the citizens — not the rabble, but well dressed citizens — of Philadelphia, on beholding the cross, the emblem of man's salvation, fall from St. Augustine's church, and become the prey of devouring flames; "a yell," as an eyewitness expressed it, "that was no doubt echoed in hell, and heard, too, in heaven." All over the land, this liberticide party, — for he who denies liberty of conscience kills liberty herself, — in the sacred name of liberty, yes, liberty of the state to bind the free conscience, is establishing its presses, employing its demagogues and colporteurs to scatter the foulest falsehoods broadcast, forming its leagues and its associations for preparing the public mind to suppress the freedom of Catholic worship. The facts glare us in the face. We see them everywhere. We read them in every anti-Catholic press; we hear them in every anti-Catholic sermon; we smell their stench in every anti-Catholic book and pamphlet. There is no denying it. We tell our brethren, nay, we tell the friends of religious liberty, of every denomination, that a deadly blow is aimed at freedom of conscience. The old Calvinistic tyranny over conscience rears anew its crushed head and spits its venom, and we must decide which we will have, CALVINISM AND THE SLAVERY OF CONSCIENCE, OR CATHOLICITY AND FREEDOM OF WORSHIP.

This is no idle declamation. Our brethren may be assured, that a deadly blow, in the attack on their worship, is aimed at the freedom of conscience itself, and that here, as in every Protestant country, we are to be placed under ban of the law, or at best to exercise our worship only by the mere sufferance of the state. Yet we are unwilling to believe the enemies of religious liberty will succeed. When we feel the breeze that comes freely and joyously over our native hills, when we look out of our window and see the monument which marks the spot where Warren fell, when we remember that Catholic treasure and Catholic blood, as well as Protestant, were poured out to win our national independence, that it was a Catholic monarch who was our generous ally, who furnished us with men and means to terminate successfully the war of the Revolution, and that in more than half of the States of this Union the cross had been planted before the Protestant adventurer came, we confess it is hard to persuade ourselves that the demagogues and maddened bigots will succeed in sup-

pressing religious liberty, in bringing our rich and noble country under a government that will tyrannize over conscience, and thus overturn the proudest monument of our fathers' glory. But numbers are against us, and we may be outvoted ; but, nevertheless, God is for us, and we will not fear whatever may be against us. We can die ; and, dying, win the victory.

As to Mr. Stephen Harrington's cant about the Bible, it will suffice to say, that, if he would read and understand the Bible better, reverence and practise its teachings more truly, and spend thus precious breath in praising it and in calumniating Catholics, he would be both a better Christian and a better citizen. If the Holy Father anathematizes Protestant Bible societies, he only proves himself the faithful shepherd of the flock. Even many Protestants themselves denounce the Bible societies, and we, when a Protestant, published some curious facts about them which we may have occasion to republish. There is some difference between anathematizing the sectarian machines called Bible societies and prohibiting the circulation of a book which Protestants facetiously call the Bible, and opposing the printing, circulating, and reading the Holy Scriptures, the word of God. When Protestants shall have the Bible to circulate, and shall in good faith circulate it, and not, under pretence of circulating the word of God, circulate their own word, perhaps they will meet with less opposition from the Holy Father.

Catholics in this country and in others may be ignorant ; but Mr. Stephen Harrington will need to travel far before he finds a Catholic as ignorant of what constitutes the gentleman and the Christian as himself. As a general thing, the mass of the people are better educated in Catholic countries than they are in Protestant countries. The Austrian system of education is superior to the Prussian, the French to the Scottish, and the provisions for education in the Papal States are far superior to what they are in New England. The Irish are as well educated, to say the least, as the English, and that they are not better educated is owing to Protestant tyranny and oppression, which made it a high penal offence for a Catholic father to teach his children even letters and science. For years, the Irish were obliged to choose between religion without education, and education without religion. It is to their credit that they did not choose the latter. Ignorant as Catholics may be, they have no reason to blush for their ignorance in the presence of Protestants.

That the Holy Father expends vast sums in educating the children of Protestants we should be glad to believe, for we really think it would be a deed of charity to give the children of Protestants a better education than they now get. But we think Mr. Harrington must be misinformed ; for Dr. Bacon, we believe it was, told us, at the late anniversary of the *Christian Alliance So-*

ciety, that the Pope is quite poor and can't pay his debts. If this be so, he can hardly send out hundreds of thousands to educate the children of Protestants. That Protestants do send their children sometimes to Catholic schools is undoubtedly true; but they are not obliged to do so; and when they do, it is of their own accord, because they prefer our schools to any they have of their own. If we establish better schools than the Protestants, under more accomplished and trustworthy teachers, really it cannot be regarded as our fault.

That Catholics, in establishing and multiplying schools, to the full extent of their means, in this country, have some ulterior object in view, there can be no doubt. They hope to make this whole country Catholic, without a single heretic in it. We are all laboring in our several ways, as we have opportunity, to this end, though not with half the zeal and energy that could be wished; for Catholics, in the midst of Protestants, too often experience the truth of the proverb, that "evil communications corrupt good manners." Nevertheless, we hold our Church is God's Church, and that whoso would enter into the kingdom of heaven must enter through it; and charity to God and man must necessarily make us somewhat active. Our schools, colleges, and seminaries are, unquestionably, all intended to further the cause of Catholicity, to promote Christian knowledge and virtue, and, if possible, to add to the number that are to be saved. That the Holy Father takes an interest in our doings, that his heart is gladdened when he sees the rose planted in the wilderness and living waters gush out in the thirsty land, we can believe; for he is the faithful shepherd, to whom has been committed the care of the whole flock.

That we are the "selected tool" of the Pope in this work is not true; but we wish it was. We seek no higher honor on earth than to be employed by him in any service he may judge us fit for. We reverence him as the chief pastor of the Church, as the vicar of Christ on earth, and we shall never feel aggrieved by being told that we are selected to be his tool.

We are not so much troubled about the "reward" we are likely to receive as our Protestant friends appear to be. It is remarkable how unable Protestants are to conceive it possible for a man to do any thing except from hope of some earthly reward. The idea, that a man can act from conviction, from a sense of duty, from an earnest desire to obey God and save his own soul from the flames of hell, strikes them as preposterous, and they seek to explain his conduct by imagining some paltry bribe of money or of worldly distinction. Nothing is more true than that, in judging others, we are sure to judge ourselves. In imagining low and unworthy motives for the conduct of others, when elevated and worthy ones are possible, we but betray our own low and unworthy tendencies. Whether we shall or shall not meet a "just recompense

of reward " from the American people is a matter of small moment. We have had some trials, in the course of a short and troublous life ; but we have not, and never have had, any cause to complain of the treatment we have personally received at the hands of our countrymen. They have thus far treated us personally with great generosity, far better than we have deserved, and they have borne from us what they would have borne as well from few others. We have no fear but they will continue to treat us as well as, if not even better than, we deserve. We know our countrymen well. We have no respect for the religion professed by the majority of them ; but there is good stuff in the American mind and heart, — only it has been a little spoiled in the making up. Our countrymen will use, even promote, the time-server, the trimmer, the man without principle, — for he is the man who will do their bidding ; but they despise him in their hearts. They will bluster a little at the man who contradicts them, tells them unpalatable truths, or treads on their corns ; but at the same time they honor him who speaks from honest conviction, from a sense of duty, plainly, boldly, independently, what he sincerely holds to be true and important. Very few of them, after all, are Stephen Harringtons. As much as we are obliged to scold our countrymen, we cannot help having a lurking respect for them ; and we are sure that we never enjoyed their confidence and respect so much before we became a Catholic as we have since. Would to God they would pay half the respect to the Catholic faith which they do and will to its unworthy advocate.

ART. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *History of the Life, Works, and Doctrines of John Calvin.* From the French of J. M. V. AUDIN. Baltimore : J. Murphy. Louisville : Webb & Brother. 1845. 8vo. pp. 502.

THE high reputation M. Audin acquired by his learned, brilliant, and fascinating *Life of Luther* will not suffer, but be enhanced, by this volume on the life, works, and doctrines of Calvin. Luther was an attractive subject ; a real German, vacillating between the angel and the demon, the man and the beast, but with the human generally predominating. At times we can hardly help admiring him, giving a tear to his tenderness, or a smile to his comical lies and coarse jokes ; and M. Audin, we think, in his sympathy with what was human in his character, has now and then carried his admiration a little too far, and has painted him in a light too favorable, and colors too attractive, for strict historical truth. We think he also treats Philip Melancthon quite too tenderly. We have less charity for Philip than for brother Martin. Luther, we doubt not, was really insane. It seems to us impossible to explain the contradictions in his character, —

his cunning, artfulness, falsehoods, bitter defiance of all that is sacred or moral, and his apparent frankness, bluntness, earnestness, and sincerity, — on the hypothesis of his perfect sanity. His reason and imagination were evidently disordered, — whether enough so to relieve him of moral accountability, we undertake not to decide ; but at least enough so to soften in some degree the severity of our censures. We feel, as we read his life, more disposed to compassionate the man than to denounce the heretic and schismatic. But with Melancthon we feel differently. He may have been of a gentler make than Luther, less rough and violent in his passions ; but he labored all his lifetime to uproot a faith which he could never in his heart fully deny to be the true faith, and to overthrow a Church which he always secretly felt was the Church of God. We look upon him as a man weak enough to suffer himself to be overpowered by Luther, and base enough to act against his honest convictions. We have no excuse for him. If he at times regretted what he had done, and sighed for the Church against which he had dared raise his parricidal hand, we give him no credit for his sighs and regrets ; for they did not work repentance, did not lead him to forsake the evil of his ways.

But with this *Life of Calvin* we have no similar fault to find. Calvin was a less attractive subject ; though his influence in fixing the character of the Reformation, in giving it, as it were, a constitution, and preserving it, for a time, was greater and is historically more important than Luther's. Calvin would never have attempted the Reformation ; but without him the schism effected by Luther would soon have dwindled away, and the disaffected would have made their peace with the Church. Of all the Reformers, Calvin was the only one who had a constructive and conservative genius ; and he is the real father of Protestantism in its organic form, as distinguished from mere revolt and license. He was not a theologian, was not a priest, was never in holy orders ; he was a lawyer, and a lawyer struggling to legalize revolt, and to give law to what was an insurrection against all law. In this struggle he showed very considerable ability, and a dogged resolution. But as a man, we cannot admire him, can feel no sympathy with him. When we meet Luther, with his cronies, at the "Black Eagle," roaring out, as they strike their glasses, —

"Wer nicht liebt Wein, Weiber und Gesang,
Der bleibt ein Narr sein Lebenlang," —

we feel that he at least belongs to the human family ; but when we meet John Calvin, we feel that it is no one of the race of mortals, but the fiend in human shape. Neither in authentic history nor in works of fiction have we met a more truly fiendish character, — one in which there was so little with which a true, frank-hearted man could sympathize, or in any sense approve.

It is remarkable, too, how completely Calvin impressed his own personal character on his religion and his followers. When we read, in the pages of M. Audin, the history of his proceedings at Geneva, we seem, allowance made for the difference of circumstances, to be reading a chapter from the early history of our own New England ; — not, indeed, in the pages of Mr. Bancroft, but in the annals of the times, or in Miss Sedgwick's *Hope Leslie*, or in Cooper's *Wept of the Wish-ton-Wish* ; for these two works of fiction are preferable, on some points, as authentic history, to the eloquent work of the historian, who sees all things in the warm sunlight of his own imagination, and writes his history on the principle, *the people can do no wrong*, and of praising all sects and denominations, — now the Calvinists,

now the Quakers, and now the Catholics; John Calvin, George Fox, and the Jesuits!

But we have no room to sketch the character of Calvin or of Calvinists. M. Audin has here given us an authentic work, a conscientious work, an eloquent work, a profound work, — in the preparation of which he has spared no expense of labor, research, or thought. Whoso would appreciate Calvin, Calvinists, or Calvinism, nay, the Reform itself, will find this book the one they want, and they may read it with full confidence that they are reading history, not fiction. They will find no charge against any one of the Reformers not sustained by public documents, by the Reformer's own writings, or those of his Protestant contemporaries. So far as we have been able to discover, nothing to the prejudice of one of the glories of the Reformation has been admitted on Catholic authority. The estimate given is really the estimate the Reformers had of themselves or of one another. M. Audin has done an invaluable service to the cause of truth in preparing it, and we owe a debt of gratitude to his translator for rendering it accessible to the American public.

In a critical mood, we should find some fault with the author on a few collateral points; less, however, in this work than in his previous one on Luther. He awards higher praise to the Catholics of the sixteenth century for their enthusiasm in regard to ancient literature and art, than we are willing to yield them. We can excuse this enthusiasm, but we cannot regard it as a merit. Pure Latinity, elegant Latin verses, a lively and just appreciation of the elegances of composition, of the exquisite beauties of ancient art, and of the embellishments of life generally, are all very well; but, after all, not matters of primary importance. And we confess that we have been accustomed to regard what M. Audin brings forward, as a great merit in the Catholic scholars of the sixteenth century, as one of the causes of the extension and success of the Reformation. The revival of heathen literature and art, and their cultivation by Catholics, to the neglect, in some degree, of the Christian, we think, is one of the things a Catholic has to lament; and we confess we have never been able to join in the praise of the Medicean family for the patronage they extended to them. Give us the Fathers and the Schoolmen, instead of the heathen. As a Christian, we prefer the Latin of St. Austin or of St. Thomas to that of Cicero, and the Greek of St. John Chrysostom to that of Plato or Demosthenes. We are barbarian enough to make the avowal, and are willing to bear all the ridicule it may incur from scholars. The Church was not instituted to make scholars, elegant writers, accomplished rhetoricians, but Christians eminent for their sanctity and solid piety.

M. Audin dwells more on the artistic phase of Catholicity than suits our taste. We know Protestantism has no art, no music, no painting, no sculpture, no architecture, and we denounce as severely as any one the Vandal spirit of the Reformers, who defaced, wherever they could, almost every monument of Catholic art, as well as of Catholic piety, zeal, and charity; but this, after all, is a small matter. The Church does not need artistic embellishments, and can dispense with them. It was not instituted to foster either literature or art. It indirectly encourages them, but only for the sake of God, — only as they may contribute to the worship of God or the growth of piety. When we defend the Church on the ground of the protection it has yielded to these, we concede too much to Protestant modes of thought, and defend her, in part, as we would a human institution, and thus contribute towards making up a false issue. We have but one reason for embracing the Church, but one ground on

which to rest her defence ; that is, she is God's Church, instituted by Almighty God to be his organ for teaching and governing mankind, and it is only by coming within her pale and obeying her we can do our duty to God and our fellow-men, or save our own souls. The Church is this, or she is nothing. If she is this, here is reason enough for embracing her ; and other reasons, however true they may be, do not strengthen this, but really weaken by obscuring it. Show us that Puritanism is of God, and we leave willingly the glorious old cathedral, as much as we love it, for the meetinghouse. A man cannot be a true Catholic, unless he is one simply in obedience to the positive command of Almighty God. We must believe, because Almighty God reveals and commands.

In a literary point of view, M. Audin's works have very high merit. The author is a man of learning, research, eminent ability, taste, and genius. But his works are written too much in the modern French style to satisfy our individual taste. We detest the modern French historical style. It is lively, brilliant, dramatic ; but it wants solidity, dignity, truth. It affords a fine opportunity for the writer to display his parts, to employ his fancy, his imagination, his various reading ; but it affords, also, every facility for the suppression or perversion of truth, to give false views through its dramatic representations, and leave on the reader a wholly false impression. Read Michelet, Capefigue, Barante, and even Thierry, and you will not doubt the truth of what we say. We know that M. Audin makes this style only the vehicle of truth : we know, also, that the writer, who would be extensively read and immediately useful, must in some degree conform to the reigning taste and fashion of his age and country ; but this conformity should extend to as few points as possible. It is better to sacrifice immediate popularity and usefulness than to encourage a vicious mode. He who keeps to what is universal and permanent, which changes with no change of country, time, taste, or fashion, will be truest to the Church, and, in the long run, effect the most good, nay, will secure the most solid and durable fame, though this last is a small matter.

The work before us is exceedingly well translated. The translation is free, easy, tasteful, and appears to be faithful. A few Gallicisms may be detected, and now and then a word is adopted which is hardly English. But, upon the whole, the translation is highly creditable to Mr. McGill, and proves him an accomplished scholar. He would, however, have much enhanced the value of his volume, had he added, here and there, a few short notes explanatory of matters with which a large portion of his readers cannot be presumed to be familiar. We ourselves frequently felt, while reading it, the need of them.

One or two slight verbal criticisms we must offer. The translator uniformly uses *Catholicism* instead of *Catholicity*. *Catholicism* is not properly an English word, and we confess we like it as little as we should *Christianism*. It sounds too much like *Calvinism*, *Lutheranism*, &c., and places our holy religion in the category of the *isms*, where it does not belong. *Catholicity* is the proper English word. It is a word of the same class with *Christianity*, and of a class from which none of the sects can select a name. *Catholicism* seems to us a word which smacks a little of heresy, and we hope our writers, who seem to have unconsciously adopted it from the French, will studiously avoid it. The English language has so long been controlled and so modified by heretics and schismatics, that it is not without great labor and pains it can be made to discourse sound doctrine ; and we cannot afford to forego the little of *Catholicity* it has

been suffered to retain. Before we became a Catholic, we ourselves used almost always the term *Catholicism*; but since, we find it grating on our ears. Mr. McGill is not peculiar in using this term. It is quite common, if not universal, in all the late English and American Catholic works we have seen; but we do not recollect to have met with it in a single one of the older English writers of the Church.

Another verbal criticism we must also make. In a few instances in Mr. McGill's translation, in many more instances in the translation of the *Life of Luther*, we find the infinitive following the verb *ought* used without the sign *to*, which is never allowable in English. This is so common in the translation of the invaluable work of Rodriguez on the *Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection*, made at Philadelphia a few years since, as to be really annoying. In regard to this last named work, we must also complain that the translator uses the plural pronouns and pronominal adjectives in the addresses to the Deity. This is necessary in French, but is not admissible in English, nor in any other language but the French we happen to be acquainted with; and to us, who *speak* no language but our mother tongue, it is offensive, — wants reverence and solemnity. These are, indeed, small matters, and we rarely indulge in mere verbal criticisms; for we make no pretensions to any extraordinary verbal accuracy ourselves; and, moreover, we do not regard verbal inaccuracies as mortal sins. As a general thing, our Catholic writers use the English language more correctly and philosophically than Protestant writers do, — as was admitted to us the other day by an eminent and learned Protestant scholar and minister. Nevertheless, now and then an inaccuracy escapes them, which only needs to be noticed to be avoided. As Catholics, we must study to restore the language as well as the faith of the English people.

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2. — *Miscellaneous Writings of George W. Burnap*. Baltimore: J. Murphy. 1845. 12mo. pp. 343.

WE have not read this book; we have merely glanced through it. We are tolerably well acquainted with the previous publications of the author, who is a very respectable Unitarian minister in Baltimore. He is a liberal-minded gentleman, of some learning and considerable ability. But every thing he writes is spoiled by his Unitarian theology and philosophy, of which we have read and written enough in the course of our life, without occupying ourselves any further with it. Of the Unitarians, personally, we would always speak in respectful terms; for we found them, during our connection with them, a mild, amiable, and liberal portion of the community, — good friends and neighbours in the ordinary relations of private and social life. As theologians, of course, we cannot respect them. Yet give us, by all means, the Unitarians before the Calvinists; for it is not so bad to make God a man as it is to make him a demon. The book before us is got up in a very respectable manner, and very well printed — for Baltimore, and would be well printed for Boston, if the printer had used better ink and employed a better pressman. We saw this work rather favorably noticed in the last *Catholic Magazine*. Was this owing to neighbourly feeling, and to the fact that it has a Catholic publisher? If a Catholic can reconcile it to his conscience, in the way of trade, to publish and sell a book which attacks and insults his faith, we cannot

reconcile it to ours as a critic to commend it. The *Discourse on Church and State* can receive from a Catholic only unqualified condemnation, for its No-Churchism, Individualism, and Rationalism. The author babbles of religious freedom, just as if there could be religious freedom where faith rests on *human* authority, whether the authority of the state, the public, or the individual! The author has not taken his first lesson in religious liberty.

3. — *The Sinner's Conversion reduced to Principles*. By F. FRANCIS SALAZAR, S. J. Arranged according to the Method of *The Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius of Loyola. Philadelphia: Cunningham. 1845. 16mo. pp. 226.

THIS is a most excellent book, admirably adapted both for spiritual reading and meditation, and worthy to be in the hands of every one who aspires to a devout life. It would do even our Protestant friends no harm to possess it, to read and meditate it daily; for, if they would do so, after a while they would begin to suspect that Catholics do not wholly disregard practical piety. The work is very neatly printed, and does great credit to the publishers. We have detected a few typographical errors, which we hope pains will be taken to correct in a second edition, which will, we doubt not, soon be called for, if it has not been already.

The work, it will be seen, is by a Jesuit. It is by the production and publication of such works as this, that the Jesuits reply to the charges everywhere preferred against them. We were asked, the other day, by a worthy Protestant lady, — who, we pray God, may not much longer be a Protestant, — why it is that the Jesuits are everywhere the objects of such decided hostility. The answer is simple. "Whoever will live piously in Christ Jesus *shall* suffer persecution." The Society of Jesus has been, since its institution in the sixteenth century, the great instrument in the hands of Almighty God in rolling back the tide of heresy and infidelity, and extending the borders of the Church. It thus necessarily encounters the opposition of those three inveterate enemies of the Christian, — the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is everywhere instrumental in making men Christians, and therefore devoted to the Church. This is sufficient to excite against it all infidel governments, and all governments which seek to make the Church the tool of the State. But the order lives, and will live, and live to bless even its enemies.

4. — *Familiar Instructions in the Faith and Morality of the Catholic Church, adapted to the Use both of Children and Adults*. Compiled from the Works of the most approved Catholic Writers. By the REV. JOSEPH CURR. Boston: Donahoe. 1845. 16mo. pp. 152.

It is enough to say, in commendation of this little manual, that it is published with the approbation of the Bishop of the Diocese of Boston. It will be found to contain a large amount of instruction simply and clearly given, admirably adapted to the more advanced classes in our Sunday Schools.

5. — *Saul: a Mystery*. By the Author of "Christian Ballads," "Athanasion," &c. New York: Appleton & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 297.

THIS work, we are told, is by a clergyman of the Protestant Episcopal Church. How the author can reconcile it to his conscience to remain a member of that Church is more than we can understand. The work has very considerable poetic merit; the verse, in general, flows freely and at times harmoniously. We marked several passages, in reading, of rare beauty. Its great fault is its diffuseness. The author has great facility, and expands through a dozen lines what he ought to say in a word,—the common fault of nearly the whole race of our present English and American poets. Nevertheless, we have found *Saul* very pleasant reading. In doctrine and sentiment it is generally unexceptionable. The only fault we noticed, of much consequence, was that of making David fall in love with Abigail, while Nabal, her husband, was yet living. The whole love passage might have been omitted altogether. The passion of love has been sung and romanced upon quite enough, and quite too much, even when the sentiment is pure, for the morals of our people. The sentiment of love is sufficiently active without being stimulated by the poet's inspiration.

6. — *The Principle of Protestantism as related to the present State of the Church*. By PHILIP SCHAF, PH. D., Professor of Church History and Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church. Translated from the German, with an Introduction. By John W. Nevin, D. D. Chambersburg, Pa. 1845. 8vo. pp. 215.

WE may take occasion hereafter to recur to this work at some length, for it is a work of some ability. The author is a Professor at Mercersburg, Pa., and has been quite recently imported from Germany. His pamphlet has made some noise, and produced some confusion. Its general character is easily guessed, when we say the Professor adopts, in the main, the views of Neander, and will be understood by the old readers of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, when we tell them that its doctrine is substantially the same we brought out in opposition to Mr. Parker in the last number of that work, October, 1842. It is simply, that the Christian revelation was given to us in the form, not of *doctrine*, but of *life*. This life received and cultivated by us expresses itself in doctrines, which will become more and more adequate expressions of the truth, in proportion as the life is more and more truly lived. Thus faith is not necessary to Christian life, but Christian life is necessary to faith. It is not necessary to believe the truth in order to live it, but it is necessary to live it in order to believe it. The objection to the doctrine is, that it begins at the end, and ends at the beginning. The error of the author, to use a homely illustration, consists in putting the cart before the horse,—not an uncommon error with German theorists.

The Professor says some true things about the Middle Ages, which we commend to Professor Park. But we do not thank the Professor for what he says. We tell him, Hands off! You Protestants have done nothing but calumniate the Middle Ages for three hundred years. We shall not suffer you now to claim them. They are our property. We have borne the reproach, and will not be robbed of the glory. You must

content yourselves with tracing your pedigree to the Reformers, in the sixteenth century. There it stops. If you are dissatisfied with being *novi homines*, that is not our fault; and to relieve you we shall not admit your claim to a descent from our ancestors. *Novi homines* you are. Such you boasted yourselves, and such you shall be. The glorious ancestry you covet belongs to those who will acknowledge no relationship with you. You must be grafted, as the wild olive, into the true olive, before you can be permitted to share in its glory.

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7. — *Essays on Human Rights and their Political Guaranties*. By E. P. HURLBUT. New York: Greeley & McElrath. 1845. 12mo. pp. 219.

A BOOK in which a good share of ability is thrown away. The author makes some just strictures, but would, were his views adopted, make matters worse than they now are, which is altogether needless. The man who can quote George Combe as a philosopher, and accept phrenology as a philosophy of human nature, should be sent back to the nursery. Really, we had supposed the phrenological humbug was extinct, and we advise Mr. Hurlbut to go and try to ascertain the *duties* of man, before he undertakes to expound to us the "*rights*" of man. Man's rights are all summed up in his right to do his duty. We are quite sick of this cant about the "*Rights of Man*," "*Rights of Woman*," and all that. It should have ceased with Tom Paine and Mary Wolstonecroft. Let us try and learn our *duties* and discharge them. We shall in that way best secure our freedom, and best promote the prosperity of our brethren.

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8. — *The Garden of Roses, and Valley of Lilies*. By THOMAS A KEMPIS. Now first *correctly* translated from the Latin. New York: Casserly & Sons.

THERE is, we believe, some question as to the authorship of this work, — a work which could not have proceeded from the same author as the *Following of Christ*, to which, with all deference to the translator, we hold it to be altogether inferior, whether for learned or for simple. Nevertheless, it is an excellent ascetic book, well adapted to promote Christian knowledge and solid piety, as is well known. It is very beautifully translated, and, we presume, from the known scholarship of the translator, very correctly done.

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9. — *Father Oswald. A genuine Catholic Story*. 2d edition. New York: Casserly & Sons. 16mo. pp. 299.

AN interesting story, written with a good deal of ability, and containing a large amount of valuable instruction and solid argument. It is defective as a story, in making Edward Sefton needlessly cruel, and the Anglican clergyman needlessly brutal and stupid. Such cruelty as Ed-

ward Sefton's, and such brutality and stupidity as Rev. Mr. Davidson's, are within the bounds of possibility, perhaps of probability; but the effect of the story would have been better, if the author had softened somewhat the former, and relieved a little the latter. It is never well to overdo matters, and we as Catholics can afford to be even generous towards our opponents. We are strong enough, we hope, to knock down their strongest men. Let us not, then, waste our prowess on mere "men of straw."

10. — *Harvard University.*

THE late President of this institution sent us a copy of his speech concerning it, which we have mislaid. We read it with attention. We owe no affection to Cambridge, and, as Catholics, we feel aggrieved by its annual Dudleian Lecture. But we confess we have no sympathy with the movement now going on against the University. The University is a private corporation, not a State institution, as some suppose, and we are not prepared to deny the doctrine of "vested rights." We cannot follow the course taken by our political friends in regard to it. Take it from the Unitarians, and you throw it into the hands of the Calvinists. As Catholics, we prefer to have it as it now is. It is bad enough now, but if it came under the control of the Calvinists, it would be a great deal worse. We hope none of our religious friends will join the movement against it. For, under the plea of making it *not* sectarian, if there is a change, it will be made sectarian in the very worst sense. The distinguished politician who has led off the attack against it is, perhaps, not to be followed in all his movements, even by his friends; and in nothing have we, as one of his friends, felt more aggrieved than in his attack on Cambridge University, his own *Alma Mater*, and to whose generosity, it is said, he is not a little indebted. It is not well, nor manly, to seek to gratify our private resentments under plea of the public good. The Unitarians make the University as little sectarian as possible. They teach the smallest amount of theology conceivable, and the professors are as little disposed to inculcate peculiar religious views, and as near in a state of equilibrium as to all theological doctrines, as can be desired. We certainly think Unitarian negation and indifference far less objectionable than Calvinistic falsehood and bigotry. We hope the University will remain under Unitarian control.

* * WE beg the indulgence of the booksellers who have sent us works which we have neglected to notice. We promise, hereafter, to try and do better. The length of the article on Professor Park has crowded out much matter prepared or intended for this number, — especially replies to the *Episcopal Observer* and *Methodist Quarterly Review*.